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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines and confirms the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized
water reactor (PWR) radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian
origin. In the equilibrium cycle, the periphery of the PWR is loaded with alternating fresh
and once burned non-uranium fuel assemblies, with the interior of the core comprised of
conventional three batch UO 2 assemblies. Plutonium throughput is such that there is no net
plutonium production: production in the interior is offset by destruction in the periphery.
Using this approach a 50 MT WGPu inventory could be eliminated in approximately 400
reactor years of operation. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72
operating US PWRs could disposition 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years. Use of a low fissile
loading plutonium-erbium inert-oxide-matrix composition in the peripheral assemblies
essentially destroys 100% of the 239 Pu and > 90% totalPu over two 18 month fuel cycles. Core
radial power peaking, reactivity vs EFPD profiles and core average reactivity coefficients
were found to be comparable to standard PWR values. Hence, minimal impact on reload
licensing is anticipated. Examination of potential candidate fuel matrices based on the
existing experience base and thermo-physical properties resulted in the recommendation of
three inert fuel matrix compositions for further study: zirconia, alumina and TRISO particle
fuels. Objective metrics for quantifying the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium
host waste and fuel forms are proposed and were applied to compare the proposed spent
WGPu non-uranium fuel to spent WGPu MOX fuels and WGPu borosilicate glass logs. The
elimination disposition option spent non-uranium fuel product was found to present
significantly greater barriers to proliferation than other plutonium disposal products.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Scope and Objectives
Plutonium of nearly any isotopic composition can be used to produce an explosive
critical mass.' Figure 1.1 plots the critical mass of uranium and plutonium in a simple
weapon design consisting of a metal sphere surrounded by a thick neutron reflecting uranium
metal shell [R-2]. Approximately 10 kilograms of plutonium with an isotopic content
typically found in once-through light water reactor spent fuel would be sufficient to build
such a simple nuclear explosive. The basic information required to assemble a nuclear
weapon has been public for many years [T-2] . Therefore, physical control of plutonium and
other weapons usable fissile materials is the primary means of limiting the proliferation of
nuclear destruction capabilities. By the year 2000, the world inventory of all plutonium (Pu)
will be 1600-1700 metric tons (MT). This inventory is projected to continue to grow by 60-
70 MT per year [N-1]. The reliability of international safeguards in deterring and detecting
diversion of plutonium for non-peaceful purposes is a function of the size and physical form
of the stockpile which must be safeguarded. For example, plutonium in the form of fuel
High concentrations of 238Pu and 242Pu in a plutonium mix make those compositions much less practical for use in nuclear
explosives. However, these exceptions are inconsequential since the vast majority of the world's plutonium is of an
isotopic composition which makes it of practical use in producing a nuclear yield.
assemblies which can be counted are easier to safeguard than plutonium in the separations
part of a reprocessing plant where it is dissolved in various radioactive solvents [M-2].
Measurement and monitoring uncertainties applied to large stockpiles make it nearly
impossible to comply with the IAEA guideline of timely detection of the diversion of a
significant quantity of fissile material, and can be sufficient to allow accumulation of enough
material to produce several weapons. 2  Consequently, many experts have called for a
reduction of world inventories of plutonium [N-1, V-l].
Figure 1.1 Critical Mass of Uranium and
Plutonium as a Function of Isotopic Mix [R-2]
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239 Pu has a 24,000 year half life and it decays to 235U with a 700,000,000 year half
life. Both 239pu and 235U are excellent material with which to build a nuclear weapon. Thus,
nuclear transmutation, primarily through fission reactions, is the only way to irrevocably
reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons material. Light water reactors (LWR) are the
primary vehicles through which large quantities of materials can be transmuted and PWRs
are the dominant LWR variant. Thus, transmutation of plutonium in PWRs is one of the
weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposal options recommended by the National Academy
2 The IAEA defines a significant quantity as 8 kgs of Plutonium [M-2].
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of Science (NAS). Mixed uranium-plutonium dioxide (MOX) fuels are already used to burn
plutonium in the PWRs of several nations. Unfortunately, neutron capture in the 238U also
present produces 239Pu, thereby reducing the maximum net plutonium destruction possible.
Non-uranium fuels do not produce any plutonium and so eliminate more plutonium than
mixed oxide fuels for the same reactor power level and capacity factor. Total plutonium
destruction in a light water reactor with a mixed oxide core destroys only approximately 30%
of the total plutonium loaded while non-uranium fuel plutonium disposition options destroy
nearly twice that amount [D-4].
This thesis examines the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water
reactor radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. Several
constraints are considered including effect on the risk of proliferation, acceptability of
resultant core physics parameters and fuel manufacturing feasibility. Elimination is defined
as substantially complete destruction via transmutation. Large scale use of non-uranium fuels
for plutonium disposal will require a significant research and development effort. The goal
of this work is to suggest a starting point for that development.
The first chapter reviews background information and defines the terms that frame the
debate over plutonium disposal. Chapter two presents a brief summary and a qualitative
comparison of the various disposition options being considered for WGPu in addition to the
proposed non-uranium peripheral PWR scheme. Next, a series of metrics are presented for
quantifying the relative proliferation resistance of the plutonium forms associated with the
disposal options. The fourth chapter discusses the general neutronic considerations of non-
uranium fuels and outlines the search for non-uranium fuel matrices with acceptable
properties. Chapter 5 reviews the computational tools and methods used to develop and
analyze fuel performance. Analysis of the results are presented and discussed in chapter six.
The final chapter summarizes the thesis, draws final conclusions and identifies future work.
1.2 Background
This section provides a picture of what kinds and how much plutonium exists in the
world stockpiles. The two basic types of plutonium, referred to as "reactor grade" and
"weapons grade", are defined. Then the custodians, sizes and rates of growth of current
world stockpiles of each type are outlined.
1.2.1 Plutonium Isotopic Grade Definitions. Plutonium is generally classified as being of
either of two grades: weapons grade or reactor grade. These grades correspond to the
traditional separation between the two primary sources of plutonium: military weapons
programs and the civilian nuclear power industry. Reactor and weapons grades of plutonium
are defined according to their isotopic content. The Department of Defense defines
plutonium grades based on 24 0Pu weight percent: weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) contains
less than 7 weight percent (w%) and reactor grade plutonium (RGPu) contains greater than 19
w% [D-7]. Berkhout et al (1993) provide a concise description of typical compositions and
key properties as listed in table 1.1 [B-l]. RGPu is defined here to include the range of
isotopic compositions found in typical commercial spent low enriched uranium (LEU) and
MOX fuels. WGPu is defined in accordance with the generally accepted US and Russian
definition of plutonium that contains > 94% 239Pu [V-1].
The isotopics of RGPu can vary considerably depending on the power history of the
host material. Plutonium is formed via neutron capture in 238U, followed by two relatively
rapid beta minus particle decays producing 239pu. The higher isotopes of plutonium are
primarily formed via subsequent 239Pu neutron capture reactions. 240&242Pu have relatively
low thermal fission cross sections and their concentrations tend to build up with fluence. In
contrast, 241Pu.is an excellent fissile material with a large thermal fission cross section. Most
of the RGPu is found in once-through LEU spent fuel and has an isotopic composition
similar to the values listed in table 1.1 [B-l]. As plutonium is recovered and recycled as
MOX, the relative content of the higher isotopes increases. The reduction in 239Pu and
increase in 240,241& 24 2 Pu concentrations as a result of a second cycle can be seen by comparing
the spent LEU and MOX fuel compositions found in table 1.1. With additional cycles the
production and destruction rates of plutonium isotopes reach a quasi-equilibrium. Typical
equilibrium spent MOX fuel plutonium compositions contain about 1-3% 238Pu, 35-40%
239Pu, 30-35% 24oPu, 15-19% 241Pu and 10-14% 242pU.
This distinction between weapons and reactor grade plutonium is an attempt to
emphasize the separation between non-peaceful and civilian uses of nuclear technology.
Unfortunately, as we will see, the distinction is one more founded in policy rather than in
physics. First we will look at the sources of plutonium.
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Tble 1.1 ... .le ion ofrades f Putu Im
Isotope Half Life Reactor Gradea Weapons Decay Neutron Delayed
Spent Fuel Graded  Heat Emission Neutron
LEUb  MOXc Fraction
atom atom atom neutrons/
years kW/tonpercent percent percent sec-k_
238Pu 87.7 1.3 2.3 0.012 560 2.6x106 0.0021
2 3 9 Pu 24,100 60.3 38.1 93.8 1.9 22
240Pu 14.4 24.3 32.7 5.8 6.8 9.1x105
241Pu 376,000 8.3 16.9 0.23 4.2 49 0.0049
242pu 430 5.0 8.3 0.022 0.1 1.7 x 106
241Am 0.8 1.7 0.13 114 1.2x103
Radiation hazard
relative to 239pu 190 290 34
Maximum storage time 7 3 No Limit
of separated Pu (yrs)e
Neutron emission rate 3.3x 5.0x 106 5.3x 104
(s10
Pu Decay Heat (kW/t-)
after 10 years of storage 14.3 24.4 2.4
a. Plutonium stored for two years after separation
b. Fuel irradiated in a PWR to 33 Mwd/kg and stored for 10 years before reprocessing
c Fuel irradiated in a PWR to 43 Mwd/kg and stored for 10 years before reprocessing
d. Weapons Material Stored for ten years
e. The period of time the material could be stored before becoming unacceptable for use in MOX fabrication facilities. Assuming
plutonium
separated after 10 years fuel storage and a maximum 241Am content of 2.5%.
1.2.2 Plutonium Sources and Stockpiles. Unlike highly enriched uranium which is almost
entirely under the stewardship of United States (US) and Former Soviet Union (FSU)
militaries, the vast majority of the world's stockpile of plutonium is under civilian control.
Spent fuel is the largest single source of plutonium containing some 1100 metric MT of
RGPu and is produced at a rate of 60-70 metric MT/year [N-1]. Separated RGPu stockpiles
are also growing.
In the 1970's, the projected growth in energy demand and the fraction of that demand
which would be supplied by nuclear power were overestimated. In addition, it was
anticipated that fast breeder reactor programs would prosper and require plutonium fuel.
Based on these estimates, shortages in available uranium reserves were anticipated.
Consequently, large capital intensive programs were begun to expand reprocessing capacity
and close the nuclear fuel cycle. In the intervening period since these programs were begun,
energy demand leveled off, nuclear power plant construction stagnated and large new
uranium reserves were discovered. In addition, fast breeder reactor programs have been
delayed and scaled back in response to public concerns, technical problems and the below
expected growth in energy demand [N-3]. The result has been a long term glut in the
uranium market driving down the price of uranium yellow cake, the raw material for LEU
LWR fuel, from typical market prices of $30-50 per pound in 1978 down to $7.25 per pound
in 1995 [B-3].3 Consequently, the additional reprocessing and remote fabrication costs
associated with MOX fuel make it economically unattractive, and less than 1/5th of the
plutonium in spent fuel has been recovered [B-l].
Through 1990, 120.5 MT of civilian RGPu had been separated. Of this, only 35.7
MT were used in fast breeder reactors and 12.3 were used for MOX in light water reactors.
As of 1992, 86 MT of separated plutonium were in storage worldwide [N-I]. Despite
realization that plutonium cycles will neither be cost effective nor required to extend fuel
reserves in the foreseeable future, plutonium reprocessing programs are likely to continue in
3 The price of one pound of yellow cake was $7.25 in March 1995 but it has recently doubled over the last year due to
worldwide increase in nuclear power and reduced Russian output [J- 1].
Europe, Russia and Japan due to the momentum of long range contracts and capital
investments [N-1]. New reprocessing plants whose construction was begun in the 1970's and
early 1980's are just now opening their production lines. This additional new capacity adds
to the existing separated RGPu production-consumption mismatch. Following current
reprocessing production plans, approximately 20 MT of separated RGPu will be added to the
stockpile annually [S-3]. Consequently, civilian separated RGPu stockpiles are projected to
increase to between 110 and 170 MT by early in the next century.
Another major source of plutonium comes from military nuclear weapons programs.
These programs ran reactors whose sole function was to produce WGPu. LEU fuel was
driven to very low burnups in LWRs to optimize the production of the desirable 239 Pu isotope
relative to the higher plutonium isotopes. The fuel was reprocessed and the plutonium
recovered for use in the construction of nuclear arsenals. Over the period from 1944 to 1994
the US produced or acquired 111.4 MTs of WGPu [D-3]. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) agreements between the US and FSU call for nuclear arms reductions down to
1,000-2,000 tactical weapons and 3,000-3,500 strategic weapons. To reach these objectives
the US must retire approximately 15,000 weapons and the FSU as many as twice that number
[B-1]. Forty-five and ninety MT of plutonium pits may be made available for disposal
through US and FSU weapon dismantling programs, respectively. There is approximately
another 70-120 MT in combined plutonium scrap material inventories. The US recently
declared 38.3 metric MT of WGPu to be excess to national security needs [D-3]. This
amounts to 50% of the total US weapons plutonium inventory. Estimates of between 100 and
200 MT of WGPu pits and residual WGPu scraps will be added to the separated plutonium
stockpile by the year 2000.
It is worth reiterating that either reactor or weapons grade can be fashioned into a
weapon which is capable of producing a nuclear fission explosion. Hence, the distinction
implied by the names of these two grades is somewhat misleading as will be discussed in the
next section.
1.3 Proliferation Concerns
The information necessary to build a nuclear weapon has been public for many years
and the necessary equipment and non-nuclear components are accessible worldwide [T-3].
Once a would-be nuclear bomb maker has possession of sufficient quantities of plutonium,
little else stands in the way of producing a device capable of producing a nuclear fission
explosion. This section discusses the value of RGPu as a raw material for nuclear explosives
and proliferation threat scenarios. First the nuclear explosive properties specific to plutonium
are reviewed. Then the distinction between a RGPu nuclear "explosive" and a WGPu
nuclear "weapon" is considered. Finally, the current weapons reduction verification methods
are discussed for their potential application to plutonium stockpile reduction through burning
as fuel in multiple LWRs.
1.3.1 Plutonium as a Nuclear Explosive Material. Unlike uranium, all plutonium isotopes
can sustain a fast chain reaction and so the critical mass for all plutonium isotopic
compositions is finite; plutonium poses a unique proliferation threat. The age of the earth is
equivalent to over 10,000 half lives of the longest lived plutonium isotope; thus, plutonium is
essentially not found in nature.4 239Pu production in LEU fuels is the primary source of
plutonium. Higher plutonium isotopes are produced from 239pU via sequential neutron
captures. 238pu is produced by 242Cm alpha decay. Thus, most plutonium is predominantly
composed of 239pU as can be seen in table 1.1. Unfortunately, 239pU is also the preferred
isotope for making a nuclear weapon. It is worth digressing to belabor the contrast between
plutonium and uranium weapons properties.
238U will not sustain a fast chain reaction. Consequently, 233 & 235 U can be diluted with
238U to produce pure uranium which is not weapons usable; pure uranium with less than 6
weight percent (w%) fissile isotopes cannot be used to produce a nuclear fission explosive
[T-2]. As a practical limit, uranium enrichment of greater than 20 w% is required to make a
weapon of reasonable mass and volume [M-3]. Thus, uranium of less than 20w% 233 &235 U
must first be enriched to be of use for a nuclear weapon.
4 The half life of 242Pu is 376,000 years and the age of the earth is estimated here as 5 billion years.
Enriching uranium has historically not been the method of choice for obtaining
weapons material. Gaseous diffusion technology was closely guarded in contrast to
plutonium reprocessing technology which was made public in 1955 [M-7]. In addition,
gaseous diffusion was capital intensive and consumed large amounts of energy which made it
difficult to conceal. However, the physical plant equipment size and power requirements of
modem gas centrifuge enrichment technology are much lower than those gaseous diffusion.
Thus, construction and operation of gas centrifuge enrichment plants are more difficult to
detect than gaseous diffusion plants. However, the difficulty in importing gas centrifuge
technology remains a formidable barrier [M-7]. The chemical separation of plutonium from
spent fuel is still easier to accomplish than uranium enrichment to weapons usable levels.
Thus, preventing the diversion of plutonium remains the primary barrier to proliferation. 5
All of the plutonium isotopes can be used to produce a bare metal critical mass. J.
Carson Mark (1990) provides an excellent discussion of the characteristics of plutonium
isotopes relevant to weapons use, some of which are listed in table 1.2 [M- 1]. 239&241pU are
both fissile and have substantial fast neutron cross sections. Their cross sections differ
somewhat but they have a similar bare metal critical mass. 241pU is less desirable than 239pU
because it beta minus decays to produce 241Am which emits a hard gamma and also leads to
the production of 238pU. 238 Pu is fissionable with a very low threshold energy. Above
0.5Mev, 238Pu has a larger cross section than 239pU So that even though it produces only 2.75
neutrons/fission, as compared to the 3.0 neutrons/fission of 2 39 Pu, it has a similar critical
mass. However, 238Pu is the least desirable isotope for weapons use because of its relatively
large spontaneous fission probability and alpha emissions, which produces significant decay
heat. As shown in table 1.1, small quantities of 238 Pu significantly increase the neutron flux
of spent MOX and LEU RGPu compared to WGPu. In addition to being a handling hazard, a
larger neutron flux reduces the probable nuclear yield.6 The 240 PU fission cross section has a
threshold of a few hundred kilovolts. The high fission threshold of 24 0Pu reduces its
5 Development of enrichment capability is time consuming and is assumed not to be the first choice of a sub-
national/terrorist proliferator. As is covered in section 1.3.3, this thesis focuses on a subnational proliferation threat.
6 For more discussion on the effect of neutron flux on nuclear yield. see section 1.3.2.
fissionability in a scattering environment such as an oxide. However, 240pu has a larger cross
section than 23 5U above 1 Mev, and in a metal system, the bare critical mass of 24 0PU is
smaller than that of 94% enriched 235U. Above 1 Mev, the fission cross section of 24 2pU is
similar to 240Pu but 24 2pu's fission threshold is significantly higher making it a less effective
weapons material. In addition it suffers the same spontaneous fission properties as 238pu
although to a lesser extent. Unfortunately, even in very high burnup materials there is
sufficient 24 1Pu to offset the problems caused by 242 pu.
Fission 1 Mev Range Approximate Bare MetalIsotope Fission Cross # Neutrons Per Critical Mass
section (b) Fission (Kg)
238 pu Threshold 2.3 2.75 15(75 ev)
239pu Fissile 2.2 3 15
240pu Threshold 1.9 3 40(0.3 Kev)
241pu Fissile 1.9 3 15
242pu Threshold 2.0 3 177(100 Kev)
2IU Fissile 1.6 2.45 52
a. Threshold energies are defined as the lowest energy above the thermal range for which the
fission cross section exceeds I barn over a significant spectrum range.
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that although RGPu is less desirable
than WGPu for making a weapon, both isotopic compositions support production of a nuclear
fission explosive. In fact, RGPu material has a significantly lower fast critical mass than pure
235U. The US successfully tested a RGPu nuclear weapon in 1977 [L-1]. The differences
between RGPu and WGPu lay in the relative degree of the associated handling hazards and
the reliability of the yield. The following discussion is a brief description of basic nuclear
weapon design and mechanics.
1.3.2 Distinction Between "Nuclear Weapon" and "Nuclear Explosive". Nuclear weapons in
the arsenals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapons states can reliably obtain
a high percentage of their design yield. Yield is defined as the explosive power and is usually
measured in equivalent MT of high explosive. A weapon design yield fissions a significant
portion of the weapons material, producing a large yield. In contrast, a fizzle yield equates to
the minimum energy that must be produced if the system goes fast critical. Complete fission
of 1 kilogram of uranium or plutonium produces a 17 kiloton yield. The weapon which
destroyed Nagasaki produced a twenty kiloton yield. The Nagasaki weapon was a very
simple implosion device consisting of a 6 kgm of WGPu spherical core surrounded by a
natural uranium metal tamper/reflector which was in turn surrounded by conventional high
explosives. This design can be used as a generic model for discussion of weapon mechanics.
A qualitative description of how a nuclear fission weapon works is followed by a quantitative
discussion of the effects of the higher neutron flux associated with RGPu.
The explosion process is initiated by the detonation of the high explosives. The force
of the explosion initiates a shock wave which compresses the tamper and the core. Core
compression increases plutonium sphere density and a critical geometry is achieved (i.e.
critical mass a I/p). The core continues to compress and begins to generate neutrons at an
increasing, exponential rate as it becomes supercritical. The tamper reflects some of the
neutrons which might otherwise leak out of the assembly back into the core. The
compression continues until the energy generated by the fission begins to vaporize all the
material, building up pressure, forcing the weapon apart and making the plutonium
subcritical. The period of compression is called the assembly phase and is followed by the
weapon rapidly exploding apart, which is the disassembly phase of the detonation. The mean
time between fissions is approximately 10-8 seconds. Roughly 40-50 generations of fissions
are required to generate sufficient energy to cause the expansion of the core [L-1]. The
energy builds up in a few hundredths of a microsecond reaching temperatures around several
hundred million degrees Kelvin and pressures of 108 bar. Expansion of the initial core radius
by approximately 1 cm will reduce the probability that a neutron produced by fission will go
on to cause another fission sufficiently to quench the chain reaction. There is time for only a
few generations of fissions once the disassembly phase begins. The majority of the yield is
generated during the disassembly phase.
The greater the compression or degree of supercriticality achieved prior to the
disassembly phase, the more material that will be fissioned and energy released during the
disassembly phase and the greater the yield of the weapon. Thus, yield is a function of the
speed of assembly and the point of the start of the chain reaction during the assembly phase.
The faster the assembly, the greater the degree of compression achieved when disassembly
begins. A greater compression produces less leakage and higher maximum supercriticality.
A longer delay to the onset of a chain reaction allows more time for assembly, increasing the
degree of supercriticality. Greater supercriticality results in more fission during the
disassembly phase.
A sustained chain reaction is one in which at least as many neutrons are produced as
are consumed in any given neutron life cycle. Criticality is defined as the state at which the
system produces as many neutrons as are lost to leakage and non-fission absorptions. Thus,
the chain reaction can begin any time from the point of initial criticality, and is initiated by a
sufficient number of neutrons causing fission. The chance that sufficient neutrons will cause
fission, initiating the chain reaction, is proportional to the state of criticality and number of
neutrons present. A higher neutron flux requires a lower state of criticality to initiate the
chain reaction. This increases the probability that the chain reaction will be initiated earlier
in the assembly phase resulting in a lower total yield. It is worthwhile to quantify these
concepts.
The exponential increase in neutrons produced and energy released in the assembly
phase can be expressed as eat. The value of the time constant a, is zero for an exactly critical
system and can reach 1-3 x 108 sec 1' for highly supercritical systems [M-l]. Alpha increases
until the start of the disassembly phase. As the density of the weapon decreases during
disassembly, the value of a drops off rapidly to zero. The higher the value of a which can be
achieved prior to the start of the disassembly phase, the greater the total release of energy.
For a system achieving a small degree of supercriticality, the fraction of the total fissile
material which will be consumed is proportional to the value of a3 at the point of initial
disassembly [S-2]. In a core with a mass of approximately 10 kgs, disassembly begins when
at reaches 40 to 45 where t is the time from the point of criticality [M-l]. The smallest
possible explosion a value or smallest possible yield, is achieved when the chain reaction
begins just as the system reaches criticality or alpha = 0. This situation corresponds to a
fizzle yield. As the neutron source is increased the probability of a fizzle yield increases.
This relationship is represented by:
1-
- [-Nv']
P=e 2(11)
where v' is the probability that any one neutron will start a chain reaction, N is the number of
source neutrons produced in the time interval t from criticality (v'=0) to when v' equals its
maximum value, and, P is the probability of not having predetonation up to that time [S-2].
The value of v' corresponds to the degree of supercriticality and the yield produced. The
greater the peak value of v', the more critical the system and the greater the probability of
predetonation. For example, a material with a neutron source of 104 neutrons/second with an
assembly which compresses 10 cm producing a final value of v'= 0.03 and a compression
velocity of 105 cm/sec has an N= 1. Its chance of predetonation prior to achieving a v'= 0.03
is (1-e0 .° 01 5) or approximately 1.5%. If the neutron source is tripled to 3 x 104 neutron/sec, or
N=2, the chance of predetonation will be approximately 4.4%. For the same system if the
desired peak value of v'= 0.3, the probability of predetonation would increase to 15% and
36.2% respectively. From table 1.1 WGPu, once-through spent RGPu and recycled spent
MOX have N values of 5.3, 33 and 500. Thus, we would expect the probability of
predetonation prior to a v'=0.03 to be 7.6%, 39.0% and 99.9% respectively. The reliability of
the yield is significantly greater for WGPu than for spent RGPu or MOX plutonium isotopics.
However, as seen in the difference in predetonation probability for v'=0.03 and v'=0.3, the
effect of increased neutron sources on the predetonation probability diminishes for lower
yields. The difference between an explosive constructed with WGPu versus RGPu becomes
one in which the design yield is the typical yield, with very severe predetonation being rare
for WGPu, to one in which the typical yield is a band from one to a few times larger than the
fizzle yield for RGPu.
However, a typical yield for a very unsophisticated RGPu explosive is likely to be on
the order of 1 kiloton [M-1, T-2, L-l]. This is sufficient to level a significant portion of a
major city and cover the rest in radioactive fallout. To a significant extent, the higher
spontaneous fission probability of RGPu vs WGPu can be compensated for by using a more
sophisticated design than that used in the first plutonium weapon. The predetonation
problem caused by use of RGPu can be compensated for by a faster assembly phase and by
fissioning a higher percentage the plutonium, giving the same yield for a smaller amount of
material. For example, if both the assembly time and the amount of fissile material were
halved, then the probability of predetonation would be decreased by a factor of 4. Better
grades of conventional explosives will produce a more rapid compression, decreasing the
value of N. Improvement in high explosives technology has resulted in the reduction of the
weight of explosives required in US nuclear weapons from hundreds or thousands of pounds
(5000 pounds for the Nagasaki bomb) to a range of 15 to 45 pounds [H-7]. Using a reflector
similar in design to the one used in the Trinity device combined with the improved
explosives available today could allow Trinity level yields (17 kilotons) with RGPu [L-l].
Thus, a nuclear weapon may be produced by using WGPu with an unsophisticated
design or RGPu with a sophisticated design. A nuclear explosive is defined as device which
has a low probability of producing its design yield. Unfortunately, the distinction may be
insignificant when considering a terrorist threat scenario. The next section discusses
potential proliferation threat scenarios.
1.3.3 Proliferation Threat Scenarios. In order to assess the effectiveness of plutonium
disposal altern.atives it is necessary to understand the proliferation threats that they are
designed to counter. There are two distinct sources of plutonium weapons material which
pose a proliferation threat: WGPu and RGPu. The immediate concern for proliferation is the
disposal of WGPu. However, discussion of WGPu proliferation threats should include
consideration of the broader question of management of growing world inventories of
separated RGPu and spent fuel. In order to frame the discussion of different threat scenarios
it is necessary to define some of the pertinent terms.
International programs for nuclear weapons fissile material control consist of
safeguard and security measures. The purpose of safeguards is to detect any diversion of
plutonium in peaceful use for weapons purposes. Security measures are designed to prevent
diversion or theft of weapons materials for unauthorized uses. International safeguards are
the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while security is the
responsibility of the state in which the nuclear facilities are located.7 The threat of diversion
of weapons material is differentiated from the threat of theft in that theft implies that the
material is taken against the owner's will by a sub-national or terrorist group. Verification,
which may include but is not limited to IAEA safeguards, is the process or procedures used to
independently confirm that countries are fulfilling their treaty obligations such as the NPT
and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The NAS listed three types of
WGPu threats: diversion, theft and harmful implications of the management of WGPu
disposal [N-2].
National diversion of plutonium can be carried out either covertly or overtly. Covert
diversion would include gradual siphoning off of weapons material from disposal process
streams. The rate of plutonium removal from process streams might be kept within the
tolerances of measurement uncertainties and so go undetected. Over time, large volumes of
material will be processed allowing the diversion of significant quantities to unauthorized
purposes. Overt diversion scenarios range from outright abrogation of the specific treaty
requirements to violation of the intent. Neither the INF nor START include provisions for
the verification of the elimination of warheads. The treaties limit the maximum number of
deployed nuclear weapons and are focused on the dismantlement and destruction of weapons
delivery systems. Neither the disposition of the warheads contained in these delivery
vehicles nor the fissile material contain in the warheads are addressed. Existing multi-
7 Section 1.3.4 has a more detailed discussion on the interface of state and IAEA safeguards and security.
warhead launch vehicles are generally not loaded to their maximum warhead capacity.
Consequently, warheads can be added to existing launch vehicles and or weapons material
can be reused thereby significantly reducing the time required to reconstitute nuclear
arsenals. A dramatic change in the political environment could lead a weapons nation to add
warheads to remaining launch vehicles allowed by the treaties or onto new launch platforms
not covered by the treaties. In these ways, a nation could rapidly scale up its nuclear arsenal
to pre-treaty capabilities. This is known as the "Breakout" threat scenario.
Theft of weapons materials can be accomplished forcibly, overtly but not forcibly or
covertly [N-2]. Another nation or sub-national group might directly and forcibly steal
weapons material from a weapons nation or use an agent to effect the theft. Overt but non-
forcible theft refers to a scenario in which national authority is lost leaving the material open
for procurement by an outside group. Finally, the covert theft scenario requires the
complicity of people inside the custodial organization. The faltering economic stability of
Russia and other FSU nations are of greatest concern for this scenario. Fissile material
controls in FSU states rely almost entirely on the physical security provided by the custodians
of the material. Their material inventory systems are considered weak [N-1, V-1]. As the
economic situation in these countries deteriorates, there is a growing incentive for custodial
personnel to facilitate the theft of the highly valuable weapons material. This theft scenario
applies to proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to other nations as well as non-
national proliferation to sub-national groups.
It is important to view the impact of plutonium disposal in as broad and
comprehensive a manner as possible. Disposal has the potential to decrease or increase the
world nuclear proliferation threat. The NAS list potentially harmful influences of WGPu
management on specific non-proliferation areas [N-2]. These harmful influences can also be
applied to the larger picture of all plutonium: WGPu plus RGPu. WGPu disposal has the
potential to weaken the institutions currently managing nuclear weapons in the FSU and US.
WGPu management may provide incentives or disincentives for further arms reductions.
Thus, a forthright and cooperative effort in good faith could go a long way toward building
the trust to move forward in the reduction of the global nuclear weapons threat. Weak and
ineffective WGPu disposal may lead other nations to lose faith in the intentions of the nuclear
weapons states and seek nuclear weapons capability. Finally, the way in which WGPu is
dispositioned will have an impact on the way in which RGPu is handled in the future.
In the 1970's under former US President Carter, reprocessing was banned in the US
because of the concern that it would legitimize and expand separation and use of RGPu in
civilian fuel cycles. Such an expansion was considered a grave proliferation risk due to the
potential for diversion of plutonium recovered during reprocessing of spent fuel. However,
the rest of the world did not follow the US lead and the separation and use of RGPu has
grown as discussed in section 1.2.1. The growth of the plutonium fuel cycle has been limited
only because it is not economically justifiable in the near term. This is evidenced in the US
where the reprocessing ban has since been repealed but reprocessing has not occurred. It can
be argued that by removing itself from the development of reprocessing and plutonium fuels
technology, the US has nullified its ability to influence the proliferation resistance of the
plutonium economy. Similarly, a less than robust and comprehensive course of action in
WGPu disposal will have ramifications on the US's ability to frame the solution to the
growing world plutonium stockpiles.
The final dimension in considering the 'effectiveness of disposal alternatives to
counter threat scenarios is time. The longer it takes to reduce the stockpile of available
WGPu to the minimum level required the greater the risk of proliferation. Since WGPu in
the form of metal "pits" is more attractive for weapons use than RGPu, which is usually
stored in the form of spent fuel or PuO2 powder, its availability poses a greater overall threat.
Therefore, disposal of WGPu deserves the greatest immediate attention. The political
instability in the FSU states underscores the need to move forward with final disposal of
WGPu. However, consideration must be also given to the broader picture of growing total
world inventories of RGPu both in spent fuel and separated form.
The scenarios discussed above are derived from consideration of WGPu disposal.
The reduced reliability of yield and increased handling hazards associated with RGPu
weapons make it a less likely material of choice for building a national nuclear arsenal.
Consequently, diversion and breakout scenarios are less credible threat scenarios when
considering RGPu. However, the distinction between a nuclear weapon and a nuclear
explosive discussed in section 1.3.2 becomes unimportant when considering a sub-national
or terrorist type theft scenario threat. It follows that the theft scenario threat posed by WGPu
is not much greater than that of separated RGPu [N-l]. There is no technical solution to
thwart the will of a nation to develop or enhance its nuclear weapons capability. Knief states
that "... little short of an act of war can prevent a determined state with the necessary resources
from developing nuclear explosive capability." [K-4]. The other category of proliferators are
terrorist organizations. This thesis seeks to address the need for reducing the world inventory
of both WGPu and RGPu. Consequently, countering a non-national theft scenario is the
primary focus of this work.
Any scheme for reducing the world's plutonium stockpile should include an integral
system for verification of final plutonium disposal. This verification system must track the
fate of all plutonium handled with sufficient certainty to satisfy international scrutiny and
oversight. In the case of WGPu, this task is complicated by the concurrent requirement to
protect sensitive weapons information. The next section begins by discussing current
safeguards, security and verification practices as background for proposing how they may be
extended to encompass the destruction of plutonium in light water reactors using non-fertile
fuel.
1.3.4 Safeguards, Security and Verification Considerations. In recognition of the
proliferation threat posed by civilian plutonium, the NAS states in its 1994 Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium Report that "..., safeguards and security for civilian separated
plutonium and HEU should be increased to a level comparable to those applied to plutonium
in military stocks." [N-I]. The NAS also calls for "international management" of all
weapons usable materials, which includes civilian plutonium. There is a growing
awareness of the need to bring all plutonium, WGPu, spent fuel RGPu and separated RGPu,
under more stringent control [B-1, N-1, M-3, V-l]. Proposed plans to bring about such
changes include:
0 Halting production of all fissile materials for weapons uses
0 Nations possessing fissile materials to provide detailed and verifiable declarations of all
such materials
0 Internationalize storage of all excess fissile materials and bring all materials under
safeguards
0 Extend registration and declarations to include all civilian plutonium in storage
0 Agree on international approaches to manage and verify the reprocessing and use of
plutonium
0 Systematically and verifiably reduce the world fissile material stockpiles to specific
levels through transfers to non-weapons uses
The first steps are already being taken. Weapons reduction agreements were accompanied by
an almost complete halt in weapons plutonium production. In September of 1993, President
Clinton proposed a ban on the production of all fissile material for weapons and the
placement of all excess weapons and all civilian fissile material under international
safeguards. The US no longer produces any weapons material and the Russians have shut
down all but three of their plutonium production reactors. Russia deems the three reactors
necessary for power production and has agreed to shut them down by the year 2000. France
and the United Kingdom have also halted production of weapons material. The US has
recently issued a detailed inventory of all of its WGPu and declared 38.2 MT available for
disposition as excess material [D-2]. Discussions are underway to extend the scope of
disarmament programs beyond simple dismantlement of weapons to the less easily reversed
verification of.reduction in the inventories of WGPu. It is important to look at how such
reductions might be verified. Schemes to reduce the world inventory of plutonium must be
compatible with heightened security and safeguards requirements. Acceptance of such a
scheme may further depend on whether or not the destruction of plutonium can be
independently verified. It is valuable to first look at the existing system of safeguards.
The purpose of national safeguards is to prevent theft of fissile material from national
or private ownership. International safeguards build on national safeguards, and are also
concerned with the diversion of fissile material by the owner. In practice, this means that the
records supplied by the custodial facilities are subject to independent verification.
Most nations have systems for accounting for the location, quantities, uses and
transfer of fissile materials. However, the quality and extent of safeguards and security
standards vary from nation to nation as well as from facility to facility within a nation. NPT
non-nuclear weapons states are required to open all their nuclear facilities to IAEA
inspection. Non-NPT states (e.g., India, Pakistan & Israel) do not have international
safeguards on all their nuclear facilities, but they may have placed individual facilities under
safeguard measures as part of nuclear supply vendor agreements. NPT nuclear weapons
states are not required to open any of their facilities to IAEA inspection. However, many
have made voluntary agreements to submit some of their nuclear facilities to IAEA
inspections. The IAEA safeguard procedures are a function of the type of nuclear facility.
Table 1.3 indicates an idea of the extent of IAEA oversight and the types of nuclear facilities
with custody of plutonium [N-l].
IAEA safeguards build upon the safeguard programs of the custodial state; however,
their authority is very limited. The IAEA safeguard requirements outlined in the 1980
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are vague [N-l]. The IAEA has
produced its own guidelines which are more specific, but they are not binding. In practice,
the security of fissile materials is dependent on the custodial state. States also maintain
material accountancy programs which are independently verified during IAEA inspections.
IAEA safeguard policy dictates the frequency of IAEA inspections based on the type of
weapons material handled in the facility. The strategy is to ensure "timely" detection of
diversion. Timely detection is defined as detection within sufficient time to prevent
conversion of diverted material into a weapon. For example, the time required to convert
metallic plutonium into a weapon is estimated at 7-10 days. The conversion time for low
enriched uranium is estimated to be one year. Thus, facilities which handle metallic
plutonium are subject to very frequent inspections relative to those that handle low enriched
uranium [M-7]. The intent of IAEA verification inspections is to deter diversion by making
the risk of IAEA detection great. However, detection of diversion becomes difficult for
facilities which handle bulk materials.
Unlike individual components such as fuel assemblies which can be individually
counted, measurement processes for bulk materials such as PuO 2 powder, are only accurate
within a percentage of the amount measured. Thus, it is not possible to exactly account for
all the weapons material in bulk material facilities. The precision to which IAEA verification
of custodial material accountancy records can be achieved becomes a function of the
throughput of the facility. For example, the 880 MT/yr throughput of the planned Rokkasho
reprocessing facility at Aomori in Japan will result in plutonium accounting to within plus or
minus 256 kg/year [M-7]. Such variance in material accountancy leaves a large margin
through which to divert plutonium. Consequently, there is a strong emphasis on facility
containment and surveillance (CS) measures to augment material accountancy.
In portal perimeter monitoring, facilities containing fissile material are enclosed in a
security perimeter. Access to the facility is restricted through a minimum number of gates
and the flow of vehicle traffic in and out is limited to plutonium transportation vehicles.
Everything entering and exiting the perimeter is monitored for fissile material. The US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently requires portal monitoring systems at US nuclear
facilities be able to detect as little as 3 gms of unshielded 235U or 0.5 gms of unshielded Pu.
In addition the system must be able to detect 100 grams or more of lead which might be used
for shielding. All transfers of material are logged by oversight personnel. Material balances
are checked to ensure no unauthorized diversion takes place. Bulk material is placed in
smaller discrete packages which can easily be counted. These packages are sealed to prevent
tampering with package contents and tagged with a unique identification code for definitive
tracking.
Table 1.3 Facilities Under Safeguards or
Containing Sfeguarded Material
Facility Category Non-Nuclear Non-NPT States Nuclear Weapon Total
Weapon States States
Power Reactors 151 13 2 166
Research Reactors 134 22 2 158
Conversion Plants 6 3 0 9
Fuels Fabrication 33 9 1 43
Reprocessing 5 1 0 6
Plants
Enrichment Plants 5 1 1 7
Separate Storage 35 6 5 46
Facilities
Other Facilities 54 4 0 58
Subtotal 423 59 11 493
Other Locations 290 28 0 318
Non-Nuclear 0 3 0 3
Installations
Total 713 90 11 814
* Safeguarded facilities as of the end of 1992.
Tagging includes microscopic photography of exterior surfaces of the package or
spray painting signatures. Both tagging schemes provide a unique tracking code which is
virtually impossible to duplicate [T-3]. Seals prevent undetectable tampering with package
contents. The IAEA currently seals packages by wrapping them in bundles of optical fibers.
illumination of one end of the fibers produces a unique and complex pattern on the other end.
The pattern is recorded and referenced to the tagging code. Opening the package requires
disturbing the pattern of the optical fibers and thus irretrievably alters the illumination
pattern. Thus, unauthorized package tampering, especially during transport when it is most
vulnerable, can be detected. Alternately, containers can be sealed using spot welds.
Photographs of the welds record the unique surface patterns. Attempts to open the package
will disrupt these patterns which are referenced to the associated package tag. Package
contents can be verified passively or actively.
Remote detection and monitoring of warheads is done via fingerprinting of each type
of warhead. Fingerprinting refers to identifying the distinctive physical characteristics for
specific types of nuclear warheads to allow their detection and identification. There are three
techniques for detecting the presence of fissile materials via radiation: passive detection of
radioactive decay emissions, active gamma irradiation (x-ray imaging) of an object, or
inducing fission in the material. All isotopes of uranium and plutonium undergo decay. The
energy of the emissions are a function of the energy level of the parent nuclide. Thus,
specific isotope content can be determined. Only neutron and gamma emission are
penetrating enough to be of practical use in the detection of fissile material. Neutrons are
emitted from spontaneous fission of the even plutonium elements or from (alpha, n)
reactions from actinide alpha decay interacting with light nuclide contaminants. Gammas are
emitted with most decays and spontaneous fission. Only those above energies of 0.1 Mev
penetrate sufficiently to be of practical use in detection of fissile materials. As part of the
fingerprinting process, the gamma peaks with the greatest signal to background noise ratio
are selected. WGPu warhead detection with hand held portable detectors out to
approximately 25 meters from the source has been reported [F-2]. This detection figure can
be increased three fold using collimators and background shielding. However, shielding can
be used to defeat passive detectors.
Active gamma ray interrogation techniques can be used to overcome some shielding.
The Gamma ray energies used are penetrating enough traverse through the material but yet
not so penetrating that the absorption differential between fissile and shielding material
cannot be detected. X-raying techniques are used in portal monitoring with devices capable
of imaging entire vehicles. However, this approach can be defeated by increased shield
thickness.
The least desirable from a hazard standpoint but potentially the most effective method
for detecting fissile material is inducing fission. Thermal energy neutrons are preferentially
absorbed by the fissile material resulting in some fissions. Either the prompt gammas or the
fission neutrons generated can then be detected. However, a thermal neutron source strong
enough to be effective would be very large and impractical [F-2]. Alternatively, a high
energy neutron source can be used. This prevents using prompt fission neutron emissions for
detection. However, either delayed neutrons or gammas can serve as the detected emission.
Fission product radiation from spent fuel increases background radiation beyond the
level which will allow passive gamma detection of residual plutonium. However, if
sufficient 242 Pu is present, passive neutron emission rates may be sufficient. Alternatively,
high or low energy neutron induced fission techniques might be effective. As a last resort,
the fission products could be separated from the rest of the fuel, allowing straightforward
determination of the residual plutonium. Fingerprinting and analysis of the spent fuel should
be part of the fuels development program. Fingerprint patterns could be developed as a
function of burnup and initial plutonium composition.
Reactor burning plutonium disposal schemes will require fuel fabrication and reactor
site portal perimeter monitoring. In addition, cycles requiring reprocessing will require
monitoring of the reprocessing facility. The quantities of plutonium entering the facilities
could be tracked and the amount leaving could be verified through sampling and assay of a
portion of the product materials. For example, plutonium dioxide discretely packaged and
fuel rods could serve as entering and exiting plutonium flow media. Entering discrete
plutonium dioxide packages would be tracked as described above. The fuel rods could be
tagged via surface microphotography to uniquely identify individual rods and/or fuel
assemblies. Photographs of spot welded seals would prevent undetectable tampering with
rod contents. Thus, each rod could be tracked. Material balances between incoming
plutonium dioxide and outgoing fuel rods would provide verification that no material was
being diverted in the fuel fabrication process. Random sampling of fresh and spent fuel rods
could be used to verify the final destruction of plutonium.
Fresh fuel decay emissions could be passively monitored to verify plutonium content.
The higher neutron emission rate of RGPu over WGPu would make it even easier to verify
rod contents. RGPu composition varies. Fingerprinting would be carried out on a batch-by-
batch basis. The level of monitoring could be scaled as necessary to provide the required
assurances that no material was being diverted. Since fresh fuel allows passive detection, it
might be possible to reduce the level of monitoring down to individual rods as part of the
fabrication process. Spent fuel composition could be verified by tracking of physical
presence in reactor for a given time period. On-site international oversight would be limited
to outage periods to verify when the non-uranium WGPu fuel was loaded and discharged.
Alternately, the unique tagging and sealing of the rods might provide sufficient assurance to
eliminate the need for tracking of the rods through the fuel cycle. Fresh rods could be
shipped out from a central processing facility, irradiated, and then returned to the central
processing facility for verification of residual plutonium content. Again, virtually any level
of spent fuel plutonium destruction verification desired, from checking each individual rod to
random sampling of whole core loads, could be achieved. However, the cost and practicality
of transportation when applied to examining all spent fuel pins irradiated in a multiple reactor
scheme could prove prohibitive. Finally, since the initial plutonium composition is known,
the final composition can be calculated for a known fluence history. Fluence exposure could
be determined via the use of fluence test pieces permanently affixed to the fuel pins.
1.4 Conclusions
The world inventory of plutonium is already large and is growing rapidly at a rate of
70 MT/year. Total plutonium stockpiles will reach 1700 MT by the year 2000. The bulk of
this plutonium is protected by the radiation barrier of the spent fuel in which it resides.
However, noting that the radiation barrier provided by spent fuel is temporary, the NAS
recommends that the investigation into long term management of the plutonium in spent fuel
should begin now [N-1]. Separated RGPu is being produced at the rate of 20 MT/year. This
rate far exceeds consumption and will result in a stockpile of approximately 170 MTs by the
year 2000. In addition, the INF and START treaties will liberate approximately 100 MTs of
WGPu for disposal.
Plutonium is uniquely suited to supporting fast chain reactions. It cannot be
denatured to prevent its use as weapons material. Only chemical rather than enrichment
barriers can be imposed by plutonium processing. Thus, the primary barrier to the
proliferation of plutonium nuclear devices is physical control. Measurement and monitoring
uncertainties are such that if the amount of bulk plutonium safeguarded grows too large,
diversion can be accomplished without detection. Thus, as the world inventory increases, so
does the risk that physical control over significant quantities of plutonium will be lost.
A credible nuclear device capable of a yield in the range of one kiloton can be
produced using RGPu. A one kiloton yield would have a lethal range roughly one third that
of the Hiroshima explosion [N-2]. Thus, a very simple RGPu metal sphere (with uranium
reflector) weapon design could be used to destroy a significant portion of a large city and
cover the rest in radioactive fallout. Furthermore, the difficulties in producing such a weapon
with RGPu are not appreciably greater than those encountered with WGPu. For RGPu, the
nuclear proliferation scenario of plutonium theft by a non-national entity is more credible
and is selected as the threat of concern for this thesis.
Experts are calling for world-wide management of plutonium including reduction of
stockpiles to the minimum levels consistent with needs. The only way to irrevocably reduce
stockpiles is to destroy the plutonium through fission and transmutation. The most promising
method for effecting large scale transmutation of plutonium in a timely manner is through
light water reactors. It appears likely that current monitoring and verification procedures can
be adapted to the verification of plutonium destruction in reactors. The next chapter will
summarize and compare proposed WGPu disposal options.
CHAPTER 2 SUMMARY AND QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF
WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
OPTIONS
Although there is little concern over the control of US stockpiles, political instability
and economic hardship places the security of FSU states' WGPu at risk. By default, secure
storage will be required until long term solutions can be agreed upon and implemented by the
US and FSU states. Ideally, the storage and inventory of the WGPu would be subject to both
stringent security and bilateral safeguards.
Currently considered long term plutonium disposition options can be roughly divided
into two major categories: vitrification and reactor burning. Vitrification of WGPu involves
transforming it from its current metal pit form, into a radioactive glass waste form which is
unusable in a nuclear explosive without chemical processing.' Thus, vitrification makes the
plutonium difficult to extract and use. The second category involves fissioning the plutonium,
extracting the resultant energy, in one of a host of potential nuclear reactors. The plutonium is
thus converted from a metal pit form to radioactive spent fuel. The reactor options can be
subdivided into alternative reactor designs and fuel cycles. Of interest here are the current light
water reactors (CLWR), advanced light water reactors (ALWR), Canadian deuterium uranium
SThere are other so called clean glass vitrification options which do not involve the addition of radioactive fission products.
However, the general consensus, as led by the NAS, is that a radioactive barrier should be included in vitrification
products [N-1, N-2].
reactors (CANDU), the General Atomics Plutonium Consumption - Modular High
Temperature Gas Reactor (PC-MHR) and other reactor (OR) designs including liquid metal
reactors, molten salt reactors and accelerator based conversion (ABC) designs as vehicles for
plutonium disposition. There are several key issues to be considered in the evaluation of
WGPu disposition alternatives.
As discussed in chapter one, the most certain way to mitigate the threat of
proliferation via the use of plutonium is to reduce the size of the world's stockpile of
plutonium and maintain it at the minimum level which supports nuclear programmatic
requirements consistent with a high degree of assurance of detecting and preventing any
unauthorized diversion using available safeguard and security methods. Reducing the world
inventory of plutonium requires transmuting the plutonium in reactors, chiefly through
fission reactions. This chapter briefly describes and compares the primary reactor disposition
options being considered for WGPu plutonium. Focusing the plutonium disposition debate
solely on WGPu produces a different set of criteria with which to evaluate disposition options
than might otherwise develop if the focus included separated and spent fuel RGPu
inventories. The greater and immediate risk posed by excess WGPu may be just cause for a
narrow WGPu focus in the near future. However, the larger threat posed by all plutonium
must be addressed in the not too distant future.
This chapter serves three purposes. The first is to develop the distinction between a
WGPu and a RGPu disposition mission. The second is to establish a baseline reference of
WGPu disposition options and examine how effective the WGPu options are for a RGPu
disposition mission. Finally, the advantages of the proposed plutonium elimination option in
accomplishing a RGPu mission are presented.
The first section of this chapter examines the distinction between considering WGPu
as a waste for disposal or a resource and the distinction between the criteria which apply to a
strictly WGPu inventory as compared to all-plutonium disposition missions. The next
section briefly describes and qualitatively compares the various disposition options. These
descriptions are not detailed. Details of the various options can be found in the Department
of Energy Plutonium Phase I and II Plutonium Disposition Study Reports, reactor option
vendor reports and the NAS Committee on International Security and Arms Control Panel on
Reactor Related Options Report [A-4, A-5, D-4, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, N-1, N-2, W-l]. Then,
a description of the proposed plutonium elimination option using non-uranium fuel in the
peripheral assemblies of PWR core is presented. The final section of this chapter compares
the throughput, plutonium destruction capability and discharge isotopics of representative
reactor designs in each option category.
2.1 Fundamental Considerations for WGPu vs. RGPu Disposition.
Plutonium is a hazardous material, in terms of being a radiotoxic health hazard, and
potentially dangerous in that it can be used to produce a very powerful explosion with a yield on
the order of kilotons of equivalent high explosives. Plutonium is also a source of commercial
energy. Complete fissioning of one hundred MT of WGPu produce approximately 108 MWd;
this is equivalent to all the energy generated by operating US LWRs over a three year period
[N-4]. 2 It is also roughly enough plutonium to fuel all currently operating US LWRs with a
one-third mixed oxide fuel in a once through cycle for three years. However, plutonium is more
radiotoxic than uranium and requires remote fuel fabrication processes. In addition, plutonium
fuel processing and use requires additional IAEA safeguards above those required for handling
of normal LEU fuel; this would be especially true for WGPu MOX fabrication [M-7].
Consequently, PWR MOX fuel costs three time more to fabricate than LEU fuel. [D-8] The
NAS estimated that burning 50 MT of US WGPu would cost 500 million dollars more than if
LEU were used to generate the same power even if the WGPu metal were supplied free of
charge [N-1]. There are also storage and security costs in maintaining the plutonium awaiting
fuel fabrication, Consequently, WGPu has a negative net economic value and reactor burning
options cannot be justified based on an economic need to take advantage of its energy value.
2 Assuming US LWR output of 9.92 x 104 MWe-d [N-4].
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For RGPu MOX, reprocessing costs add an additional 5% onto the MOX fabrication costs;
thus, RGPu is currently also a net economic liability [D-8]. However, reactor transmutation is
the only way currently available to destroy plutonium on the scale that is required.
Furthermore, only LWRs are numerous enough to be able to reduce or even stop the growth of
RGPu stockpiles. In addition to security and economic considerations, there are questions
regarding the impact on proliferation policy.
Proponents of disposal of WGPu as a glass waste assert that using Pu in reactors
legitimizes the use of civilian plutonium and could be perceived as a reversal of this country's
non-proliferation policy against the use of plutonium in nuclear fuel cycles. Reactor disposition
advocates argue that the destruction of plutonium for the express purpose of reducing its
proliferation risk could be proposed to the world as a direct effort to further nuclear
disarmament. As such, reactor disposition would be perceived as a confirmation rather than a
reversal of US policy. Furthermore, the NAS states that disposition of WGPu does not require
reprocessing of spent fuel and so does not necessarily resurrect the contentious debate over
whether or not reprocessing should be allowed in the US [N-2]. However, reprocessing is
required for an RGPu disposition mission. There are other fundamental differences between
RGPu and WGPu disposition missions which add to the list of considerations in choosing
between reactor and waste glass disposition options.
The key emphasis of any plutonium disposition scheme is to minimize the risk of
proliferation. However, the relative importance of the criteria by which risk is measured is a
function of the scope of the mission. WGPu is less than 7% of the total world plutonium
stockpile and, with the exception of three Russian reactors scheduled to be shutdown as soon as
alternate energy sources can be found, is no longer being produced. Of the 91 MT of WGPu
produced in the US, 33.5 MT is scrap and residue material leaving 68.5 MT that is either in
nuclear weapons or stored in metal pit and weapon component form at Pantex in Amarillo,
Texas [N-2]. Thus, the existing US WGPu stockpile is predominantly in a metal pit form and
of a relatively consistent isotopic composition. Furthermore, the US and Russian military are
the principal custodians of WGPu. Thus, disposition of excess WGPu is a well defined and
finite problem. WGPu can be dispositioned through a concentrated program centered around a
small number of processing facilities involving a very restricted number of participants. On the
other hand, RGPu makes up approximately 94% of the world plutonium inventory and is being
produced at a rate of 60-70 MT/yr. Spent fuel RGPu is produced by and is in the custody of
hundreds of private electric utilities all over the world. Responsibility for the security of this
RGPu falls predominantly on the individual custodians. Spent fuel material designs and
burnups are specific to the many different reactor designs used to bum the fuel. Thus, the
isotopic composition of the RGPu is variable. Most RGPu is in spent fuel form but a large
stockpile of separated RGPu also exists. Unlike WGPu, RGPu must first be recovered from
spent fuel via reprocessing before it can be eliminated ,thus adding another layer of complexity
to the mission. RGPu will continue to be produced for the foreseeable future. Thus, a more
long term solution is required which will probably entail the involvement of many commercial
and government entities. These differences between WGPu and RGPu disposition missions
manifest themselves in defining the criteria for determining the relative attractiveness of the
potential solutions.
The NAS defines two clear but qualitative standards for WGPu disposition: the stored
weapons standard and the spent fuel standard, respectively [N-1]. The stored weapons standard
means that during processing the security of the plutonium should be maintained as close as
possible to that which applies to stored nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the US and FSU.
Nuclear disarmament should reduce the nuclear weapons threat relative to not disarming. Thus,
separated WGPu must be secured as if it were still incorporated in a whole nuclear weapon.
The current storage standard for separated RGPu are less stringent than those for WGPu.
However, there exists a general consensus that separated RGPu security standards should be
tightened [N-1, V-1]. The spent fuel standard requires that the final WGPu disposition product
be roughly as inaccessible as the plutonium found in typical LEU spent fuel. The radiation
barrier in spent fuel is credited with providing the bulk of the inaccessibility of plutonium. To a
lesser degree, the degraded isotopics associated with the irradiation of the WGPu to the RGPu
isotopic compositions found in spent fuel is also assumed to detract from the attractiveness of
plutonium for nuclear weapons use. The spent fuel standard rests on the logic that since WGPu
makes up less than 6% of the total global stockpile of plutonium, reducing its attractiveness to
that of the plutonium found in spent fuel eliminates the additional risk posed by WGPu over the
far larger stockpile of RGPu. Thus, the standards for the disposition of only WGPu are limited
in scope and are not directly applicable to a RGPu mission.
Based on the logic behind the spent fuel standard, there is no additional advantage to
making the WGPu more inaccessible than RGPu in spent fuel; hence, no additional credit
should be given to an option because it produces a product which makes the WGPu more
proliferation resistant than spent fuel. This directly contrasts with how RGPu mission (i.e. a
mission to minimize the total proliferation risk due to all plutonium) options would be valued.
A RGPu option which produced a more inaccessible or unattractive final plutonium form would
be more desirable in direct proportion to how much more inaccessible it made the plutonium.
In considering the WGPu-only mission, the time it takes to reach the various stages of
inaccessibility in a disposition process emerges as an important criteria for differentiating the
attractiveness of the options. The risk of proliferation grows in an integral sense with
accessibility of a given plutonium host form and the time it stays in that form. The quicker the
disposition scheme can process WGPu metal into a final product meeting the spent fuel
standard the lower the overall risk. The DOE solicited vendor proposals for completing WGPu
disposal within a specific time from the decision to proceed [D-4]. Vendor proposals were
targeted at completing a 50 MT WGPu disposition mission within 25 years for new reactor
designs (i.e. ALWRs, MHTGRs and ORs) and within the remaining plant lifetime for
existing reactor proposals (i.e. CLWRs and CANDU). The time required to complete design,
construction, qualification and licensing of all reactor and MOX fabrication facilities deducts
from the time available to complete plutonium burning fuel cycles. Thus, for the WGPu
mission reactor, throughput is particularly important. A lower throughput forces the use of
more reactors to complete the mission within the specified time frame. Increasing the
number of reactors required to complete the mission drives up the cost and transportation
risks associated with the option. The urgency specific to the WGPu mission and resultant short
duration time scale has a strong impact on the relative worth of potential disposition schemes.
The spent fuel standard can be achieved without resorting to new technology. Consequently,
the time delay associated with the development of new technology is unwarranted and
diminishes the relative merit of any option involving new technology. In contrast, RGPu
disposition schemes will need to continue until RGPu is no longer produced. In order to be able
to maintain the desired stockpile size, it would be necessary to be able to destroy plutonium at a
rate equivalent its production rate. Thus, the RGPu mission would be one of establishing an
equilibrium; as such, the sensitivity of the relative risk reduction associated with the time it
would take to implement a given option is diminished. As the importance of time is reduced
the relative proliferation risk associated with the final plutonium form becomes more important
for the RGPu mission. Although the growing stockpiles of separated RGPu may be of an
immediate concern, the much larger quantity of RGPu in spent fuel has a radiation barrier that
will make it somewhat inaccessible for the immediate future. Consequently, for the RGPu
mission it may well be worth a reasonable implementation time delay to develop a new
disposition technology which produces a final product that is significantly more proliferation
resistant than the spent fuel standard. The time scales over which WGPu and RGPu disposition
will take place are fundamentally different. The following sections summarize and compare
reactor disposition options using these considerations as a framework.
2.2 Reactor Burning of Plutonium
This section reviews the options for using CLWR, ALWR, CANDU, PC-MHR and
OR designs for plutonium disposition. Only highlights regarding the maturity of the
technology, experience base and potential obstacles are discussed. More detailed
descriptions can be found in the Department of Energy Plutonium Phase I and II Plutonium
Disposition Study Reports, reactor option vendor reports and the NAS Committee on
International Security and Arms Control Panel on Reactor Related Options Report [A-4, A-5,
D-4, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, N-1, N-2, W-l]. The DOE-solicited vendor reports address three
possible WGPu disposition missions: spiking, spent fuel and elimination. The purpose of the
spiking mission is to process the WGPu into a proliferation resistant form as rapidly as
possible. WGPu fuel is loaded into a reactor and irradiated only long enough to build up a
sufficient radiation barrier to deter theft. The spiked fuel is then unloaded and stored. After
all WGPu has been spiked, the spiked fuel is reloaded into the core and irradiated to meet the
spent fuel standard. This option is economically unattractive for three reasons. Since the
"spiked condition" discharge burnup is low, fresh fuel is consumed at a rapid rate. Thus a
significantly larger capacity and thus more expensive MOX fabrication facility would be
required for spiking. The frequent refueling shut downs of the plant would greatly diminish
one of the key advantages of a reactor burning option: namely, the ability to offset disposition
costs through the generation of electricity revenues. There would also be significant
additional storage facility costs for spiked fuel awaiting reload. The NAS concluded that the
incremental risk reduction gained by the more rapid development of a radiation barrier would
be more cost effectively acquired through increased physical and institutional security and
safeguards [N-2]. The spent fuel mission is simply to degrade fresh WGPu reactor fuel to the
spent fuel standard without the additional "as rapidly as possible" spiking constraint. The
NAS considers a self protecting radiation barrier to be the key deterrent to recovery of
plutonium rather than total plutonium content or plutonium isotopics. Thus, the key
distinction between the spiking and spent fuel option is the economic benefits of allowing
longer fuel cycles to produce spent fuel with larger discharge burnups. However, the DOE
has also stipulated a 240pu/TotalPu ratio of greater than 0.20 which is not met by the spiking
option. At greater than 20% 240Pu the surface flux due to spontaneous fission is considered
sufficient to deter use of the plutonium in a nuclear explosive. Finally, the spiking mission
has no value as a RGPu disposition mission, and hence will not be considered further. The
third class of disposition option, called the elimination option, involves producing spent fuel
with essentially no residual plutonium. As is presented in the following subsections
describing the categories of reactor disposition options, reactor vendor plutonium disposition
calculations have not demonstrated the ability to complete an elimination mission without
repeated reprocessing of spent fuel.
2.2.1 Current Light Water Reactors: The US PWR, BWR and Russian VVER1000 units
now operating are classified here as Current Light Water Reactors (CLWRs).3 There are 100
LWRs in the US and 400 worldwide [N-5]. LWR disposition options use WGPu mixed with
depleted uranium or natural uranium to produce mixed oxide fuel (MOX). The US pioneered
RGPu MOX research in the 1950's and 1960's but abandoned the research in the mid-1970's
as part of a non-proliferation policy of not promoting a civilian plutonium economy. The
European community continued MOX development and use.
Germany, France and Belgium use 1/3 MOX core loads extensively in their LWRs.
Japan plans to begin burning 1/3 MOX core loads in 10 of its light water reactors by the year
2000 [A-2]. Belgium provides a significant portion of the worlds MOX fabrication capacity.
Great Britain does not use MOX in its reactors but plans to expand its MOX fabrication
capacity to compliment its reprocessing services to other nations. The NAS evaluated MOX
technology to be very mature [N-2]. Thus, CLWR technology is considered a very mature
option for disposition of WGPu. The rate limiting step in burning MOX in CLWRs will be
the development and qualification of MOX fabrication capacity in the US and Russia.
The US has no operating production scale MOX fabrication facilities and is currently
examining the feasibility of converting one of five nuclear sites originally designed for other
uses to support the WGPu disposition campaign [B-2]. In an effort to reduce MOX
fabrication costs, the suitability of the existing capabilities at each site, such as secure
plutonium storage vaults, waste treatment, an active protection force, perimeter control
systems, and the existing licensing basis are used as evaluation criteria. Location is also a
large factor in selecting a MOX fabrication site. Collocation of the pit processing, MOX
fabrication facility and the reactor which will burn the WGPu MOX would minimize the risk
due to transportation theft. Furthermore, locating all of these facilities on a government site
is likely to make the licensing process, which could be the rate limiting process, significantly
3 Russia also has an older fleet of RBMK reactors. However, the safety standards of these reactors are substantially below
international standards and they are slated to be shut down as soon as replacement power can be constructed. Thus,
RBMK reactors are not likely to play a significant role in plutonium disposition.
easier. The Fuel Manufacturing and Evaluation Facility (FMEF) at Hanford is particularly
attractive because the Washington Nuclear Project reactor units #1 (WNP1), #2 (WNP2) and
#3 (WNP3) are also nearby. WNP3 is a 75% complete system 80 reactor which could be
readily modified to burn a full MOX core. WNP1 is an incomplete PWR located on the
Hanford reservation. WNP2 is an operating 1155 MWe BWR-5 which could be loaded with
a full MOX core and is located on the US Government owned Hanford site. The Fuel
Processing Facility (FPF) on the DOE Idaho Falls site already contains many of the
capabilities needed for a MOX fabrication facility. The FPF and FMEF are to be the focus of
the next phase of the DOE study to determine where best to establish a MOX fabrication
plant. However, all of the candidate facilities will require sufficient work and licensing re-
evaluation which might make building a completely new site potentially competitive.
Russian MOX fabrication capacity is also insufficient for WGPu disposition. Russia
has a small scale operational MOX fabrication facility which has been feeding its BN600
liquid metal reactor. A new larger scale MOX fabrication facility located at the military
reprocessing Mayak facility is 50% complete. Work was stopped due to a lack of available
funding to complete the project. The NAS estimates insufficient funding will be the major
obstacle to MOX disposition of WGPu in Russia [N-2]. There are additional obstacles to the
WGPu MOX disposition in CLWRs.
With the exception of 3 Combustion Engineering System 80 reactors, CLWRs are not
specifically designed to handle a full MOX core load. Initial studies found that without some
modification, CLWRs were generally limited to a core loaded with 1/3 MOX and 2/3 UO 2.
There are several differences between 239Pu and 235U which can limit CLWRs to a 1/3 MOX
core load:4 239Pu has a smaller delayed neutron fraction reducing the time margin for reactor
control, the spectrum of Pu fuel tends to be more epithermal, reducing control absorber
worths, the 239 Pu 0.3 ev resonance produces less negative temperature coefficients of
reactivity, the higher average neutron flux energy and increased gamma radiation produced
4 See Chapter 4 section , for a more detailed discussioh on the differences between the use of 239Pu and 235U as the primary
source of fissile material for power production.
by MOX results in more irradiation damage and heat up of the vessel and internals and the
larger decay heat generation rate for MOX fuels increases the load on post shutdown and
emergency cooling systems [N-2]. From a WGPu disposition mission perspective, a 1/3 core
loading limitation increases the number of reactor-years it would take to disposition the
WGPu. The following expression relates MOX throughput (e.g. MT/yr) to reactor
characteristics and MOX loading parameters:
MOX = (thermal power)(capacity factor)(% of core MOX)(Pu enrichment w%) (2.1)
Throughput (average fuel exposure at discharge)
More reactor sites mean greater transportation requirements and an increased risk of theft or
diversion. In addition, a 1/3 MOX core generally results in net plutonium production in
CLWRs. The spent WGPu MOX meets the spent fuel standard but the world inventory of
plutonium expands. Thus, 1/3 MOX core loading is unsuitable from a world plutonium
inventory reduction perspective.
There are three System 80 Combustion Engineering (CE) reactors operating in Palo
Verde, Arizona which were originally designed with the additional control absorber and
supporting systems to burn full MOX cores. The additional control rod locations have since
been filled with instrumentation but a full MOX capability could be recovered with minimal
alteration to the existing systems. Depending on which reactors were selected, between two
and three CLWRs could disposition 50 MTs of WGPu in their remaining lifetime. More
recent vendor calculations indicate that sufficient margin exists in the designs of many US
CLWRs to allow full WGPu MOX operation with little reactor system modification. These
reactor vendor calculations have not been independently verified and the maximum allowable
enrichments are limited compared to ALWR designs. A higher allowable enrichment has
important impacts on total WGPu disposition program time and cost. Increased enrichment
increases throughput, thus reducing the total time to complete the WGPu disposition mission.
Secondly, a higher enrichment means that fewer total MTs of MOX must be fabricated and a
lower maximum fabrication capacity is required. This reduces the capital and operating costs
for MOX fabrication. Up to a point, the additional reactivity and reduced negative
temperature coefficient magnitude resulting form higher WGPu enrichments can be
compensated for by adding burnable absorbers with appropriate resonance peaks, such as
Erbium-167. 5 However, increasing the WGPu enrichment also increases the residual fissile
plutonium content in the spent fuel. A high fissile content in the spent fuel may make it more
difficult to dispose of due to long term repository criticality concerns. Additional fresh fuel
enrichment will also increase the decay heat load of the spent fuel, potentially decreasing
repository capacity [N-2] Augmenting the maximum allowable enrichment will incur
additional reactor modification costs suggesting that a compromise between modification
cost and time versus increased throughput is required. No US LWR is currently licensed to
burn either full or 1/3 MOX core loads. The time and effort required to obtain NRC licensing
is likely to be considerable. Vendors are working with utility owners who are interested in
the possibility of burning plutonium in their reactors [E-2].
Several utilities have indicated they would be interested in disposition of WGPu
provided they were properly compensated. Compensation from the US government may
include furnishing of free MOX fuel, reimbursement for all additional operational costs and
government-provided security and government taking title of the spent fuel. Specific
proposals have included private entity purchasing of two or three collocated reactor units
from utilities with government cost-plus reimbursement of capital and operating costs and
outright government acquisition of one or two commercial units which are either partially
complete or were economically driven to close down prior to the end of their licensed
lifetime. It is important to remain cognizant of the fact that the larger volume of the RGPu
disposition mission could not be handled in such a limited way.
Maintenance of minimum global stockpiles of RGPu would require processing of
much larger quantities of RGPu; at a minimum, 60-70 MT/year would have to be
dispositioned just to arrest further RGPu stockpile growth. This can be compared to the total
global WGPu disposition program of 100 MTs over a few decades. RGPu reduction requires
5 See Chapter four, section 4.3.4 for more details of burnable absorber uses.
a broader effort involving many more entities than is required for WGPu disposition.
Elimination of RGPu via LWR MOX burning requires repeated recycling. With each recycle
the actinide content will grow, making fuel fabrication more and more difficult. As a
practical point of reference, current MOX reprocessing practices do not routinely exceed two
recycles [N-2]. PUREX process recycling of MOX fuel produces a pure plutonium product
stream thereby increasing the chances of diversion. WGPu MOX disposition eventually
reaches the point where the quantity of plutonium remaining can not support criticality in a
single reactor. Thus, a partial MOX load is required resulting in an exponentially decreasing
plutonium destruction capacity. Thus, MOX disposition of WGPu or RGPu is not suitable as
an elimination option.
In summary, CLWRs are attractive because they are already operating. Expanding
existing licenses to allow burning of MOX is likely to be less difficult then siting and
licensing an entirely new reactor. However, there are several obstacles to the use of CLWRs
for WGPu and/or RGPu disposition. Building the required MOX fabrication capacity is
likely to be the limiting task in disposition of WGPu in US and Russian CLWRs. The
limiting step in building the MOX fabrication capacity is licensing and approval. Collocation
of a MOX fabrication and reactor site reduces transportation risks and is desirable for the
WGPu disposition mission. However, the much larger capacity required to maintain a
constant RGPu stockpile will require several fabrication facilities and multiple reactors. One-
third MOX core loading increases the number of reactor-years required to disposition 50 MT
of WGPu by a factor of three. Such partial loading also results in net production of
plutonium contrary to an RGPu mission. It may be possible to use some existing reactors
with 100% MOX cores with minor modifications. However, the enrichments possible are
likely to be limited, thereby reducing throughput. Full RGPu loading will probably require
reactor modifications. The allowable enrichments may be increased through the use of
burnable absorbers but the resulting fissile content of the spent fuel will also increase. A
relatively large fissile content in the spent fuel may be a long term repository criticality issue
making disposal difficult and the spent fuel more attractive for plutonium recovery. Finally,
MOX burning in CLWRs is not suitable for eliminating plutonium. The repeated
reprocessing that would be required over a long time period would likely result in an overall
increase in the net proliferation risk. ALWRs also use MOX fuel but some of the other
disadvantages of CLWR plutonium disposition can be avoided through the use of ALWRs.
2.2.2 Advanced Light Water Reactors. ALWRs can classified as of either an evolutionary or
passive safety type design. Evolutionary reactors are generally the next generation vendor
designs which include experience based improvements in safety, reliability and ease of
construction over current LWRs. US evolutionary LWR capacities range from 1300-1400
MWe and their designs are very mature. Evolutionary ALWRs are being built outside the
US. The ABB-CE system 80+ and the ABWR have received Nuclear Regulatory
Commission design certification and are in the final stages of the design licensing process.
Passive safety type ALWRs designs combine natural modes of heat transfer and material
properties to prevent short term severe core damage without operator action in the event of a
design basis accident. They are typically 600 MWe or less in size resulting in a higher bus
bar cost. Passive Safety ALWRs are more revolutionary in design then are the evolutionary
ALWRs and are consequently less mature. Assuming the evolutionary reactor designs are
deemed sufficiently safe, the passive safety type ALWRs offer no advantages over the
evolutionary type for plutonium disposition and their smaller size reduces the potential
maximum throughput. Between 4 and 9 passive safety ALWRs are required to disposition 50
MT of WGPu in 25 years as compared to 2 evolutionary ALWRs. Thus, passive safety type
ALWRs will not be considered further.
Evolutionary ALWRs for plutonium disposition are designed with features such as
more control rods and control rods with greater absorptive cross sections to boost total
control rod worth, increased cooling of core internals to mitigate gamma heating, larger
chemical shim systems, a thicker core support barrel to mitigate fast neutron flux, and larger
spent fuel and emergency cooling systems to handle the larger plutonium spent fuel decay
heat loading. These features give ALWRs the advantage of sustaining full MOX core
loading with plutonium enrichment in the neighborhood of 6-7 w% and achieving plutonium
destruction ranging from 22-36%. Thus, the overall throughput of plutonium can be increased
and the total MOX fabrication requirements to complete the disposition mission are reduced.
From the perspective of a RGPu stockpile reduction and maintenance mission, higher initial
enrichment results in spent fuel with a higher fissile plutonium content. The net destruction
of plutonium is improved only slightly because the higher plutonium content displaces some
uranium. However, ALWR MOX fuel still contains significant amounts of 238U which
breeds new 2 39pu. Thus, ALWRs offer little advantage over CLWRs for an RGPu disposition
mission.
Burnable poison such as erbium, gadolinium and boron must be added to the MOX
fuel to offset the unwanted physics impact of high plutonium enrichments. This is a new
MOX fuel form which is not part of the existing experience base. Consequently, it will
require testing and qualification before it can be licensed for use. Thus, additional fuel
testing and development is required in order to take advantage of the additional throughput
capacity of ALWRs.
ALWRs have several disadvantages relative to CLWRs. There are no ALWRs in the
US or Russia. They must be sited, licensed and built. In the US there is strong public
resistance to construction of new reactors bolstered by the economic reality of a lack of
demand for additional base load generating capacity in the near future. The Russians do not
have the capital necessary to bring their CLWRs up to international safety standards much
less build new ALWRs of foreign design. The next section discusses the viability of using
CANDU reactors for plutonium disposition.
2.2.3 CANDU Reactors. There are 22 operating CANDU reactors with output varying from
515 to 881 MWe. Each BruceA station provides 769 MWe at a capacity factor of 80%.
CANDUs employ on-line refueling and a deuterium moderator to maintain criticality with
natural uranium and avoid the need for enrichment. On-line refueling allows the low excess
reactivity and short core residence times of natural uranium fuel without power interruption.
The deuterium moderator reduces parasitic neutron absorption losses relative to water,
improving the neutron economy, which increases the maximum achievable discharge burnup.
CANDU reactivity control systems are more flexible and have a greater capacity to add more
control absorbers than CLWRs or ALWRs. This enables them to operate with full MOX
cores and higher enrichments without the need for any system modification. CANDU
discharge burnups are typically only 20% of CLWR spent fuel burnups. CANDU's have a
more thermalized neutron spectrum which increases the 239Pu destruction potential. The
shorter residence time and lower operating temperatures of natural uranium CANDU fuel has
allowed for a relatively thin cladding. In a WGPu disposition mission role where higher
enrichments have a positive economic advantage, the maximum residence time of the fuel in
the core is limited by the thin cladding. Cladding water-side corrosion limits the maximum
allowable residence time which in turn limits the ability to take advantage of the higher
WGPu enrichments allowed by the more flexible CANDU reactivity control system. The
discharge burnup for the WGPu fuel is limited to approximately 9,700 MWd/MT. Proposed
CANDU MOX fuel of 1.2 w% and 2w% enrichment is located in the intermediate and
outermost rings respectively, and contains about 0.19 Kgm WGPu/bundle. A new
"CANFLEX" CANDU fuel design is capable of sustaining a discharge burnup of 17,000
MWd/MT. The corresponding WGPu MOX enrichments are 2.1 w% in the intermediate ring
and 3.6 w% in the outer ring which equates to 0.38 Kgm WGPu/bundle. The CANFLEX
design has the same external dimensions but with each bundle containing 43 fuel elements
vice the 37 elements in the standard design. Thus, the power density in each element is
reduced thus allowing each element to go to higher burnups without degradation. The
dysprosium content and diameter of the inner two rings is increased while the plutonium
content is increased and the diameter of the pins in the two outer rings is decreased compared
to the standard CANDU fuel bundle design. Using CANFLEX fuel each reactor would
dispose of 9 bundles/day producing the same 1050 Kg/yr. throughput. Thus, the real
advantage of the CANFLEX fuel is that increasing the enrichment reduces the total amount
of MOX fuel that must be fabricated to complete the WGPu disposition mission, which saves
on fuel costs. The calculated total plutonium destruction with the MOX fuel was 34%.
Using non-uranium fuel and on-line shuffling where each fuel bundle makes multiple passes
through the core in a plutonium "destruction" mode, 80% plutonium destruction is estimated
[A-3]. Using a non-fertile fuel without shuffling produce 60% net plutonium destruction. A
rigorous development, testing and qualification regime would have to be completed before
the novel non-uranium fuel design plutonium destruction mode could be implemented.
Canada has no MOX fabrication facilities nor is there any significant experience base
for CANDU MOX fuels. However, the fuel is simpler, operates under less demanding
conditions and would likely be less expensive to produce. The partially complete Hanford
FMEF plant is favored as the production site for the Bruce A station CANDU unit's MOX.
The MOX would be fabricated in the US and transported to Canada. The spent MOX would
then be returned to the US. This reactor disposition scheme has the shortest duration between
the time of decision to the time when the first WGPu MOX enters the reactor. The time it
would take to produce and qualify the MOX is the limiting factor. There are no CANDUs
licensed to burn MOX and there is a Canadian tradition against enrichment and nuclear
weapons technology. Gaining the Canadian public's acceptance for this disposition plan
could also be a significant hurdle. The political viability of shipping US WGPu out of the
security of US soil is uncertain. The lower burnup and smaller size of the CANDU spent fuel
might make it a greater proliferation theft risk.
2.2.4 Plutonium Consumption - Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (PC-MHR).
The General Atomics Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (MHR) is an advanced
reactor designed primarily for inherent passive safety. It is gas cooled with TRISO particle
ceramic fuel loaded into vertical channels cut into large graphite moderator blocks. Each
31.4" high hexagonal graphite fuel block consists of several axial channels. Into some of
these channels are placed fuel rods, with the remainder serving as the single phase helium
coolant conduits. Standard refractory TRISO-coated fuel particles with a plutonium oxide
kernel, porous graphite buffer inner coat, silicon carbide barrier middle coating and an outer
dense pyrolytic carbon protective layer, are compacted with carbon into fuel elements which
are inserted into the fuel bearing channels. The resultant spent fuel is considered suitable for
disposal.
Various configurations and compositions of plutonium loaded TRISO fuels were
tested in both the Dragon and Peach Bottom reactors to burnups up to 747,000 mega-watt-
days per metric ton of heavy metal, (MWd/MT) with a fast neutron fluence of 1.5 x 1025
n/m2, E > 0.18 Mev [G-2]. Peach Bottom fuel with up to 88% enriched PuO2 kernels
demonstrated performance on par with HEU kernels except that the performance was more
sensitive to the O:Pu ratio. General Atomics is proposing the PC-MHR which is an
adaptation of their direct cycle Gas Turbine MHR for the disposition of WGPu. The gas
turbine uses a direct cycle to boost the thermal efficiency and thus reduce the busbar costs of
electricity generation. The plutonium consumption versions use a non-fertile PuO 2 kernel
TRISO particle fuel with a O:Pu ratio of 1.6. Er20 3 compacts are loaded in separate channels
as a lumped burnable poison. The PC-MHR destroys 90% of the 2 39Pu and 63% of the total
Pu loaded with a 24 month residence time average burnup of 590,000 MWd/MT Pu. The
non-uranium fuel enables the PC-MHR to achieve a total plutonium destruction level that is
nearly a factor of three higher than can be achieved with LWR once-through MOX cycles. In
its review, the NAS pointed out several advantages and disadvantages of the PC-MHR as a
disposition option, as listed in Table 2.1.
TRISO fuel silicon carbide, (SiC), and pyrolytic carbon, (PyC), layers strongly
enhance the fresh fuel chemical barrier to WGPu recovery. The NAS Panel on Reactor
Related Options report noted that manufacturing TRISO fuel "... as soon as possible, before it
could be used in a reactor, would provide a more significant safeguard than would fuel
fabrication for most other reactors."[N-2]. The Panel further noted that because of its higher
burnup and non-plutonium producing nature, TRISO "... spent fuel would pose a less
attractive target for a potential proliferator than most other types of spent fuel." Since the
fuel and the moderator are combined in single graphite block units, the plutonium density is
lower than in standard LWR oxide fuel. A larger mass of the fresh fuel would have to be
stolen to accumulate a critical mass, improving the proliferation resistance of the fuel.
However, a lower plutonium density fuel also correlates with a larger volume of spent fuel
for final disposal.
Table 2.1 Advantages and Disadvantagesof thePCMHR
Advantages Disadvantaes
1. Tougher to recover WGPu from fresh SiC 1. Need funding for a new reactor
coated fuel than fresh MOX fuel design acceptance and licensing
2. Much higher 2 3 9Pu and tota Pu destruction than 2. Must develop, test and qualify
LWR MOX options plutonium TRISO fuel
3. Spent fuel Pu has less attractive isotopics for 3. New fabrication technology and
explosive than MOX LWR spent fuels facility required
4. Spent fuel has more physically dilute Pu 4. Must redesign core for higher
burnups
5. Spent fuel multiple coatings tougher to 5. Must overcome utility skepticism
reprocess than MOX resulting from Colorado Fort St. Vrain
and German THTR
6. Lower spent fuel radiation barrier
The critical path for the PC-MHR is qualification
concluded that the PC-MHR technology was not
and testing yet to be done [D-4].
of the PuO2 kernel TRISO fuel. The DOE
yet mature with considerable development
2.2.5 Other Reactors. There are existing and conceptual reactor designs which could be
brought to bear on the plutonium disposition problem. These include current and advanced
liquid metal reactors (LMRs), molten salt reactors (MSRs) and accelerator based conversion
schemes (ABC).
There are nine operating LMRs which are typically fueled with 20-40w% enriched
plutonium and uranium fuels. Great Britain the US and Germany have all canceled their
LMR programs but France, Japan and Russia have active LMR programs. The US EBR-II
(16.5 MWe) and the FFTF (400 MWth) facilities are too small to make a significant
contribution to the WGPu disposition mission. In addition, FFTF has been shut down and
funding for the EBR-II has been canceled. France's 1200 MWe Superphoenix reactor is by
far the largest LMR in the world. Of the current LMRs only the Superphoenix is capable of
disposition of plutonium at a significant rate. Unfortunately, Superphoenix's availability has
been low and France now intends to convert this plant into a research facility. Japan has
postponed its planned deployment of commercial LMRs and recent technical problems at
Japan's new 280 MWe Monju facility have brought the viability of that project into question.
The 280 MWe Monju facility would only be capable of a maximum disposition rate of 10-15
tons of WGPu every 20 years. The Russian 56 MWe BN600 LMR was designed to burn
HEU and conversion to using an all MOX core is not considered technically feasible. The
small size and poor reliability of current LMRs resulted in a NAS recommendation against
their use for WGPu disposition [N-2]. However, it is worthwhile to consider the possibility
of using future advanced LMRs for RGPu disposition.
LMRs use a fast flux spectrum and so are theoretically capable of fissioning close to
100% of the plutonium. In the once-through mode, the higher fissile plutonium loading
required to maintain criticality in a fast spectrum results in spent fuel with a higher weight
percent of fissile plutonium. Although it would meet the NAS spent fuel standard, the
isotopic content would be higher in 239pU than the residual plutonium in MOX spent fuel
produced from plutonium of the same initial isotopic composition. Consequently, recycling
would be required to eliminate plutonium. In the recent past, advanced LMR programs were
ongoing in the US, Russia, and Japan, with a collaborative Western European effort between
France, Germany and Great Britain. The US GE Integrated Fast Reactor (IFR) design used a
Pu-Zr-U metal alloy fuel in a 330 MWe passive decay heat removal design. The design
included an innovative non-aqueous pyroreprocessing facility on the reactor site. Molten
uranium and plutonium were recovered together with some residual fission products in a
proliferation resistant mix which would then be remotely fashioned into new metal fuel
elements. An LEU fuel reprocessing technology which did not effect the complete separation
of a pure plutonium stream would be significantly more proliferation resistant than PUREX.
Development of such reprocessing would be an invaluable technology in support of a RGPu
disposition mission. However, the IFR project was canceled in 1994. Completion of the IFR
is estimated to take 10-15 years after licensing and technical approvals were obtained. The
construction of two 50% complete Russian 750 MWe BN800 LMR was halted due to lack of
funds. The BN800 is designed to use a full MOX core. Completion of the BN800 reactors is
likely to require western funding and a minimum of 10-15 years. Germany and Great Britain
have withdrawn their support for the collaborative design of the European Fast Reactor and
the Japanese have indefinitely postponed the construction of their 670 MWe loop design
demonstration fast breeder reactor.
The capital costs for advanced LMRs are likely to be -significantly greater than those
of ALWRs or other reactor technologies. Their designs are significantly less mature and their
past reliability record is not promising. LMRs use enriched fuel which is a more natural fit
for RGPu or WGPu disposition. However, even with free enrichment, LMR fuel is still
significantly more costly than LWR fuel. LMRs have no real advantages over LWRs in a
plutonium disposition mission and their maturity is significantly lower. Thus, it would seem
unwise to rely on LMRs for WGPu or RGPu disposition.
Molten salt reactors (MSR) and accelerator based conversion (ABC) schemes are still
in the conceptual phases and are the least mature options. The advantage of MSRs are that
liquid fuel allows for continuous on-line reprocessing, facilitating near total plutonium
elimination. Similarly, ABC designs can produce near total destruction of plutonium. Both
designs are a minimum of decades away from fruition and so will not be considered further
here.
2.3 Non-Uranium Plutonium Enriched Fuel in PWR Periphery
Light water reactor burning of WGPu in MOX fuel will reduce it to no more a
proliferation threat than the far more extensive world stockpile of reactor grade plutonium.
However, RGPu can be used to produce a multi-ton nuclear yield in an unsophisticated
explosive design. Thus, converting all the WGPu into spent fuel does not address the largest
part of the plutonium proliferation threat posed by a sub-national group. The 100 MT of
WGPu to be declared surplus makes up approximately only 6% of the world's plutonium
inventory. Short of destruction, the unique characteristics of plutonium prevent achieving
absolute assurance against it being chemically processed and subsequently used to generate a
nuclear explosion. In order to truly minimize the sub-national proliferation threat, both
WGPu and RGPu must be burned beyond the NAS spent fuel standard. The immediacy of
the WGPu problem leads the NAS to reject the development of new technology for WGPu
disposition but the NAS also states that "Further steps should be contemplated, however, to
move beyond the spent fuel standard and reduce the security risk posed by all the world's
plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated; the need for such a step
already exists and will increase with time" [N-l]. Elimination of plutonium in a once-
through reactor deep burning fuel cycle would be a final solution. This section presents the
plutonium disposition scheme which is the subject of this dissertation.
2.3.1 Non-Uranium Fuel. There are two reasons for using non-uranium fuel rather than
MOX. 238U breeding of 239 Pu prohibits substantially complete plutonium destruction in a
once-through LWR MOX fuel cycle. The PUREX reprocessing technology and equipment
required to produce a pure plutonium stream from MOX fuel cycles is well defined and uses
equipment common to a wide variety of non-nuclear chemical processes [S-4]. MOX spent
fuel does not provide a credible chemical barrier to plutonium recovery. A novel fuel and
cycle designed to maximize plutonium destruction can improve the overall proliferation
resistance of plutonium cycles. It is interesting to note that all of the LWR WGPu disposition
options being considered by the DOE or the NAS employ a MOX fuel cycle. Non-uranium
fuel enhanced the destruction capability of both the CANDU and PC-MHR reactor
disposition options to 63% and 80% as compared to CLWR and ALWR destruction
capabilities of 22-36%. Use of CANDUs for the WGPu mission requires transferring WGPu
across national borders and there are a relatively few CANDUs in the world for the RGPu
disposition mission. The PC-MHR reactors do not currently exist and even if they were
exclusively chosen to meet future energy needs, it would be many years before they would
exist in numbers comparable to LWRs. An appropriately composed non-uranium LWR fuel
would provide most of the PC-MHR benefits listed in table 2.1 while avoiding all the cost
and uncertainty of a new reactor technology. Finally, none of the reactor WGPu MOX
disposition options are able to effect a true elimination option without relying on repeated
recycle. Consequently, a non-uranium fuel designed to eliminate plutonium in a once-
through cycle in existing LWRs is of interest.
2.3.2 PWR Peripheral Cycle Description. PWRs comprise over two thirds of operating US
commercial reactors. Thus, it would be convenient to be able to achieve a deep burn of
plutonium in PWRs. A PWR fuel cycle using non-plutonium producing fuel in the
peripheral assemblies of a PWR is proposed.
A true plutonium elimination option requires that the plutonium fuel be subcritical for
a period of time while the remaining plutonium is transmuted. The reactor must be able to
drive the subcritical plutonium fuel near the end of its residence time without unacceptable
power peaking or loss of core criticality. In commonly used three batch low leakage core fuel
management, the twice burned UO 2 assemblies are placed on the core periphery because they
generate less power. These assemblies are, by themselves, subcritical and produce only
about 30% of core average power during their third cycle. Producing fewer neutrons in the
core periphery reduces vessel fluence as well as improving overall neutron economy. The
non-uranium plutonium fuel is specifically designed to yield a large net plutonium
destruction while operating in PWR peripheral assembly locations. The fissile density of the
fresh plutonium fuel is similar to twice burned UO 2 fuel. This lower plutonium enrichment
reduces residual plutonium, degrades discharge plutonium isotopics and further enhances
neutron economy. Driving well burned plutonium fuel on the periphery of the core to
eliminate plutonium is an extension of low leakage management. Using the peripheral
locations also produces less of a disruption to core average physics parameters.
Peripheral assemblies constitute approximately 20-25% of the core and have a smaller
contribution to overall core properties due to their lower average power density. Thus, the
impact of 239Pu properties on core characteristics is reduced. The lower power density of the
peripheral assemblies also reduces the performance requirements of the fuel. Using only
peripheral assemblies allows greater flexibility in matching the fuel design with the fuel cycle
needs. Early fuel management schemes placed the freshest assemblies on the core periphery
to minimize power peaking. The shift to current low leakage management was
accommodated through changes in fuel design rather than with reactor modification.
Similarly the extension of this trend is accomplished in the present instance using a non-
uranium plutonium fuel and an alternate peripheral loading pattern.
The proposed fuel would have a core residence time of two 18 month cycles. The
first cycle that the non-uranium plutonium assemblies are introduced into an equilibrium
PWR core, they are loaded in every other peripheral location. During the first cycle the
interior plutonium pins see a much larger thermal flux due to the self shielding of the
plutonium fuel assembly. At the end of the first cycle the once burned non-uranium
plutonium fuel assemblies are rotated 180 0 to expose the exterior pins to the larger thermal
flux found on the inner half of the assembly. Thus, the plutonium assemblies are burned
more evenly, increasing plutonium destruction. The UO2 assemblies which remained in the
periphery during the first cycle are replaced with fresh plutonium assemblies. At the start of
the second cycle, the once burned and fresh non-uranium plutonium fuel assemblies are
loaded in an alternating pattern in all the peripheral locations of the core. This staggered
loading pattern reduces the total driving power load on the core ( i.e. the reactivity penalty of
the peripheral assemblies) and minimizes power peaking in the UO2 assemblies adjacent to
the periphery.
Chapter 4 presents a more detailed discussion of the potential composition,
development, testing and fabrication requirements of the non-uranium fuel. Chapter 6
presents the results of calculations of the physics, throughput, discharge isotopics and
plutonium destruction capability of the proposed cycle. Section 2.4 compares the
performance of the vendor-proposed reactor plutonium disposition options. These results
serve as a comparative baseline with which to evaluate the results of using this peripheral
PWR non-uranium fuel cycle for plutonium disposition.
2.4 Comparison of Options
This section compares the throughput, discharge isotopics and plutonium destruction
produced by the proposed reactor disposition options. The first subsection defines the specific
reactor designs for which the results are presented. The second subsection presents the
results and discusses their significance. All of the options require construction of fuel
fabrication and plutonium pit conversion facilities. LWRs have an edge over the non-MOX
options in that there is a large MOX experience base. A discussion of the feasibility of
fabricating non-MOX plutonium fuels is deferred to chapter 4.
2.4.1 Definition of Reactor Disposition Options. There are several. CLWR and ALWR
options proposed for plutonium disposition. For comparison purposes it is sufficient to look
at a typical current and advanced PWR and BWR design, for a total of 4 LWRs. The PC-
MHR and CANDU options are mature technologies and are also considered. Table 2.2
summarizes the representative designs selected. All of the references designs considered are
full plutonium core options.
The three Palo Verde ABB-CE system 80 reactors are used as the representative
reference CLWR-PWR design. These reactors were specifically designed for use with full
MOX cores with features such as extra control rod worth, greater decay heat removal
capabilities, more-shielded pressure vessels and better cooling of core components. The
System 80 reactors were designed with 97 control rod locations as compared with 101 rod
locations for the evolutionary ALWR System 80+. The lower control rod worth of the
System 80 reduces the allowable enrichment to 4.5 w% WGPu as compared with the 6.7 w%
used in the 80+ disposition design. The core average burnup of the spent fuel is 32,500
MWd/MTHM as compared to 42,600 MWd/MTHM for the 80+. Two of the Palo Verde
System 80 control rod locations are being used for instrumentation because they were not
required for UO 2 core operations. Very few modifications to the existing Palo Verde reactor
designs will be required: the existing rod locations will have to be reclaimed for control rod
use or the boron enrichment will need to be increased. These system 80 plants have an
average remaining lifetime of 32 years. The three Palo Verde reactors can disposition 50
MTs of WGPu in 11.1 years of operation while two can accomplish the mission in 16.7 years.
The GE BWR-5 design is the reference CLWR-BWR design. This design is
considered representative of the 27 GE BWR-4,-5 &-6 designs now operating. Full MOX
cores with fuel rod enrichments between 1 and 4.2 w% WGPu and a loading of 5.33 Kgs of
WGPu/bundle are proposed. All rods contain gadolinium as a burnable absorber. One-third
of the core is replaced every 18 months resulting in a 4.5 year residence time and a discharge
burnup of 37,600 MWd/MT. It takes 66.1 reactor-years to disposition 50 MTs of WGPu in
BWR-5s, which represents approximately 12% of the GE BWR-4,-5 &-6 remaining reactor-
years. For the reference case 3 BWRs are used to disposition the WGPu.
Table 2.2 Selected Typical Reference Reactor Designs
Reference Type Reference Design Power Rating (MWe) Fuel Type
ABB-CECLWR - PWR 1270 MOXSystem 80
GECLWR - BWR 1155 MOXBWR-5
ALWR - PWR Westinghouse 1400 MOXPDR 1400
GEALWR - BWR 1300 MOXABWR
GAMHTGR 286 PuO2 TRISOPC-MHR
AECLCANDU 769 MOXBruce A
The Westinghouse PDR1400 was submitted to DOE as a larger alternative to the
PDR600 to increase the plutonium throughput. The PD600 is an adaptation of the
commercial AP600 design for the plutonium disposition mission. The MOX fuel is 6.6 w%
WGPu using a zirconium-diboride integral fuel burnable absorber coating, high soluble boron
concentrations and glass burnable absorber rods to meet safety criteria. Two PDR1400
reactors are required to disposition 50 MTs of WGPu in 25 years.
General Electric's ABWR was originally designed for full MOX core operations. The
first of two new units being built in Japan was recently completed. NRC design certification
of the US version was completed in 1995 and final design licensing is underway. The
average fuel bundle plutonium content is 5.3 w% with gadolinium used as an integral
burnable absorber. Gd203 has been burned in BWR MOX fuel before but not at the high
weight percents proposed for this option. Two ABWRs disposition 50 MTs of WGPu in 25
years.
The General Atomic PC-MHR is a inherently passively safe design. Although the
maturity of the PC-MHR is not at the level of ALWR designs, it is based on experienced
gained from 35 years and 50 gas cooled reactors. The 590,000 MWd/MT burnup required to
effect the plutonium disposition mission appears much larger than the typical 40,000
MWd/MT burnups of the LWR options. However, qualification of the TRISO fuel
performance and manufacturing quality assurance makes the critical path for deployment of
this option significantly longer than that of any of the other vendor reactor options proposed.
Fourteen PC-MHR 14 reactors are required to disposition 50 MTs in 25 years due to its lower
power rating.
AECL's CANDU proposal is based on using the four-unit Bruce-A reactor site for
WGPu disposition. The Bruce-A plants are located in Ontario, 160 kgs from the US-
Canadian border. Each of the CANDU's 480 fuel channels contain 13 fuel bundles. In the
existing fuel design, each fuel bundle contains 37 fuel elements concentrically arranged.
MOX would be substituted for natural uranium in the outer two rings and depleted uranium
with 5 w% dysprosium as a burnable absorber would be used in the two central rings. Two
reactors consume 15.5 bundles per day so that each reactor will disposition 1.05 MT/year.
Two of the four reactor units could be used to disposition 50 MT of WGPu in slightly
more than 6 years of reactor operations. Thus, the CANDU option is the fastest WGPu
reactor disposition option by almost a factor of two.
2.4.2 Throughput, Discharge Isotopics and Destruction. Table 2.3 presents the results of the
vendor reference design calculations for disposition of 50 MT of WGPu in 25 years [A-4, A-
5, D-4, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, N-1, N-2, W-l]. The small size and greater fraction of plutonium
destroyed in the PC-MHR correlates to the low throughput relative to the other designs.
There is no diluent metal in the TRISO kernel so that the discharged heavy metal is mostly
plutonium. The BWR-5 produces the best discharge isotopics and plutonium destruction of
the CLWR options due to its higher discharge burnup. The discharge isotopics of all of the
MOX options are similar to each other and typical of RGPu.
L I .. . . . , ... .I
Metric Reference Designs
System-80 BWR-5 PDR1400 ABWR PC-MHR CANDU
Throughput (MT WGPulRx-yr)
1.5 1.06 1.56 1.2 0.28 1.05
Discharge Isotopics (k m Isotope /kgm total Pu Mass)
238u 0 0.010 0.02 0.006 0.003 0.001
239u 0.609 0.421 0.54 0.590 0.275 0.513
240Pu 0.234 0.353 0.227 0.270 0.302 0.375
241Pu 0.137 0.151 0.151 0.105 0.327 0.086
242Pu 0.027 0.066 0.062 0.028 0.093 0.024
Destruction Fraction (kgm loaded/kgm discharged)
239u 0.49 0.71 0.53 0.61 0.89 0.63
Total Pu 0.22 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.64 0.34
Average Burnup (GWd/MTHM)
32.5 39.2 40.0 39.0 590.2 9.7
% Pu in HM Reload Fuel
3.7 2.0 1.1 4.1 96.1 1.0
Discounted (4%) Life Cycle Cost (Revenue) in $M - Government Ownership
not avail. not avail. (759) (552) (1324) not avail.
Discounted (4%) Life Cycle Cost (Revenue) in $M - Utility Ownershi
not avail. 1313 1111 1113 (660) 1481
Government owned option cost data was not available for any of the existing reactors nor was
it available for the utility owned option for the system 80 reference case. The general trend is
Table23 Summary Comparison of Throughput, :Discharge
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that if the government takes ownership, it theoretically could recoup upfront capital costs
through electricity revenues. The utility owned options are based on a cost-plus fee for
service type arrangements and so the government cannot make money on the disposition.
The 48% thermal efficiency of the proposed PC-MHR direct cycle design produces
significantly lower busbar generation costs and yields better life cycle costs.
All of the reactor options provide several proliferation barriers to the reuse of the
processed plutonium for weapons use. Conversion of the metal pit into an oxide fuel
provides a chemical barrier and increases the critical mass required. Nuclear transmutation
destroys some of the plutonium, hence reduces the amount of plutonium available for
weapons use. The resulting fission products provide a strong radiation barrier forcing remote
handling and sophisticated processing of the spent fuel to recover the plutonium. Finally,
even if recovered, the residual plutonium isotopics are degraded in favor of the higher
isotopes making it less attractive for use in making a nuclear explosive. All of the reactor
options meet the spent fuel standard and the >20 w% 240pU for WGPu disposition standard.
It is appropriate to digress here to consider the non-reactor option of vitrification.
Vitrification of WGPu with or without high level fission product waste does not
reduce the world inventory of plutonium or does it isotopically degrade the plutonium. The
advantage of vitrification is that it would take less time from the point at which a decision is
made to establish a radiation barrier. In this respect, the incremental risk reduction provided
by vitrification over the time required to complete reactor disposition may be seen as
analogous to spiking. The magnitude of this incremental risk reduction must be weighed
against the failure to reduce the world inventory of plutonium or isotopically degrade the
plutonium. The other advantage of vitrification is that it can not possibly be construed as a
endorsement of the civilian plutonium fuel cycle. The value of this advantage must be
viewed in the historical light of the impact of the mid-1970's decision of the US not to
reprocess. Vitrification is not at all applicable to a RGPu disposition mission; it would not
make sense to reprocess spent fuel to produce a RGPu disposition product that was not more
proliferation resistant than the spent fuel from which the plutonium was extracted in the first
place. As such, vitrification of WGPu may be viewed as a lost opportunity to build
momentum for the ultimate goal of reducing and then controlling the world stockpile of
plutonium to a manageable level.
The spent fuel standard relies primarily on the radiation barrier as the key deterrent to
recovery of plutonium. The DOE has also stipulated a 2 4 p/TotalPu ratio of greater than 0.20.
At greater than 20% 240Pu the surface flux due to spontaneous fission is considered sufficient
to deter use of that plutonium for weapons use. Little distinction is made regarding the
weight percent of residual plutonium in the spent fuel. However, a weapon with a most
likely yield of greater than one kiloton can be produced with plutonium of greater than 20
w% 24 0Pu, and the radiation barrier of spent fuel is temporary. Higher fresh fuel enrichments
are desirable because they reduce the total cost of MOX fabrication to disposition a fixed
amount of plutonium. However, for the same burnup a higher initial enrichment produces a
spent fuel with a higher plutonium w%. Although the incremental increase in risk may be
difficult to quantify, fresh fuel with a high WGPu enrichment generally will produce spent
fuel with a greater plutonium content than standard LWR spent fuel.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
The WGPu plutonium disposition mission is fundamentally different than the RGPu
mission. The WGPu mission is smaller and more well defined and involves reducing the
relative risk of WGPu to that of RGPu. This mission can be accomplished with relatively
few facilities and participants. Since WGPu is no longer being produced, the disposition
mission is also finite in length. In contrast, the RGPu mission involves reducing and then
maintaining the world stockpile of all plutonium at a level which will permit achieving an
acceptable level of non-proliferation assurance. This mission requires the elimination of
orders of magnitude more plutonium than the WGPu mission. It is also indefinite in length
as it will be required as long as plutonium continues to be produced. Consequently, the goal
is one of establishing an equilibrium between plutonium production and destruction at the
desired total plutonium stockpile level. Non-proliferation experts are already recommending
such a RGPu mission [N-2, V-l].
Some very clear conclusions can be drawn regarding fuel technology for WGPu and
RGPu disposition missions. All of the reactor options will require significant fuel and fuel
fabrication qualification programs. The LWR MOX fuel development programs can draw on
the large European experience base. However, the large enrichments and burnable poison
loading proposed for the ALWR options are not part of the MOX experience base and will
require significant fuel test programs to demonstrate reliability. There is little CANDU MOX
experience but the less rigorous operating conditions and simpler design of CANDU fuels are
not likely to present significant technological hurdles. The non-uranium PC-MHR fuel
permits achievement of better discharge isotopics and plutonium annihilation fractions than
MOX fuel options. However, TRISO fuel is less mature than MOX options. Thus, from a
fuel technology perspective the MOX options are least risky but also do not offer the
potential to substantially eliminate plutonium. Consequently, MOX fuel is preferable for a
WGPu mission where the time to reduce the plutonium to the spent fuel standard is key. The
PC-MHR TRISO fuel form or the CANDU non-uranium fuel is preferable for a RGPu
disposition mission. A fuel and reactor technology which would permit large scale
plutonium elimination is the most preferable for a RGPu mission.
CLWR reactor technology is very mature with only minor modifications required for
full MOX core burning. CLWRs are already built and licensed, although the extension of
licensing to burn MOX may be problematic. On average, CLWRs have a lower throughput
which is a disadvantage for the WGPu mission. They offer less potential recovery of upfront
capital costs due to their shorter remaining reactor life span over which electricity revenues
can be collected. ALWRs provide a better opportunity to recoup capital costs but they also
entail greater economic risk due to larger upfront capital costs. CANDU is the most mature
reactor technology requiring no modifications to burn a full MOX core. However, it requires
transporting WGPu across international borders. The more mature reactor technologies are
preferable for a WGPu mission because there is less schedule risk and the cost differential
between options is not significant relative to the risk of proliferation. There is less distinction
from a RGPu perspective. It is the fuel composition and cycle design that determine the
capacity for plutonium destruction in a given reactor rather than the reactor technology itself.
However, many reactors will be required to handle the magnitude of RGPu that is involved in
the RGPu mission. Consequently, PWR reactors are preferable for RGPu disposition.
The MOX reactor options are the most mature and can convert WGPu to meet the
spent fuel standard. However, the capability to destroy plutonium is limited by the use of
238U bearing fuel. They can not go beyond the spent fuel standard without repeated recycling
which would extend the RGPu elimination mission. In consequence, MOX disposition is not
suitable for a RGPu option. The PC-MHR offers the ability to go beyond the spent fuel
standard but it requires an extensive fuel development program in addition to new reactor
technology; however, it does meet the standards of an elimination option.
The non-uranium fuel peripheral-loading PWR solution proposed here produces a true
plutonium elimination option in a once-through PWR cycle. Such a solution would be
applicable to WGPu or RGPu disposition missions. However, no additional advantage is
gained by going beyond the spent fuel standard unless all plutonium is to be considered for
disposition. Thus, the delay required to develop non-uranium fuel is not justified for the
WGPu mission. Although such fuel could be used for the later stages of this process, which
is projected to last at least 25 years. The solution offered here provides a technique for
establishing a plutonium elimination regime on the scale required to complete the RGPu
disposition mission using existing PWRs. Thus, it has the advantage of not requiring any
new reactors. One key disadvantage of the RGPu mission approach is that it will require
reprocessing of spent fuel. However, spent fuel is already being reprocessed at an increasing
rate around the world. Hence, the appropriate goal may be to make such reprocessing more
proliferation resistant. This chapter made some qualitative comparisons between disposition
options. The next chapter presents a scheme to quantitatively evaluate the proliferation
resistance of the final plutonium product.
CHAPTER THREE: METRICS FOR QUANTIFYING INHERENT
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF
PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PRODUCTS
The NAS report on Reactor related plutonium disposition options proposes
several qualitative criteria for evaluating the nuclear weapons proliferation risk
associated with WGPu disposition options [N-2]. Many of these metrics are also
relevant for a RGPu disposition mission. This chapter summarizes these metrics as
background from which a quantitative subset of metrics are derived. These new metrics
are focused on quantifying the inherent proliferation barriers specific to WGPu or RGPu
host forms because they are more technical and independent of the policy aspects of the
disposition options and so not subject to rapid change. Inherent barriers are those
barriers which result only from the properties of the actual physical product of the
disposition option. Thus, inherent barriers are also the most readily measured to support
objective evaluation criteria. It is assumed that the proliferator has possession of the
disposition product material which contains plutonium. Consequently, no institutional
barrier, physical security or safeguard metrics are considered here. In the interest of
being conservative, the criteria are weighted to account for the lowest common
denominator threat scenario: a capable sub-national terrorist group interested in
producing a crude nuclear explosive.
The author recognizes that such quantification of proliferation resistance is
controversial. However, it is important to be able to gauge approximately how
proliferation resistant the end product of a disposition option is relative to other
products and the spent fuel standard. Such quantification can not only help in selecting
which options are most useful for plutonium disposition but it can also illuminate where
the emphasis on future improvements to fuel cycle proliferation resistance can be made.
This chapter details an approach to accomplishing that task. It is offered as a logical
and objective starting point for discussion and modification rather than the definitive
method. Development of metrics and an algorithm for applying them requires making
assumptions and judgments. Some of these assumptions and judgments are subject to
debate. Hence. a strong effort is made to identify and address each of these as they enter
into the process.
Section 3.1 summarizes the NAS criteria which include the entire array of
barrier types. Section 3.2 and 3.3 propose quantitative metrics for evaluation of the
proliferation barriers resultant from only the physical properties of the disposition
product which hosts the processed plutonium. Section 3.4 proposes a scheme for
implementing the metrics to arrive at an overall ranking of disposition product's relative
proliferation resistance. A example application of these metrics is provided in section
3.5. Appendix A contains detailed example calculations supporting this application.
3.1 Background.
The section reviews some of the proposed criteria for evaluating the proliferation
risk associated with WGPu dispositioning. All of the disposition options require several
stages of activity, from weapons dismantlement to final placement of the disposition
plutonium product. The risk associated with each option is determined by the
cumulative risk of each of the stages comprising the option. This cumulative risk is
heavily biased by the least secure stage in the process. In turn, the risk associated with
each stage is a function of specific characteristics such as the physical form of the
plutonium, the plutonium inventory and the time to complete the stage. Thus, there are
several levels and categories of evaluation possible. Risk is generally assessed on a
comparative basis between options. However, two absolute standards for risk have been
identified in the WGPu debate: the stored weapons standard and the spent fuel standard.
The stored weapons standard applies to the material and the process up to the
point when the plutonium host form meets the spent fuel standard. It would be difficult
to maintain exactly the same level of security achievable with stored weapons for
plutonium actively being processed. Stored weapons are under lock and key with
military controlled access while plutonium being processed is accessible to and handled
by many workers. Thus, the goal of security and safeguards measures is to reduce the
risk to the maximum extent possible so as to approach the stored weapons standard.
The spent fuel standard requires plutonium in the final disposition product to be roughly
as inaccessible as plutonium in spent fuel. From that point on, the security measures
taken for spent fuel apply. With these two standards in mind the NAS proposes metrics
which cover all the stages of the disposition process.
3.1.1 NAS Metrics. The NAS states that the primary goal of WGPu management and
dispositioning should be the mitigation of risks to international and national security.
This section reviews these criteria to provide a context for introducing new metrics
proposed in the following sections. A more detailed description of the NAS evaluation
scheme is provided in their 1995 reactor related options report for the management and
disposition of excess weapons grade plutonium [N-2].
The NAS proposes specific criteria and an algorithm for applying them in a
stage-wise manner, ultimately arriving at a set of risks associated with the disposition
option. Consequently, these criteria cover all aspects of the disposition process. They
are categorized into four general areas: time and quantity dependent risks, intrinsic
barriers, implementation-dependent barriers, and overall risk in the overt and covert
theft and diversion threat scenarios defined in chapter 1. Table 3.1 presents a summary
of the NAS criteria [N-2]. A value is assigned for each individual criteria for each stage
of a disposition option. The NAS does not definite a single quantitative number to
characterize the overall risk of an option. Time and quantity criteria are used to assess
the risk associated with how long material spends in between the two absolute
standards. These are the only metrics which are quantified via measurement of real
disposition option properties. The plutonium is most vulnerable between the time it is
taken from a stored weapon to the time it meets the spent fuel standard. The larger the
integral of the inventory over time for a particular stage of processing, the greater the
risk. Plutonium density criteria are used to gauge how much of the process stage
material must be stolen or diverted to constitute a significant quantity. Intrinsic barriers
refer to those barriers provided by the physical properties of the plutonium material
found in each process stage. The 0-4 scale corresponds to a negligible (=0), small (=1),
medium (=2). large (=3), and very large (=4) barrier rather than an actual measurement
of the associated property. Thus, the value assigned is the result of a qualitative
assessment. The relation between scale values is not necessarily linear nor is it
consistent between criteria. The 0-4 scale for the radiological barrier of plutonium host
forms is linear with each unit change equal to an order of magnitude difference in the
radiation field. The isotopic barrier scale uses HEU as the reference zero value, WGPu
is assigned a barrier reference value of 1, typical RGPu is assigned a barrier reference of
2, high burnup RGPu with weight percent of 24 0 Pu greater than 40% is assigned a barrier
reference of 3 and uranium with less than 20 weight percent 233U or 235U is assigned a
barrier reference of 4. Larger contents of 240Pu and 242pU increase the critical mass and
make it more difficult to produce a non-fizzle yield. 238Pu complicates design problems
by generating heat and 241Pu produces 241Am. Chemical barriers refer to the chemical
form of the plutonium.
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Criteria Type of Units/ScaleMeasurement
Time and Quantit
Start Date Quantitative Date
End Date Quantitative Date
Integrated Inventory Quantitative Kg-yrs
Dilution Quantitative Kg material/Kgm
Pu
Intrinsic Barriers
Isotopic Qualitative 0-4 scale
Chemical Qualitative 0-4 scale
Radiological Qualitative 0-4 scale
Mass/Bulk Qualitative 0-4 scale
Implementation-Dependent Barriers
Location Qualitative 0-4 scale
Containment Qualitative 0-4 scale
Institutional Qualitative 0-4 scale
Overall Threat Scenario Vulnerability
Overt Diversion Qualitative High-Medium-Low
Covert Diversion Qualitative High-Medium-Low
Overt Theft Qualitative High-Medium-Low
Covert Theft Qualitative High-Medium-Low
Metallic plutonium is the most convenient chemical form for producing a
weapon. Other forms such as oxides, carbides and nitrides generally increase the
critical mass of the weapon. The presence of admixture impurities such as neutron
absorbers, fission products and chemical spoilers make processing of the raw material
into metallic form more difficult. Under the NAS scheme, plutonium metal is assigned
a chemical barrier value of zero, pure plutonium oxide is assigned a chemical barrier
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value of one, MOX is assigned a chemical barrier value of two and plutonium imbedded
in spent fuel or a vitrified waste form is assigned a chemical barrier value of four
because the radiation barrier makes processing much more challenging. The
radiological hazard metric gives credit for both penetrating gamma emissions requiring
additional process shielding and alpha and beta emissions which present inhalation and
ingestion hazards. Natural, depleted or LEU is assigned a radiological barrier value of
zero, HEU is assigned a radiological barrier value of one, WGPu in metal of oxide form
is assigned a radiological barrier value of two, metallic RGPu is assigned a radiological
barrier value of three and plutonium in spent fuel or mixed with high level waste is
assigned a radiological barrier value of four. The Mass/Bulk criteria assess how easily
the plutonium host material can be smuggled out of a facility. If the material can be
carried and easily concealed by a single individual, such as small amounts of metallic or
oxide HEU and WGPu, it is assigned a barrier value of zero. If the material is readily
portable by one person but more difficult to conceal it is assigned a barrier value of one.
If the material can be moved by one person but can not be concealed, such as a fuel
element weighing less than 10 kilograms the material is assigned a barrier level of two.
If a forklift is required for movement, such as for assemblies weighing more than 100
Kgs, a barrier value of three is assessed. Finally, material forms of 1,000 kilograms or
more requiring a crane to be moved are credited with a mass/bulk barrier value of four.
The next major category of barriers are those dependent on implementation.
Implementation dependent barriers assess the risk associated with the physical
location, containment and institutional barriers erected around the process stages of a
disposition option. The risk associated with the location of the disposition stage is
assigned as follows: transportation is considered the riskiest stage and assigned a score
of zero, multiple sites disposition is assigned a score of 1, process at a single site or
storage at multiple sites is assigned a score of two, and the least risky location criteria
value is assigned to storage at a single site with a score of 3. One point is added to the
location criteria value if the site is remote or otherwise hard to get to. Containment
criteria assess how difficult it is to defeat packaging to gain covert access to the
plutonium-containing material. Institutional criteria deal with the level of human and
hardware security provided. The final category of criteria assess overall risk relative to
the specific threat scenarios defined in chapter one.
Overall threat scenario criteria account for the influence of issues specific to
each disposition option which do not lend themselves to any of the other categories.
The effectiveness of the barriers in each stage is evaluated with respect to each specific
threat scenario. Sub-sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 review the properties of the NAS metrics
and define what is meant by inherent proliferation resistance.
3.1.2 Discussion of NAS metrics. Time and quantity criteria can be influenced by how
the technology of a specific option is implemented. For example, the time and quantity
criteria risk for a MOX fabrication stage could be reduced by increasing the throughput
capacity of the fabrication facility. The fabrication capacity is limited by cost
considerations rather than technology and so the associated risk is not limited by the.
technology. Similarly, implementation dependent barriers and overall threat scenario
barrier criteria risks are not unique for a given disposition option. The risks
characterized by these metrics is a function of how the disposition option is carried out.
As such, the measured risk is part of a set of values that can be derived by examining all
reasonably conceivable ways to carry out the disposition option. These types of barriers
are based on economics and policy and are beyond the scope of this investigation.
However, a set of barriers exist which are fundamentally different because they are more
particularly defined by the technology of the option. For example, while MOX spent
fuel isotopics will vary depending on burnup such variation is limited by reactor physics
and safety constraints. Unlike MOX, non-fertile fuel can be used to eliminate
essentially all the Pu. Thus, there is a much greater contrast produced by differences in
the technology of the option than how the option is carried out. The plutonium isotopics
produced by a disposition option can be called an inherent proliferation barrier.
3.1.3 Inherent Barriers. The key difference between inherent barriers and other sorts of
proliferation barriers is that inherent proliferation barriers remain even if the proliferator
has possession of the disposition product plutonium host material. For example, the
plutonium isotopics of a disposition option product can provide an inherent barrier to
proliferation. In the extreme case of an elimination option, if the small amount of
residual spent fuel plutonium that exists is primarily 238Pu and/or 242Pu then for all
practical purposes the plutonium is useless as a raw nuclear explosive material. The
inherent barrier metrics proposed here are a subset of the NAS metrics. They quantify
and develop the NAS intrinsic barriers. In order to evaluate these barriers it is necessary
to define several quantitative metrics for each barrier type.
These quantitative metrics measure the physical properties of disposition product
which provide the barriers to proliferation. They are equally applicable to WGPu and
RGPu disposition options. Multiple metrics are defined for each barrier type described
above. Ideally each metric would uniquely evaluate some aspect of its associated barrier.
A certain degree of coupling among the metrics is unavoidable. However, careful
definition can minimize the overlap.
It is convenient to group the proposed technical criteria into two barrier types:
those which measure the barriers associated with the plutonium host form matrix and
those which measure the barriers associated with trying to use the plutonium resident in
the host form matrix to make a nuclear explosive. These two barrier types are designated
disposition product host matrix and plutonium weapons usability barriers, respectively.
Section 3.2 and 3.3 propose specific metrics to evaluate the inherent proliferation
barriers of candidate plutonium disposition products.
3.2 Disposition Product Host Matrix Proliferation Barrier Metrics
The inherent proliferation resistance of processed plutonium host forms cannot be
quantified in absolute terms. Any host can be manipulated to retrieve the plutonium and
make a nuclear device. The goal then becomes one of quantifying the relative difficulty
involved in reconstituting weapons usable material from a given plutonium host form.
The proliferation barriers presented by the disposition product host matrix can be
quantified using metrics which measure the quantity, chemical, and radiation barriers
inherent in the plutonium host form. Quantity relates to how much of the host material
must be diverted before enough plutonium has been acquired to construct an explosive.
The lower the fissile plutonium content, the more material that would have to be stolen.
Chemical barriers resist chemical separation of plutonium from its host matrix. Metrics
measuring the inherent chemical barrier presented by a host form are perhaps the least
straightforward properties to measure. They quantify the relative difficulty involved in
developing a suitable purification process for retrieving the plutonium from the host
matrix via chemical separation. Radiation barrier metrics address the radiation hazard
associated with handling a host form before plutonium separation can be achieved.
3.2.1 Fissile Density . A lower concentration of plutonium in the host material means that
production of a nuclear explosive will require accumulation and processing of more
material. It is assumed that as the volume or mass of material that must be stolen
increases so does the difficulty in accomplishing the task covertly. If the metric were
simply defined as the volume or mass of material that must be stolen to accumulate
sufficient plutonium to produce a nuclear explosive, it would have a strong dependence on
the critical mass and the plutonium isotopics; material with a larger fraction of neutron
absorbers and a lower 239pu w% results in a larger critical, mass requiring a larger volume
or mass of material to be stolen. This interdependence is minimized by defining the
metric as a fissile density in kgs 239&24 1pu per cubic meter. The lower the fissile density
the greater the proliferation barrier. This metric does not include any consideration for
packaging. The material can be packaged at every stage of the process to optimize the
barrier to theft regardless of the option chosen. For example, fuel assemblies can be
encapsulated in canisters with tamper proof seals until they are loaded individually into the
reactor. Thus, the bulk and mass are more a function of the packaging used rather than the
technology of the option. Packaging can be mechanically removed and so is not
considered an inherent proliferation barrier. Once the proliferator possesses a sufficient
quantity of the disposition product, it will be necessary to chemically process the material
to retrieve the plutonium.
3.2.2 Chemical Barriers. Absolute chemical barriers do not exist. The commercial nuclear
industry regularly separates plutonium and uranium from spent fuel which contains
virtually the entire periodic table of elements. However, the key is to measure the relative
proliferation resistance. A plutonium host matrix which is more difficult to penetrate and
which contains a significant amount of chemical spoilers may take longer to process than a
straight MOX matrix. A chemical barrier is defined here as any element or material which
resists chemical separation of plutonium from its host form. Residual impurities in the
recovered plutonium can detract from its usefulness in nuclear explosives in two ways. A
strong neutron absorber can inhibit the chain reaction by consuming neutrons which
would otherwise lead to more fissions and a strong neutron scatterer can reduce the energy
of fast neutrons below the threshold required to cause the fission of the non-fissile
plutonium nuclides.
Determining how best to measure the relative chemical proliferation barrier of a
plutonium host form is an inexact process. The proliferation resistance depends on what
chemical method is used to separate the plutonium from the rest of the host matrix
elements. Unfortunately, there is an extremely long list of possible techniques which can
be employed. However, most fuel reprocessing is accomplished through aqueous
processes. The PUREX process is universally used for LWR spent fuel reprocessing [B-
3]. Non-aqueous pyroprocesses involve extreme temperatures and are designed
specifically to be able to handle short-cooled spent fuel which creates a serious solvent
degradation problem in PUREX type processes [S-4]. There is an ample stockpile of well
cooled spent fuel and it is assumed that a proliferator would choose the least radioactive
plutonium host that could be found. Thus, there would be no reason to pursue
pyroreprocessing technology. Other non-aqueous processes have extremely challenging
equipment material requirements or other disadvantages. It is assumed that these factors
will tend to lead the proliferator to some form of aqueous based purification scheme.
Thus, the analysis focus is on resistance to aqueous type purification processes with
particular emphasis on PUREX type processes.
Separation via an aqueous process will involve two steps: dissolution of the host
matrix solid lattice into its constituent ions followed by separation of solvated ions.
Consequently, two chemical barrier metrics are proposed: dissolution resistance and
separation resistance. Dissolution resistance quantifies the difficulty involved in
dissolving the host matrix and getting the plutonium into solution to facilitate further
processing. The greater the solubility of the matrix material the lower its dissolution
resistance. Solubility data can be found tabulated in units of gms per liter and are used
here as a measure of dissolution resistance. Other dissolution metrics are possible.
Experimental data could be generated to quantify the integral time and temperature
required to dissolve a given amount of plutonium host matrix products in the solvent
considered most likely to be used. However, there are far too many solvents to be all-
inclusive here. Standard PUREX processing begins with a nitric acid dissolution step.
Thus, the solubility of the matrix in nitric acid at a common temperature is used to assess
dissolution resistance. The solubility of each matrix in other solvents can similarly be
included in an evaluation to increase the range of validity of the results.
Once the proliferator destroys the host matrix and gets the plutonium into solution,
there remains the task of separating the plutonium ions from the rest of the host matrix
ions. Distribution coefficients provide a definitive measure of the separability of different
ions by specific solvents under very specific conditions. When tabulated values for
applicable conditions can be found, the distribution coefficients can be directly used as the
metric. For the PUREX process, the values of the distribution coefficients for the ions
of interest between the tri-butylphosphate and aqueous phase can be used as a measure
of the separation resistance. For the present purposes, the distribution coefficient (D)
values for specific ions are normalized to plutonium. The closer an ion's normalized D
value is to unity, the greater the resistance it offers. Summing the contributions of all
the ions found in a plutonium host form yields a dimensionless metric value of the
separation resistance.
There are a variety of aqueous separation schemes that may be employed by a
would-be proliferator. Distribution coefficients are only applicable for a specific set of
conditions and so are limited in their robustness for evaluation of resistance to separation.
The ionic radii of the metals present in the host matrix can be used as a more generally
applicable metric for assessing the resistance to plutonium separation.
There are several characteristics of ions in solution which describe their behavior,
including enthalpy of solution, acid-base behavior, stability and rate constants and redox
potential. These parameters quantify the stability of an ion in solution and describe how it
may react to changes in the solution environment. Trends in these properties are known to
correlate to a varying degree with the radius and charge of the ion of interest. For
example, lanthanide(II) and actinide(IV) cation solvent exchange rate constant trends
follow a simple electrostatic interaction framework [B-4]. As the ionic radius increases,
the rate constant decreases. Similarly, solvent-ion stability constants are found to be very
dependent on the ionic radius. In order for larger cations, such as plutonium, to be readily
extracted, the complexing ligand must be able to form several secondary chelating bonds
which in effect wrap around the ion. This requires that the active site of the ligand be
closely matched with the ionic radius of the cation. If the radius is too large or too small,
insufficient bonding will take place and the cation will not be easily removed to the target
solvent phase. The rate and solvent-ion stability constants are of particular importance for
aqueous plutonium extraction techniques. Predicting the behavior of ions solely based on
simple electrostatic trends is a major simplification. However, we are only interested in
whether this matrix constituent is likely to behave more or less like plutonium ions when
compared to another constituent. In the absence of distribution coefficient data, the extent
to which the ionic radius and charge of a candidate element are similar to that of
plutonium may be adequate to indicate how similar its solution behavior is to that of
plutonium.
The ionic radii and charge can be used to compare chemical barrier resistance as
follows. The quotient of each host metal ion radius and plutonium's ion radius is
calculated. The quotients are determined for each of the plutonium oxidation states, +3,
+4, +5, +6, exhibited by each non-plutonium metal ion. The absolute value of the
difference between exact ion radii agreement, i.e. 1.0, and the actual value is multiplied by
100 and then its metal weight percent of the total non-plutonium metal mass. The
weighted quotient differences for each non-metal are summed to produce a total weighted
value for each oxidation state. Perfect agreement with plutonium would yield a zero value
for each oxidation state. The average of the total weighted quotients is taken to produce a
single number for each host form. The larger the final average value, the lower the
chemical separation barrier between plutonium and the other metals in the host matrix.
The final barrier presented by the plutonium host matrix is potentially the most
formidable: the radiation barrier.
3.2.3 Radiation Barrier. The RGPu in spent fuel can be used to make a nuclear
explosive and the PUREX process is well defined and uses widely available equipment.
Consequently, the radiation barrier in spent fuel is the primary inherent deterrent to theft
and processing of spent fuel for plutonium recovery. A radiation field which will generate
a lethal dose in a short period of time may actually prevent a terrorist group from being
able to handle the host form. A radiation field of that magnitude forces the use of
shielding and remote handling procedures which greatly complicate the initial steps of the
separation process. A large radiation field can also significantly degrade the solvents used
in the separation processes further complicating the task of recovering the plutonium. On
the other hand, a weaker radiation field which may only increase the exposed individuals
risk of developing cancer may not be an effective deterrent against terrorist organizations.
Thus, while it is difficult to estimate what dose a terrorist might be willing to accept, there
is some threshold value above which remote handling will almost certainly be required
and below which exposures due to handling might be tolerable.. The NRC and IAEA
guidelines require less stringent security for plutonium containing materials producing a
radiation field of greater than 100 Rad/Hour at 1 meter because they are considered to be
sufficiently self-protected [K-4]. (Note that a dose of 450 rem is the LD50/30 limit for a
general human population)' The NRC & IAEA threshold of 100 rad/hr is adopted here.
However, radiation barriers are temporary in nature; the radiation field generated by spent
fuel of typical burnup decays to 100 Rad/Hr in approximately 160 years [N-l]. Thus, both
the magnitude of the radiation field and the estimated time it will remain above some
threshold are important. The radiation metric is defined as the number of years that a host
An LD50/30 radiation dose is defined as the dose which would cause the death of 50% of those exposed within 30
days of the exposure.
form will retain a radiation field above 100 rad/hr at 1 meter. No credit is given for alpha
and beta emissions and their associated inhalation and ingestion hazards because they are
considered more long term chronic hazards rather than capable of producing a lethal dose
preventing the completion of chemical processing. Concern for long term health problems
are not a strong deterrent against a terrorist or sub-national threat.
Assuming the proliferator is able to separate the plutonium from its disposition
product host matrix, the properties of the recovered plutonium may present additional
barriers to its use in a nuclear explosive.
3.3 Plutonium Weapons Usability Metrics
The plutonium weapons usability barrier metrics are based on the assumption that
the proliferator has separated pure plutonium from the disposal product matrix. The
associated metrics assess the level of difficulty in producing a nuclear explosion from the
recovered plutonium. It is assumed that plutonium which would allow the proliferator to
build a weapon with a lower critical mass and a higher reliability is more attractive. Low
critical mass and a high probability for producing a maximum yield suggest three metrics
for assessing how readily the plutonium in the host matrix can be used to create such a
nuclear explosive: critical mass, surface neutron flux and plutonium isotopics. In
addition, the decay heat produced by the plutonium presents a fourth plutonium weapons
usability barrier. Note that decay power and critical mass are definable functions of
isotopics: hence there is a certain degree of redundancy in the selection of metrics. This
can be allowed for in the weighting process used to combine metrics. Redundant metric
categories are retained because different manifestations of isotopic content relate directly
to physical attributes relevant to construction of a practical explosive. The relative nuclear
explosive value of a material is directly related to its critical mass.
3.3.1 Critical Mass. Nuclear weapons operate in a fast (vice thermal) spectrum; the
potential of a host form to be brought fast critical is what must be quantified. Nuclear
explosive devices compress a subcritical mass to achieve supercriticality and the resultant
explosive release of energy. There are three considerations in determining the ground
rules for calculating the critical mass: compression, weapon design and geometry.
The first judgment is whether to use the nominal or compressed density.
Estimating the degree of compression that could be achieved in a crude design is at best an
inexact process. Fortunately, compression is essentially a geometrical alteration which
can be accomplished on any host material; the effects of compression are not unique to the
plutonium being considered. Since we are interested in relative properties, the
uncompressed mass is an equally valid metric and is somewhat more straightforward to
measure. Next, the configuration of the plutonium must be considered. Technical aspects
of the design of the weapon such as use of a tamper and reflector can have a large impact
on the physics of the detonation. The reflector/casing design are not inherent properties of
the WGPu host material and therefore provide no relative resistance information. Hence,
a bare unreflected system is assumed. Finally, a spherical configuration has the lowest
neutron leakage and thus represents the lowest possible critical mass geometry.
Accordingly in the present work, the bare, unreflected, spherical, uncompressed critical
mass measured in kilograms is used to measure the nuclear explosive value of the
plutonium found in the disposition product. The second weapons usability metric
proposed is the neutron emission rate
3.3.2 Neutron Emission Rate. The likelihood that a nuclear explosive will not reach its
optimum yield depends on the subcritical surface neutron flux from spontaneous fission
and alpha-neutron interactions of plutonium nuclides. As discussed in section 1.3.2, a
higher neutron flux makes sub-maximum yield more likely but does not prevent the device
from achieving fast criticality and generating a nuclear explosion. Thus, the surface
neutron flux gives a rough indication of the likely magnitude of the explosion relative to
its theoretical maximum yield. The primary contributor to the neutron surface flux is from
spontaneous fission of the even plutonium isotopes. The concentration of nuclides which
spontaneously fission is the same for all non-irradiated WGPu host forms; thus, this metric
is essentially zero for all but spent fuel and RGPu host forms. The neutron emission rate
for plutonium metal can be readily estimated and used directly as a metric in units of
neutrons/ sec-Kg Pu.
3.3.3 Plutonium Isotopic Composition. The third weapon usability metric considers the
isotopic makeup of the plutonium which is resident in the host matrix. WGPu is highly
enriched in fissile material with an isotopic mix of approximately 93.5% 239 Pu, 6.0% 240Pu
and 0.5% 241Pu. The isotopics of all other grades of plutonium are inferior for weapons
use. Section 1.3.1 provides a detailed analysis of the effects of each plutonium isotope on
the dynamics of nuclear weapon physics and design. 239 Pu and 241Pu are the key fissile
nuclides for weapons use. The isotopic metric is defined as grams of 239+24 1Pu per gram of
total plutonium. WGPu isotopics are considered optimum for weapons use and
consequently WGPu is defined as presenting no isotopic barrier to weapons use. Since
plutonium is a synthetic element, the isotopics can only be diluted through the WGPu-
neutron interactions. Fresh fuel and vitrification host forms provide no isotopic barrier.
The fourth weapons usability metric is the plutonium decay heat.
3.3.4 Decavy Heat. The decay heat generated by plutonium complicates the explosive
design. If the decay heat is low enough, conduction through the explosive and convection
plus radiation at its surface may be sufficient cooling mechanisms. Such is the case with
WGPu. A greater decay heat rate may yield temperatures high enough to degrade other
weapons materials such as the high explosives. Thus, either the device would have to be
assembled just prior to detonation or an active cooling system would be required. The
decay heat is essentially zero for WGPu host forms such as clean glasses and fresh reactor
fuels which do not contain any irradiation products. To maximize the independence of the
decay heat metric, it is measured in units of watts per kilogram of plutonium rather than in
units of watts per critical mass. The product of this value and the critical mass can be
readily obtained to produce the total heat which must be dissipated in a design.
The metric values are defined to allow objective measurement, but how they are
applied and combined to draw conclusions about the relative inherent proliferation
resistance of individual disposition products is also critical. It is necessary to define a
logic-based algorithm for using these metrics.
3.4 Scoring and Ranking Algorithm
This section describes an algorithm for applying the metrics defined in the
previous sections to arrive at a conclusion regarding the inherent proliferation resistance
of disposition products. An example evaluation is presented in section 3.5. Table 3.2
summarizes the proposed metrics defined in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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3.2 Inherent Plutonium Disposition Product Barrier Metrics
Criteria Type of Units/ScaleMeasurement
Disposition Product Matrix Barriers
Fissile Density Quantitative kg fissile Pu/m 3
host
Dissolution Quantitative gms/liter
Separation Quantitative dimesionless
Radiation Barrier Quantitative years
Plutonium Weaon sail
Isotopic Quantitative gms fissile/gm Pu
Critical Mass Quantitative kg Pu
Neutron Emission Quantitative n/sec-kg Pu
Decay Heat Quantitative w/kgm Pu
1. The separation metric is calculated by ratioing separation distribution
coefficients if the data can be found. Alternately it is calculated as an ionic
radius ratio as described in section 3.2.3.
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The metrics defined above measure specific plutonium matrix properties. Thus, they
are objective in nature. In contrast, there are many possible ways in which to combine
these metrics to calculate and rank the proliferation resistance of the disposition options.
Altering the methods chosen would effect the conclusions which might be drawn as to
which option produced plutonium products with the most proliferation resistant inherent
barrier. Consequently a fair amount of judgment is implicit in the scheme used to
combine the metrics to reach a quantitative conclusion. Thus, the following presents
only one possible scheme and the logic used in its derivation.
3.4.1 Minimum Threshold. These metric criteria provide a means of making a relative
comparison between options. However, there should also be an absolute minimum.
The NAS spent fuel standard is the final disposition form minimum proliferation
resistance threshold. A disposition product which falls short of this standard presents a
security risk beyond that of spent fuel and will require special security measures.. Thus,
the values for each metric corresponding to typical spent fuel should be used as a
threshold. The performance evaluation of host forms should detract from the score of a
disposition product for sub-spent fuel proliferation performance and award credit for
proliferation resistance that is better than that inherent in spent fuel. Giving credit for
performance above the spent fuel threshold is only valid for a RGPu mission as
discussed in chapter 1. Thus, there is an inherent assumption that it is considered
important to deal with all the world's plutonium rather than simply reducing the
proliferation risk associated with weapons grade plutonium to the level of the much
larger stockpile of RGPu.
Next, some distinction must be made as to the relative importance of each
metrics contribution to the disposition product matrix and plutonium weapons usability
proliferation barrier types.
3.4.2 Metric Contribution Weighting. Not all the metrics need be given equal weight.
For example, the decay heat metric may be of secondary importance in quantifying the
weapons usability of a host matrix metal mix. Using a clever design, the proliferator
could store the host metal mix containing the plutonium in a cooling medium and
assemble the explosive just prior to detonation. In that case, long term decay heat removal
would not be required. Similarly, any device, crude or sophisticated, which can produce a
nuclear explosion is of concern. Consequently, the relative probability of producing a less
than optimum yield as indicated by the neutron emission rate metric is also of secondary
importance in measuring proliferation resistance and should be weighted less than other
metrics.
Thus, a minimum spent fuel standard threshold and metric weighting should be
part of the algorithm. The first step in that algorithm is to convert the all the individual
metric values into a set of metric scores normalized to a consistent scale.
3.4.3 Individual Metric Scoring. Figure 3.1 is a example flow chart for determining
individual metric values. A metric scoring curve is defined for each metric with ordinate
values from -1 to 1. The scoring curve converts the individual metric values into metric
scores according to the functionality between the metric value and the impact on the
robustness of the barrier.
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Figure 3.1 Overview of Individual Metric Scoring
The ordinate values can range from the corresponding metric value for spent LEU fuel to
the peak metric value for the options being considered. The zero abscissa value equates to
a barrier equivalent to that of LEU spent fuel. A disposition product that is not as
proliferation resistant as spent fuel for a given metric property receives a negative metric
score ; thus, the spent fuel standard is the minimum threshold. Figure 3.2 is an example
of a linear metric scoring curve for critical mass. A linear critical mass scoring function
assumes the difficulty in creating a weapon increases linearly with the critical mass.
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Figure 3.2 Example Critical Mass Metric Scoring Function
Ideally, the linear slope of the scoring function from 0 to 1 should be equal the slope from
0 to -1 to ensure equal relative weighting to the credit and penalty for positive and
negative performance, respectively. This is accomplished through proper setting of
maximum and minimum values. However, the physical realities of some metrics do not
necessarily permit equal slopes. For example, it is not physically real to define a negative
critical mass as a minimum ordinate value. Consequently, the slopes from 0 to 1 and from
0 to -1 may not be equal depending on the metric. The driving consideration is to produce
a spread in the scores. For example if the maximum critical mass performance were
defined as 1000 Kgs and equated to a metric score of +1, then all the disposition products
options would have a score of approximately 0. This would only indicate that the
disposition option critical masses were closer to that of spent fuel rather than an extreme
value of 1000 kgs. Setting too large a range of metric values obscures the differences
between the options. Thus, if possible, the range of metric values chosen should be small
enough to discern the difference between the options. Similarly, setting the range too
small drives all the options to a +1 or -1 score. This is not always avoidable but it should
be minimized. To maximize the objectivity of the metric scoring, anchoring the metric
value range on some physically real characteristic such as percentage of the spent fuel
value or the actual range of disposition metric values seems to be most logical. However,
as will be seen for some metrics in the next section, it is still not always possible to create
a spread in all of the metric scores if they are very similar. A discussion of some specific
metric scoring functions is provided in section 3.5.2. More complex curves which better
correlate the effect on the difficulty level for creating a weapon and the change in the
metric value can be envisioned. However, a detailed study of potential metrics scoring
functions is beyond the scope of this work.
Once metric scores are determined they can be weighted and combined to produce
scores for the disposition product matrix and plutonium weapons usability barrier types.
3.4.4 Barrier Type Evaluations. Single quantitative-value evaluations of the inherent
proliferation barrier presented by a plutonium host form are derived for each barrier
source: disposition product matrix and plutonium weapon usability. Individual metric
values are weighted between 0, of no importance, and 100%, of singular importance. The
sum of the weighting factors must equal 100%. The products of the individual metric
scores and their weights are summed to determine the score for the barrier type. Figure
3.3 is a flow chart for the scoring of the plutonium weapon usability barrier from the
individual metric scores.
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Figure 3.3. Overview of Barrier Type Scoring
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3.4.5 Overall Ranking of Plutonium Product Forms. The two barrier type rankings are
added together resulting in a single value for each disposition product. The host form
with the highest score is the best performer. Each disposition product is ranked between 1
and the total number of host forms being considered for disposition matrix and plutonium
weapons usability barrier types. In a comparison between HLW spiked glass, MOX spent
fuel and non-uranium spent fuel, each disposition product would have a ranking between 1
and 3 based on their overall barrier type scores. Products which perform the best are
ranked number 1 and the one performing the worst is ranked 3. Thus, the relative strength
of the proliferation barriers of each option is determined. Figure 3.4 is a flow chart for
determining the final score for a plutonium disposition product.
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Figure 3.4. Scoring of Overall Proliferation Resistance
of a Disposition Plutonium Product
Section 3.5 provides an example application of the metrics and algorithm in comparing
HLW spiked WGPu borosilicate glass, spent WGPu MOX fuel and WGPu non-uranium
spent fuel.
3.5 Example Implementation of Proposed Metrics
This section uses the metrics and algorithm detailed above to illustrate how to
quantify and compare the inherent proliferation resistance of candidate final disposition
products. WGPu disposition products are used because the properties of the WGPu
disposition products are more readily available.
The intent of this section is to provide a model for how to quantify the relative
inherent proliferation resistance of candidate disposition products. This goal is distinct
from definitively calculating the absolute proliferation resistance of these disposition
products. Many judgments and assumptions are required to complete the necessary
calculations. Some of these assumptions and judgments are subject to debate. A strong
effort has been made here to identify and address each of these as they enter into the
process. The reader is referred to appendix B which contains a detailed example
calculation of how the metrics values were derived, scored and combined to produce
barrier type scores.
There are two primary disposition options being considered for WGPu: reactor
irradiation and vitrification in borosilicate glass [N-2]. A comparison is made between
spent MOX fuel assemblies and borosilicate glass logs to one of the non-uranium fuel
plutonium disposition assemblies suggested in this thesis. The next section describes
these three reference case disposition products.
3.5.1 Description of Reference Cases. The properties of MOX irradiated in the
Westinghouse PDR1400 are used as the reference case for comparison [W-l]. LWR
MOX fuel disposition options are discussed in detail in chapter 2. The selection of the
PDR1400 reactor option is somewhat arbitrary but there is little difference between the
spent MOX properties of all the LWR reactor designs. Selection of another design as
the reference case would not significantly alter the results of this example comparison.
There are three potential sub-options being considered for borosilicate WGPu
vitrification: vitrification with high level fission product waste (HLW), vitrification with
Cesium 137 only, and a "clean glass" option.
A significant radiation barrier is established by the incorporation of HLW and
'37Cs. Incorporation of only '37Cs rather than the host of nuclides contained in HLW
simplifies recovery of the WGPu from the glass. Thus the '37Cs glass can be considered
more of a storage form rather than a waste form when compared to that produced by the
HLW vitrification sub-option. The Russians regard the WGPu as a valuable energy
resource and so are not in favor of treating it as a waste. "Clean glass" does not
incorporate nuclides to create a radiation barrier. Instead, chemical spoilers are added to
complicate the recovery of the WGPu without requiring costly remote processing. To
be conservative, a composite of the glass logs produced by both the HLW and '37Cs-
only sub-options is used as the reference product. It is assumed to have a 2,000 Rem/Hr
at 1 meter radiation barrier similar to that proposed for the '37Cs sub-option and contain
20 w% HLW. Each log weighs 1800 Kgs and contains 20 kgs of WGPu at 1.1 w%. The
spent MOX and glass are compared to a simple zirconia-plutonium dioxide-erbia (ZrO2-
PuO 2-Er20 3) non-uranium fuel.
The composition and description of the ZrO2-PuO 2-Er20O 3 non-uranium fuel can
be found in chapter six and a discussion of the materials aspects of the fuel is found in
chapter four. Table 3.3 lists the weight percent composition of the ZrO2-PuO2-Er20 3
non-uranium fuel.
Tale.3.3 Examl ZrDI &02-PuOJ-Efr.0 .Fefl. Cmositio
Isotope/Element weight percent
ZUPu 0.0003
239Pu 2.7394
24Pu 0.1701
241Pu 0.0068
Z42Pu 0.0007
241Am 0.0038
Er 1.3417
Zr 70.4440
0 25.2932
3.5.2 Metric Values Results. This section outlines the calculations and discusses the
results of an example application of the metrics proposed in the this chapter. Table 3.4
summarizes the measured/calculated raw metric values. Determination of the metric
values is generally straightforward with exceptions noted in the discussion of each
value. Appendix A contains detailed example calculations.
Fissile density values are higher for spent LEU and MOX because they must be
discharged in a near-critical condition. The fissile density of the vitrified log is only
limited by the practical constraint of the proportional cost of producing a large number
of logs. The non-uranium fuel cycle proposed here drives the plutonium bearing fuel
well into the subcritical region and essentially eliminating the plutonium. The result is
disposition product with a very low comparative fissile density. Thus, the proliferator
would have to process much more of the highly radioactive non-uranium spent fuel to
recover sufficient plutonium to create an explosive.
Dissolution values are applicable to a PUREX type dissolution of the disposition
matrix in nitric acid. The values listed are the solubility, in gm/liter, of the nitrate form
of the matrix constituents in water: UO2(NO 3)2 for MOX and LEU and Zn(N0 3)2 for
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non--uranium fuel [L-2]. The dissolution metric is not applicable to borosilicate glass
because the plutonium is removed via leaching rather than wholesale dissolution of the
matrix. The NAS judged the chemical barriers of a vitrified log to meet the spent fuel
standard. Consequently, the vitrified log will be given a dissolution metric value of 0.00
for metric scoring purposes.
hI"I
Metric (units Spent LEU HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu
in Table 3.2) Log MOX Non-U
Fuel
SDispsiti ProductMatrix Barriers
Fissile Density 158 18.34 97.48 1.55
Dissolution 167 not applicable 167 211
Separation 40 0.12 40 0.37
Radiation 160 145 160 160a
Barrier
SPlutoniumWeaons Usability
Isotopic 68.6% 94.5% 69.1% 10.2 %
Critical Mass 15.4 12.0 16.6 48.3
Neutron 3.3 x 10' 5.3 x 104  4.4 x 105  5.21 x
Emission 106
Decay Heat 10.3 2.3 14.4 10.3
a. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
Separation metric values are based on distribution coefficients reported for the
PUREX process. Values for specific ions were normalized to that of plutonium. The
normalized ion coefficients are then weighted by their atom percent in the matrix of
each disposition form. The listed value is the sum of the weighted normalized
coefficients for each matrix composition. All of the product matrices have fission
products which add some difficulty in separation of plutonium. However, PUREX is
specifically designed to eliminate low fission product compositions. The slightly higher
separation metric value for zirconia is a function of additional difficulty in removing
higher concentrations of zirconium. The uranium ion resulting from MOX dissolution and
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also found in spent LEU is significantly more difficult to separate than most of the fission
products. This gives MOX a metric separation value similar to that of spent fuel which is
much larger than that of the vitrified log or non-uranium fuel.
The radiation barrier for all the disposition product forms is similar to that of
spent LEU. Typically, 15 year old spent LEU has a radiation barrier of 2,000 rem/hr at
1 meter from midplane of the assembly [N-2]. The radiation barrier of the vitrified log
is specifically engineered to be 2,000 rem/hr at 1 meter. The radiation barrier of all
these products is controlled by the long lived fission products and/or 13 7Cs both of
which have an average half life of 30 years. Consequently, the radiation barrier reduces
by 50% every 30 years. Spent fuel reaches 125 rem/hr by 135 years and approximately
60 rem/hr by 165 years after discharge. The number of years to reach the IAEA self
protection limit of 100 rem/hr is approximately 15 years more than that of the vitrified
waste form because the vitrified glass log starts out with the same barrier as 15 year old
spent fuel.
The weapons usability type barriers rely on the inherent resistance of the
separated plutonium. Plutonium is not transmuted by the vitrification process; the final
product glass contains WGPu. The isotopics of spent LEU, WGPu MOX and WGPu
non-uranium fuels are calculated via manipulation of depletion calculation results.
Critical masses are calculated for a bare pure plutonium sphere by varying the radius of
the sphere until a multiplication factor of 1.00 results as calculated using MCNP. 2 The
density of metallic plutonium is used to convert the resultant spherical volumes into
critical masses. The high 242pU content and low fissile content of the non-uranium
residual plutonium composition results in a critical mass nearly three times that of the
other disposition products. Total neutron emissions and decay heat for the residual
2 The Monte Carlo Neutron Particle (MCNP) code is described in chapter 5.
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plutonium compositions are calculated by taking the sum of the weight percent weighted
neutron emission rates and decay heat of each of the plutonium isotopes as listed in
table 1.1. Non-uranium fuel has a very high 242PU content which produces nearly an order
of magnitude increase in the neutron emission rate. However, a slightly lower 238Pu
content results in a slightly lower decay heat rate.
3.5.3 Metric Scoring Results. Each metric value is converted into a metric score using
metric scoring function curves. Accurate establishment of metric scoring functions is
beyond the scope of this work. Linear scoring functions from -1.0 to 1.0 with the spent
fuel value equivalent to a metric score of zero as described in section 3.5.4 are assumed
for all metrics. Since the spent fuel standard was established as the minimum acceptable
performance, spent fuel's metric value scores zero by definition. Table 3.5 lists the results
of converting the raw metric values into scores and Appendix A contains detailed example
calculations.
All the disposition products have a lower fissile density than spent LEU resulting
in only positive values. The 1.55 Kg/m 3 non-uranium value is the best and so defines the
upper bound of the range and equates to a 1.00 score. The difference between spent fuel
and non-uranium fissile densities is 156.45 Kg/m 3. Taking the inverse produces a linear
slope of 6.4 x 10-3 score units/unit difference in density of the option form and spent fuel.
Thus, the MOX score is [(158.0 - 97.5) x (6.4 x 10 3 )] = 0.39. The score for the vitrified
log is similarly calculated.
The dissolution metric scoring function ranges from 0 to one and 0 to -1 are based
on the spent fuel metric value, thus defining boundary values of 0 and 334 gm of matrix
constituent/liter of H20 on either end of the ordinate axis. Since a lower solubility is
preferable, a -1 metric score equates to the higher solubility of 334 gm of matrix
constituent/liter of H20. This metric value range produces a linear scoring function slope
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of 6 x 10-3 score units/relative difference in solubility. Since the matrix of spent fuel and
LEU is the same, the solubility difference is zero and so MOX scores zero. The 211 gm
Zr(N0 3)2/liter of H20 solubility of a zirconia matrix is larger than that for a UO2 matrix,
producing the negative metric score listed.
Table 35Mettic S* res
Metric Spent LEU HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-U
Log MOX Fuel
Fissile Density 0.00 0.89 0.39 1.00
Dissolution 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.26
Separation 0.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.99
Radiation 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00
Barrier
Plutoniums Weapons Usability
Isotopic 0.00 -0.82 - 0.02 1.00
Critical Mass 0.00 -0.22 0.04 1.00
Neutron 0.00 -1.00 0.10 1.00
Emission
Decay Heat 0.00 -1.00 0.51 0.00
a. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
The 2.5 x 10-2 score units/unit difference in the separation metric value is set by
the low vitrified log value. Both the non-uranium zirconia fuel and the vitrified log have
significantly lower separation scores than MOX as a result of their lack of significant
quantities of uranium.
There is little difference in radiation barrier metric values. The +1 score is defined
as 150% of the spent fuel radiation barrier or 240 years. Likewise, the -1 score is equated
to 80 years. As described above, MOX, LEU and non-uranium fuel all have
approximately the same radiation barrier resulting in metric scores of 0.00. The vitrified
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log's radiation barrier metric value is only 15 years less and so earns a slightly negative
score.
It worth summarizing the results of the matrix level barriers metric scores before
moving to the plutonium weapons usability metrics. Although all the options exceed the
spent fuel standard for fissile density, the non-uranium spent fuel clearly offers greater
proliferation resistance as a result of eliminating more plutonium. The selection of 1.1
w% plutonium in the glass log is based on proposed options but is probably on the low
end of loading being considered [N-2]. A lower or higher loading would produce larger
and smaller fissile density respectively. The chemical barrier matrix metrics, dissolution
and solubility, show that MOX meets the spent fuel standard based mainly on the
properties of UO2. The glass and non-uranium zirconia matrix options appear less
chemically resistant than the MOX. However, these number are the most suspect in the
group because they are based on data which was not specifically derived for this
application and consequently has a limited applicability. Deriving this type of data and
developing more definitive metrics is a subject for later discussion in this section.
Finally, as expected, all the options meet the spent fuel standard for a radiation barrier and
the difference in the barrier metric scores are small. Next the plutonium weapons usability
metric score function curves and results are reviewed.
The isotopic scores are calculated with a scoring function slope defined by the
metric values. The 0 to 1 abscissa score range equates to ordinate spent fuel metric values
of 68.6% and non-uranium fuel value of 10.17 %. The 0 to -1 ordinate range is limited by
a maximum of 100% fissile plutonium. Thus, there are two different slopes: 3.18 x 10-2
from -1 to 0 and 1.71 x 10-2 from 0 to 1. Similarly, the critical mass slope from -1 to 0 is
limited by a zero critical mass. The positive score slope, from 0 to 1, is set by the 48 kg
non-uranium fuel critical mass.
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Using a log scale, the range of metric values for neutron emissions results in a
slope equal to [1/(WNF - LEU)] = 8.3 x 10'1. The low limit becomes 5.52-(6.72-5.52) =
4.27 which is greater than the vitrified log emission rate; hence, the vitrified log earns a
score of -1. The MOX score [(5.64-5.52)* 8.3 x 10"'] = 0.10.
Finally, the decay heat scoring function ordinate range is defined by the low value
of the vitrified log decay heat generation, producing a uniform slope from -1 to 0 and 0 to
1 of 0.125 score units/watt.
Summarizing the weapons usability metric score results, the strong additional
proliferation resistance secured by substantial destruction of plutonium becomes apparent.
The non-uranium spent fuel residual plutonium is mostly 242Pu making it quite useless for
nuclear explosive purposes. At the other extreme, the fact that no plutonium is transmuted
shows up as a strong weakness of the vitrification option. The MOX option falls between
the two as might be inferred since plutonium metrics essentially measure the degree of
plutonium transmutation accomplished.
3.5.4 Barrier Type and Overall Scoring Results. Individual metric values and scores are
derived above; two steps remain to determine the final ranking of the relative inherent
proliferation resistance of the three disposition products. First the proliferation score of
the disposition product matrix and plutonium weapons usability barriers types must be
determined. Then the options must be ranked in terms of their overall proliferation
resistance.
Barrier type scores are the sum of the product of the associated individual metric
contributions. The contributions are determined by weighting the importance of each
metric in determining the strength of the associated barrier. It is recognized that how
the metrics are weighted is subject to great debate. Weighting of the metrics is heavily
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dependent on the perspective of the decision maker and many different valid solutions
can result. However, as stated at the outset of this section, the goal here is to provide a
model for how to quantify the relative inherent proliferation resistance of candidate
disposition products. This goal is distinct from calculating the definitive or absolute
proliferation resistance. The viewpoint chosen here is to minimize a sub-national or
terrorist threat. The weight functions (WF) and contribution of each metric assigned by
the author are listed in table 3. 6. The WFs sum to 100% so that
the product matrix and plutonium weapons usability barrier types both have an equal
total weight of 1. Although the chemical barriers can slow down a proliferator, the
fissile density and radiation barriers are considered of greater importance than the
chemical metrics. Given an aggressive enough acid and temperature any plutonium host
matrix can be dissolved and the unique multiple oxidation states of plutonium facilitate
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Table 3.6 : Metric Weights, Contributions and Barrier Type Scores
WF HLW Glass Log Spent WGPu MOX WGPu Non-U Fuel
Diosition Product Matrix Barriers
Fissile 0.3 0.27 0.12 0.30
Density
Dissolution 0.1 0.00 0.00 -0.03
Separation 0.1 -0.10 0.00 -0.01
Radiation 0.5 -0.09 0.00 0.00
Barrier
Matrix Barrier Score 0.07 0.12 0.18
Plutonium Weap ns Usability
Isotopic 0.4 -0.33 0.006 0.40
Critical Mass 0.4 -0.09 0.014 0.40
Neutron 0.1 -0.10 0.00 0.10
Emission
Decay Heat 0.1 -0.10 0.051 0.00
Usability Barrier -0.62 0.07 0.90
Score
I
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its separation from all other ions. The NAS estimates that any group possessing the
sophistication required to build a nuclear device would also posses the necessary
chemical expertise to overcome any chemical barrier that could be engineered into the
clean glass option [N-2]. The radiation barrier is considered the primary barrier to spent
LEU fuel plutonium recovery. Thus, it is given slightly heavier weighting over the
fissile density. Similar primary and secondary weighting of the plutonium weapons
usability metrics is also adopted.
A nuclear explosion cannot take place unless the isotopic and critical mass
barriers have been overcome. In contrast, neutron emission and decay heat barriers can
make weapon design more difficult they can not prevent detonation. For example,
neutron emissions simply reduce the likely yield of a nuclear explosive. However as
stated in chapter 1, even a low yield in the range of one kiloton is a substantial terrorist
threat. Assembling the weapon just prior to detonation would circumvent decay heat
considerations. Thus, the critical mass and the isotopic barriers are more heavily
weighted than decay heat and neutron emission barriers.
The metric contributions are the product of the weighting function and the
metric score. These contributions are summed to provide total barrier type scores. In
turn these barrier type scores are added to quantify the overall relative proliferation
resistance of each of the three disposition products. A disposition product which exactly
met the spent fuel standard would have an overall score of 0.00. The disposition
products are then ranked in order of decreasing total score. These ranking are listed in
table 3.7. The top scoring product is ranked number 1 and is the most inherently
proliferation resistant product while the lowest scoring product is ranked number 3 and
is the least inherently proliferation resistant product. As a result of the enhanced
plutonium weapons usability barrier, the non-uranium spent fuel provides significantly
superior proliferation resistance. The MOX spent fuel provides the next best performance
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and scores slightly above the spent fuel standard (as the reader will recall, the spent fuel
standard equates to a score of 0.00). The vitrified waste form is the least proliferation
resistant product because of the low barrier to use of the separated plutonium which
remains weapons grade. This substandard performance of the vitrified waste form is
based the assumption that both the matrix level and plutonium usability barriers are of
equal merit. However, the matrix level barriers would have to be considered
approximately 8 times more important than the plutonium usability barrier (an unlikely
consideration) for the vitrified waste form to meet the spent fuel standard.
Table 3.7 Final Scores and Ranking of Products
HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-U
Log MOX Fuel
Matrix Barrier Score 0.074 0.12 0.18
Weapons Usability Score -0.62 0.07 0.90
Overall Score -0.55 0.19 1.08
Ranking 3 2 1
3.6 Summary and Conclusions. NAS metrics include all aspects of the dispositon
process. Thus, they include implementation, policy and economic based risk
considerations of specific proposals. However, a subset of metrics quantifying only
those barriers to proliferation which are a function of the properties of the final
disposition product forms can be defined. These barriers are inherent in the disposition
product and so remain even if the proliferator is given access to the plutonium. Thus,
the inherent barriers are the most reliable. The set of metrics proposed quantify the
proliferation resistance independent of non-technical considerations. Thus, they can be
used to determine how plutonium disposition options can be improved to reduce the risk
of proliferation. These metrics can be objectively defined based on measurable
properties. However, quantifying the inherent relative proliferation resistance of
plutonium disposition products requires assumptions and judgments. Specifically, the
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weighting of the importance the contribution individual metrics make to the cumulative
proliferation resistance is heavily subject to the viewpoint of the evaluator. The
viewpoint chosen here is minimization of the threat from a sub-national/terrorist type
threat. In addition, the view is inclusive of all plutonium , WGPu and RGPu, and so
credit is given for proliferation resistance achieved beyond the spent fuel standard. The
spent fuel standard is used as the minimum threshold of proliferation resistance so that
performance below that provided by spent fuel is penalized. The requirement for
inclusive judgments and policy type decisions necessarily dictates that the scheme
outlined above can only be a starting point for discussion.
The results of the application of the proposed metrics and evaluation algorithm are
as follows. Although all the options exceed the spent fuel standard for fissile density, the
non-uranium spent fuel is clearly offers greater proliferation resistance as a result of
eliminating more plutonium. The selection of 1.1 w% plutonium in the glass log is based
on proposed options but is probably on the low end of loadings being considered [N-2]. A
lower or higher loading would produce larger and smaller fissile density respectively. The
chemical barrier matrix metrics, dissolution and solubility, show that MOX meets the
spent fuel standard based mainly on the properties of U02 . The glass and non-uranium
zirconia matrix options appear less chemically resistant than the MOX. However, these
numbers are the most suspect in the group because they are based on data which was not
specifically derived for this application and consequently has a limited applicability.
Finally, as expected, all the options meet the spent fuel standard for a radiation barrier and
the differences in the barrier metric scores are small.
The advantages of near complete elimination of plutonium in the non-uranium fuel
substantially enhances the plutonium weapons usability barrier. The non-uranium spent
fuel residual plutonium is mostly 242Pu making it quite useless for nuclear explosive
purposes. On the other extreme, the fact that no plutonium is transmuted shows up as a
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strong weakness of the vitrification option. The MOX option falls between the two as
might be expected since plutonium metrics essentially measure the degree of plutonium
transmutation accomplished.
As a result of the enhanced plutonium weapons usability barrier, the non-uranium
spent fuel provides significantly superior proliferation resistance. The MOX spent fuel
provides the next best performance but scores only slightly above the spent fuel standard.
The vitrified waste form is the least proliferation resistant product because of the low
barrier to use of the separated plutonium, which remains weapons grade. This substandard
performance of the vitrified waste form is based the assumption that both the matrix level
and plutonium usability barriers are of equal merit. However, the matrix level barriers
would have to be considered approximately 8 times more important than the plutonium
usability barrier (which appears unlikely), for the vitrified waste form to score overall as
well as the spent fuel standard. Chapter four examines the selection of a non-uranium fuel
of the type identified here as the preferred alternative.
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CHAPTER FOUR: NON-URANIUM PLUTONIUM FUELS
Reduction of the world's stockpile of plutonium will reduce the risk of proliferation
relative to a subnational threat. This work proposes to eliminate plutonium by loading it in
non-uranium fuel and burning it in a PWR radial blanket. Chapter 2 examined the WGPu
options being considered and presented the qualitative logic behind selection of PWRs and
non-uranium fuels as the preferred alternative for plutonium elimination. Specifically, non-
uranium fuel can destroy plutonium more efficiently than MOX fuels. The metrics in Chapter
3 reinforce these ideas with quantitative measures of the relative risk reduction achievable
with the proposed elimination option. This chapter focuses on the particulars of the non-
uranium fuel suggested for use in the peripheral assembly elimination option proposed here. To
be of practical use, such a non-uranium fuel must meet two sets of performance criteria:
acceptable in core neutronic and thermo-physical performance. The fuel's overall performance
must support its integration into current LWR fuel cycle with the minimum perturbation
possible. Neutronic considerations include radial power peaking, reactivity vs burnup profiles
and depletion cycle composition. Thermo-physical performance must be as good or better than
U0 2 in terms of thermal, physical and mechanical integrity over the fuel cycle. A large fuel
development and qualification program will be required before the recommended plutonium
elimination option could be implemented. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the
possible fuel matrix designs and requirements
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First, the design variables available for consideration are reviewed. Then the material
and neutronic considerations of non-uranium fuels are examined. A survey of candidate non-
uranium fuels and their relative advantages and disadvantages is presented. A selection
process is presented which leads to the recommendation of specific non-uranium fuels for
development. Finally, fabrication methods are considered.
4.1 Introduction
There are many variables which determine fuel performance and the degree of
proliferation enhancement achieved. This section lists and discusses these variables. First it is
important to identify the characteristics of the ideal plutonium eliminating fuel and cycle.
4.1.1 The Ideal Pu Burning Fuel Cycle. The ideal fuel and fuel cycle combination for
plutonium burning would have a high burnup capability resulting in a spent fuel with a
negligible plutonium content. Residual plutonium would be comprised primarily of non-
fissile isotopes. The fuel should be compatible with both existing and advanced LWRs in
order to increase the potential maximum rate of plutonium destruction. A high degree of
safety and reliability in service are required for the cycle to be accepted by the commercial
industry. In addition, fabrication of the Pu burning fuel should not be significantly more
difficult or costly than current fuels if the cycle is to be economically viable. Finally, the
spent fuel should be acceptable for geologic disposal without need of further processing.
Section 4.1.2 presents the design variables which can be manipulated to achieve this ideal.
4.1.2 Design Variables and Assumptions. Fuel geometry, composition and cycle variables
determine performance. Table 4.1 lists these design variables and summarizes the
considerations and advantages that can be realized with the appropriate manipulation of each.
The geometry of the fuel assembly can be altered to manipulate the degree of
moderation of the fuel. This together with the clad thickness, fuel rod diameter and the fuel
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rod pitch can be varied to adjust the magnitude and sign of the isothermal moderator
temperature coefficient. Over-moderation produces a more positive (less negative)
isothermal moderator temperature coefficient. Increasing the fuel rod diameter, reducing the
rod pitch or increasing the cladding thickness will increase the metal to water ratio thereby
reducing the degree of moderation. Decreasing the degree of moderation can also be used to
shift the neutron spectrum upwards and reduce the reactivity of the plutonium.
The desired plutonium destruction and neutronic characteristics can be achieved with
or without altering assembly geometry. However, altering the geometry has thermal-hydraulic
implications. Since the least impact possible on existing PWR systems is desired, no
changes in geometry are proposed here: the lattice of choice is the widely used
Westinghouse 17 x 17 assembly with the dimensions listed in table 4.2.
Composition determines the neutronic, mechanical and thermal properties of the fuel.
The composition of both the cladding and the fuel meat itself can be manipulated to achieve
acceptable overall performance. Fertile materials can be used to hold down excess reactivity
and to produce fissile material . Fissile nuclide production adds positive reactivity as a
function of burnup, thereby extending achievable cycle length. Using thorium (Th) to
produce 233U may be of particular interest in the development of non-uranium fuels. Unlike
2 39pu, 233U can be denatured by adding a small amount of 238U to prevent creating a source of
pure 233u.
The type and distribution of burnable poisons can be selected to tailor the reactivity
profile of the fuel over core life, the prompt fuel temperature coefficient (FTC) and
isothermal moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) and the residual plutonium content.
Burnable poison selection was examined and is discussed at length in section 4.3.4.
Burnable poisons (BPs) can be homogeneously distributed in the fuel, heterogeneously
lumped in fueled or unfueled rod locations or used as a surface coating on fuel.
Homogeneous BPs provide a larger negative reactivity insertion per unit of poison than
lumped burnable poisons. Consequently, burn out is quicker than for lumped BPs.
Homogeneous distribution requires that the BP be compatible with the fuel matrix.
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Rod Pitch
Rod Pitch
Rod Diameter
Cladding
Annular Fuel
Rod Plenum
Burnable Poisons
Burnable Poisons
Burnable Poisons
tight pitch
increase pitch
increase
thicker
use it
increase
homogeneous
lumped
IFBAa
increase epimermal nrux =>
1. more 239 Pu(n,2n) 238pu;
2. more 238U and 232Th capture => inc. conversion
3. lower •39Pu => inc. loading
=> higher flux => more complete Pu burnup
=> reduce mod/fuel ratio => more negative MTC
=> allow for high burnup water side corrosion
=> reduce mod/fuel ratio => more negative MTC
=> accommodate high burnup fission prod. gases
=> reduce peak centerline temperature
=> accommodate high burnup FP gases
=> greater BOL reactivity hold down
=> slower poison burnout
=> compromise between lumped and homogeneous
Fertile Nuclide 238U, 23"Ih => manipulate reasonance integral => vary slope of
Concentrations mixture reactivity vs burnup curve
Pu Analogs/ Th, Ce, Ru, => make recovery of pure Pu from the fuel more
Recovery Ti, Zr, Pr, Hf, difficult
Spoilers Np
B, Dy, Ho,
Burnable Poisons Gd, Er, Hf & => negative contribution to temperature coefficients
Eu.
Cladding Zr w/Hf alloy => increase hold down reactivity
Cladding Stainless => increase parasitic losses
Steel
Cladding Zirlo/Duplex => better durability for increased burnup
Pu Assembly Peripheral => lower power density
Location => reduced impact on core physics parameters
a. Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber
Lumped BPs are self shielded and so burn out slower, providing a more constant positive
reactivity insertion rate per unit burnup. Integrated Fuel Burnable Absorbers (IFBA) are a
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coating of BP on the fuel. IFBAs have the advantage of not requiring incorporation in the
fuel matrix and without the need to displace that pin in the assembly. However, unlike
lumped or IFBA poison distribution schemes, homogeneous poisons require chemical
processing to remove them. This enhances the proliferation resistance of the fuel. In the
present work, the desired neutronic performance was achievable without the need for non-
homogeneous burnable poisons. Consequently, neither lumped nor IFBA distributions were
given further consideration.
Rod Outside Diameter (cm) 0.950
Diametral Gap (cm) 0.0165
Clad Thickness (cm) 0.0572
Rod Pitch (cm) 1.26
Number U0 2 Rods per Assembly 264
Square Assembly Width 21.40
The cycle length and the number of batches used determine the required fissile fuel
loading in reload fuel. The goal of this work was to integrate non-uranium plutonium fuel
into typical PWR fuel cycles. Consequently, the standard industry practice of a three batch
core with an 18 month cycle length was assumed.
Fuel composition is the primary variable which determines fuel performance and is
the subject of the remainder of this chapter. The required material performance must be
established to provide a background for selection of the appropriate material composition.
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4.2 Required Material Properties
This section derives fuel performance requirements. First, the general PWR fuel limit
requirements are adopted. These general requirements are then translated into specific
minimum acceptable fuel properties based on corresponding U0 2 characteristics.
4.2.1 Basis for Fuel Performance Requirements. A fuel's thermal and mechanical properties
enable it to perform satisfactorily. Satisfactory performance can be defined as the
maintenance of cladding integrity without the need for a reduction in reactor plant
operational status. Transient and steady state design limits are designed to ensure that
cladding integrity is maintained. PWR fuel must fulfill the requirements listed in table 4.3 to
be deemed satisfactory. The presence of non-uranium fuel in the core should not impose any
additional operational or transient restrictions beyond those which normally apply to a
standard PWR core. Non-uranium fuel assemblies comprise approximately 25% of the PWR
core in a peripheral loading scheme. Consequently, as long as the fuel performs at least as
well as standard UO2 no additional restrictions should be required. Thus, UO2 characteristics
are used as the baseline minimum performance standards. Furthermore, these general criteria
can be translated into specific property values that must be better than or equal to those of
UO2 as listed in table 4.4 [T-1]. UO 2 fuel integrity under transient and normal operating
conditions is ensured by meeting two design criteria: no incipient melting of the fuel under
steady state or transient conditions and a maximum allowable cladding strain of less than 1%.
These criteria establish the minimum performance standards for U0 2 fuel in PWRs.
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Reguirement ra Conditions Accident Conditions
- no autocatalytic exothermic
Chemical Stability - compatible with cladding at reactions with H20 or Air at
temperature temperatures less than
1200 0C
- no degradation of properties no significant release of
- no significant release of
Irradiation Stability below limits over expected energy stored in crystalline
residence time, fluence
- swelling less than U0 2
- not degraded below that of
Thermal Conductivity - greater than that of UO2Thermal Conductivityover service life UO2 for peak temperatures
or transient temperatures
Specific Heat - no specific requirement - comparable to or less than
U02
Thermal Stress Resistance - no specific requirementor better than
U02
Fresh Fuel Property Value Associated Design Limit(s)
Steady State and Transient Fuel Peak
ThermalConductivity 3.6 W/m-°C Centerline Temperature - no incipient
(200-1000 oC) melt
Steady State and Transient Fuel Peak
Melting point 2800 'C Centerline Temperature - no incipient
melt
Specific Heat @ 100 OC 247 J/Kg-°C Transient Peak CenterlineTemperature - no incipient melt
Linear Expansion Coefficient 1.01E-5 7'C < I% clad strain(400-1400 oC)
no phase change
Stability Range from 20 oC up to < 1% clad strain
melting point
Theoretical density 10.97 gm/cm - minimum porosity for swelling
U0 2 fuel design criteria require no melting of the fuel under transient or steady state
conditions. Thus, the peak fuel temperature must be below the melting point of the fuel. The
melting point, thermal conductivity, specific heat and power density establish the allowable
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steady state temperature profile in the fuel. The specific heat determines the amount of
stored energy in the fuel at steady state conditions. The specific heat also determines the
amount of energy which can be stored in a transient without exceeding the peak centerline
temperature. The linear expansion coefficient and stability range address changes in fuel
volume with temperature. Phase changes can lead to fuel expansion, cladding strain and
subsequent failure. Thus, a limit of less than 1% cladding strain is established. The
crystalline structure of oxide fuels must be stable over the temperature and fluence range
expected in a PWR. UO2 has a fluorite face-centered cubic crystalline structure which is
thermally and structurally stable. The fluorite structure is somewhat unique in that it has a
large number of vacant sites. This allows UO2 to incorporate a significant percentage of
fission products without alteration of its structure [K-2]. Similar performance is required of a
viable non-uranium plutonium fuel. Specific performance criteria can be developed to
directly compare key thermo-physical properties.
4.2.2 Thermal Performance Criteria. The non-uranium ceramic material which will
incorporate the plutonium and absorber atoms must possess thermo-physical properties
which give it in-service performance as good or better than UO2. It is therefore worthwhile
to develop a set of metrics, based on the discussion above, to compare properties of potential
plutonium fuel ceramics to U0 2. Thermal performance is defined by the licensing and design
limits imposed on fuel. Three performance areas are of specific interest: thermal margin to
melting, transient time constant for quenching, and stored energy.
1. Thermal Margin to Melting: Let TCL, TMP be the normal operating centerline temperature
and the ceramic melting point respectively. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship of these
temperatures:
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Figure 4.1 Fuel Temperature Profile
AT is the difference between fuel outside edge temperature, TFO, and TCL. AT is therefore
equal to the linear heat generation rate, q', divided by the product of the thermal conductivity
of the material, k, and 41t. The relative thermal margin to melting can be calculated by the
following expression:
M argin = Tm =(4.1)
TMP 4k ( k T,,.
Thus, for the same q' a material with a larger value of kTMp will have a larger thermal
margin to melting.
2. Stored Energy. Stored energy must be removed via emergency cooling systems in the
event of a Loss of Coolant Accident, LOCA. The more energy stored in the fuel during
normal operations the greater the heat load on cooling systems. The stored energy, E,, is
approximately equal to the product of the heat capacity, cp, the density, p, and the average
fuel temperature AT =1/2(AT):
q'pcp
E s p cA T 8 1k (4.2)
In this expression, one recognizes the thermal diffusivity parameter a as:
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a pc- (43)pcp
Thus, ceramic material a values can be used as a comparison metric. A larger value of a is
preferable from a stored energy consideration.
3. Transient Time Constant. The transient time constant characterizes the rate of decay of
the fundamental mode during quenching. It is determined by the thermal diffusivity, a, in
expressions of the form:
P = Po e a(4.4)
Table 4.5 summarizes the above considerations. The ratio of the metric values to that
of UO2 must exceed or equal 1.0 to ensure adequate performance. Section 4.6.4 applies these
performance criteria to the recommended fuels matrices identified and described in the
intervening sections. It is important to note that the thermal conductivity is a strong function
of crystalline structure, purity, fluence and temperature and quoted values vary considerably
in the literature. Thus, the values presented are more illustrative of potential performance
and must be confirmed as part of the fuel development and testing program.
LIM
The steady state and transient power density plays a large role in determining the ability of a
given set of fuel properties to perform satisfactorily. The power density is in turn determined
by the neutronic characteristics of the fuel relative to the fuel around it. Thus it is critical to
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ITable 4.5 Summary of Proposed Thermo-physical Performance Criteria
Thermal Limit or Performance Constraint Metric Metric Value New Matrix
Consideration Metric Value U02
No Fuel Melt - normal operating thermal kTMp > 1.0
margin to melting
LOCA Performance - maximum allowable stored a > 1.0
energy _
--
understand the neutronic differences between standard UO 2 fuel and non-uranium plutonium
fuels.
4.3 Non-Uranium Plutonium Fuel Neutronic Considerations
Plutonium's neutronic properties differ significantly from those of uranium. Although
plutonium is the source of 30-50% of the power in UO 2 fuel at the end of a conventional LWR
cycle, non-uranium fuel derives nearly all of its power from 239pU fissions and has a much
higher plutonium atom density than end of life U0 2 fuel. This presents some problems at the
interface between Pu and UO2 assemblies. In addition, the absence of 238U in non-uranium Pu
fuels necessitates that a substitute diluent must be employed.
4.3.1 23 9pU Compared With 235U. The use of 239pU instead of 235U as a fissile power source
presents several challenges. Table 4.6 lists the cross section properties for key fissile and fertile
nuclides. 239Pu has significantly larger thermal absorption, fission and absorption to fission
cross section ratio, resulting in a hardening of the neutron spectrum relative to 235U fuel.
Consequently, burnable absorber and control rod worths and shutdown margins are reduced.
Also, 239Pu atom density must be higher than 235U in UO2 to achieve the same reactivity.
Uniform Pu assembly enrichment can produce unacceptably large power peaking factors at the
interface between UO2 and Pu assemblies. The thermal flux is suppressed at the edge of the Pu
assembly. The pins on the interface between the U0 2 and Pu assemblies experience a much
larger thermal flux than the more interior pins resulting in unacceptably high power peaking.
Thus, the pins at the edge of the assembly would require a reduction in their fissile loading
relative to the interior pins. Alternatively, a low fissile density may be used throughout the Pu
assembly with an appropriate BP loading to hold down excess reactivity at the interface.
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Table 4.6 Cross Sections of Key Fuel Cycle Nuclides(barns)
7.4 571 678 2.7 1013 290 1368
7.4 46 101 2.7 271 0.06 368
525 577 7421E-6 5E-6 290 1007
n 12N in 1\I I 1 I\
R6 86 884 380 274 445 8493 697
11 85.2 135 130 272 169 8484 116
RIr 0.58 748 250 1E-03 277 9 581
Notes:
1. Thermal cross sections are evaluated at 2200 m/s or 0.025ev.
2. Resonance Interals are for infinitely dilute conditions.
A less troublesome consideration is that 239PU also has 1/3 the delayed neutron fraction
of 235U, reducing the reactor reactivity response time and thus the margin for reactor control.
Fortunately, studies indicate that the control systems in place have sufficient response margins
to accommodate plutonium fueled reactor transients. [N-2]. Peripheral location and lower than
average power will also reduce the worth of the subject plutonium fuel as discussed in chapter
5.
Figure 4.2 sketches the fission cross section versus energy profile for 239Pu and 235U on
a log-log scale. At 0.01 ev both 239pu and 235U have (approximately) a thermal fission cross
section of 1,000 barns but 239pU's only drops to 500 barns at 0.1 ev as compared to 200 barns for
235U. In addition, 239Pu has a nearly 5000 barn fission cross section peak at approximately 0.3
ev. The 239pu resonance absorption region has both capture and fission reaction components.
Any negative prompt feedback provided by capture resonance broadening is offset by increased
fission absorptions. Also, an increase in moderator temperature leads to an upshift in the
neutron spectrum into a region where 1/v control absorbers are less effective. Moreover, the
239pu fission cross section is still relatively high in the slightly epithermal region and has that
5000 barn peak at 0.3 ev. Thus, there can be a net increase in reactivity in under-moderated
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system condition leading to a less negative or positive isothermal temperature coefficient. 239pu
tends to have less negative prompt fuel and isothermal temperature coefficients compared to
235U enriched UO2 fuels. Thus, greater non-fissile resonance absorption is required to offset
this undesirable effect. 23U is the major resonance absorber in UO2 fuels but is absent in non-
uranium Pu fuels. The presence of 2°Pu compensates in RGPu; however, WGPu is > 93 w%
239pU. Thus, burnable poisons are required for non-fertile WGPu fuels.
Figure 4.2 Comparison of39Pu anS'U
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4.3.2 Effect of 24 0pU & 24 1PU Content. 240pU is both a resonance absorber and thermal poison.
Figure 4.3 shows the absorption cross section profile for 24 0pU. Its absorption cross section
follows a 1/v profile from 300 barns at 0.02 ev to 100 barns at 0.3 ev. Thus, it provides some
hold down reactivity but the effect is small. Sterbenz et al. [S-l] investigated the effects of
variable 240 pU content in a PuO 2-ZrO 2 fuel. They reported that for a fixed BOL reactivity, an
increase from 4w% to 18w% 240pU loading only increased the allowable loading of plutonium
from 7.8 to 11.0 grams. However, the resonance absorption was found to significantly improve
the prompt fuel temperature coefficient (FTC). At 4w% 240N the FTC was 0.0528 to 0.00
pcm/oK from 600 to 1100 OK and -0.167 pcm/oK from 1600-2400 OK. At 18w% the FTC
improved to a small but negative value of -0.244 to -0.186 pcm/0K over the entire temperature
range from 600-2400 OK. Only a very slight improvement in the isothermal moderator
124
temperature coefficient ( MTC) from 15 to 10 pcm/oK was noted. The main effect of increasing
the 240pu content is to provide some resonance absorption which helps to make the FTC more
negative. This can reduce the required loading of resonance absorbing BPs when burning
RGPu which has approximately 24w% 24OPu.
Figure 4.3 (a 240pu and Of 241pu
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241Pu has even larger fission and absorption cross sections than 239pU. Consequently, a
RGPu in a non-fertile matrix has a less negative reactivity versus burnup slope than comparably
loaded WGPu non-fertile fuel. The higher initial content of 24Opu in RGPu results in higher
production of 241Pu which mitigates reactivity loss with burnup. Thus, WGPu presents greater
neutronic challenges than does RGPu; consequently, modeling and depletion calculations were
done using WGPu loaded non-uranium fuel.
4.3.3 Special Considerations for Non-Uranium Fuels. In non-uranium fuel, alternatives must be
found to perform the physical and neutronic functions that 2 38U serves in U0 2 fuel. 238U is the
major actinide constituent in the U0 2 pellet which forms the physical matrix of the fuel. A
substitute matrix must have comparable thermal and mechanical properties. 238U acts as an
neutron absorber to hold down the excess reactivity at the start of a cycle. This allows greater
fissile loading and a longer fuel cycle. 238U also helps extends the cycle in MOX fuels by
producing additional 239Pu to mitigate the rate of fissile depletion. In addition to these
functions, 238U is a resonance absorber with peaks in excess of 5000 barns at - 7, 11, and 13 ev.
A substitute resonance absorber is required in non-uranium fuels to provide the negative
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Doppler reactivity contribution normally provided by the 238U in MOX fuels. Burnable poisons
or thorium can be used to provide these functions.
Table 4.7 is a summary comparison of the nuclear design characteristics for a reactor
loaded with non-uranium plutonium without poison or fertile material fuel as compared to the
same reactor loaded with standard U0 2 fuel with the same BOL reactivity and burned at the
same power density to EOL.
Table 4.7 Comparison of Non-Uranium Plutonium and
Standard Uranium Nuclear Desi Characteristics
Parameter Plutonium Core Reason for Potential
Difference Consequence
1. WGPu 1. Reduced resonance 1. Unacceptable
Isothermal Moderator compositions are absorption plus Transient Behavior
Temperature much less negative spectral shift
Coefficient (MTC) 2. RGPu 2. Same as above but 2. Unacceptable
compositions are with increased 240pu Transient Behavior
slightly less negative resonance absorptions
1. WGPu 1. Reduced resonance 1. Unacceptable
Prompt Fuel compositions are absorption Transient Behavior
Temperature much less negative 2. same as above but
Coefficient (FTC) 2. RGPu with increased 240pu 2. Unacceptable
compositions are resonance absorptions Transient Behavior
slightly less negative
Cold to Hot Reduced Less Negative MTC Reduced cold boron
Reactivity Swing requirements
Installed Reactivity Reduced Lower allowable Shorter cycle length
fissile loading
Control Rod Worth Reduced More epithermal flux Possible increase in
number of rods
Boron Worth Increased BoronReduced More epithermal flux
requirements
Xenon Worth Reduced More epithermal flux Improved stability
Fission Product Increased Increased Yields Reactivity penalty -
Poisons shorter cycle
Local Power Peaking Increased Increased water worth More complex fuel
management
Delayed Neutron Reduced Pu < u Unacceptable
fraction Transient Behavior
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The differences which can not be accommodated within safety margins must be compensated
for through the manipulation of fuel design and/or plutonium fuel loading strategies.
4.3.4 Use of Burnable Poisons. Burnable poisons are one potential fuel design solution to
compensate for the potentially unacceptable nuclear design characteristics of non-uranium
plutonium fuels. Burnable poisons (BP) are used to serve three purposes: to provide beginning
of cycle (BOC) excess reactivity control allowing increased fissile loading, to shape the
reactivity vs. burnup curve over the cycle, and to provide negative contributions to FTC and
MTC through resonance absorption. There are two disadvantages of burnable poisons:
unavoidably diminished neutron economy and the potential shortening of the cycle due to
residual negative reactivity at the end of the cycle (EOC). The second disadvantage can be
minimized by using a (monoisotopic) BP with a large thermal capture cross section. Such a BP
can provide maximum BOL excess reactivity control with a minimum number density and will
bum out faster, leaving less residual negative reactivity at the EOC. However if the thermal
cross section is too large, the poison burns out too quickly causing an unacceptably high excess
reactivity peak early in the cycle. A BP with a thermal cross section slightly larger than the
fissile nuclide is ideal. When the fissile nuclide depletion rate is slightly less than the total
combined BP depletion, the rate of the net loss of reactivity can be slowed.
This description of BP control can be quantified as follows:
Starting from the basic depletion equation:
dN
- -CI, (4.5)dT
lBP
and assuming that 235 1, it can be shown that:
and ssuingtha ~Q235U1
BP
[F]l tIaf
[ l (.I [F] oJ j (4.6)
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where [F] is the fissile nuclide density and [BP] is the burnable poison concentration..
Generally, 1/3 of the initial fissile load is necessary just to produce criticality at time t = end of
cycle:
[F], 1
[F]0  -3 (4.7)
Therefore, if the end of life burnable poison concentration is to be less than 10% of the initially
loaded density, then:
BP
a thermal > 2.5F Ž (4.8)
a thermal
This provides a rough yardstick for measuring the relative acceptability of a given nuclide as a
burnable poison.
Table 4.8 alphabetically lists all nuclides with a thermal absorption cross section of
greater than 1000 barns or a resonance integral greater than 2000 barns. These cross sections
are also ratioed to the corresponding 239Pu thermal and resonance cross sections. The 239pU
thermal and resonance ratio values for those BPs anticipated to have an end of cycle residual
density of less than 10% of the initial loading are listed in bold face and highlighted in the last
two columns of table 4.7.
A BP resonance cross section which overlaps the 0.3 ev 239pu cross section is preferable
for inserting a negative contribution to FTC in the non-uranium plutonium fuels. In addition, a
flatter cross section profile through the thermal energy range, approximately 0-1 ev, can
produce a more negative contribution to MTC. Thus, the Bp/239Pu resonance ratio, the energy
of the resonance and the slope of the cross section profile are all contributory factors. Thus, the
cross section vs. energy profiles of these poisons can be reviewed to determine their suitability.
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r~d~u
I85.V1 l 1 W V.JI
25.5 180 2800 0.18
24.9 130 1600 0.13
28.2 2700 340
23 670 3000 0.66
47.8 9204 5800
52.2 350 150 0.34
14.8 61000 1540
15.7 255000 800
100 64.5 710 0.06
13.8 4000 3100
26.7 208 3000 0.20
Notes:
1. All values are listed in barns 4. Res. Int. are for infinitely dilute conditions.
2. Res.Int. = Resonance Integral 5. Thermal cross sections are evaluated at 2200 m/s.
3. Ratios are absorption or resonance integral divided by the 239pU
Samarium (Sm) and Holmium (Ho) have large cross sections but can be eliminated for
the following reasons. Sm's cross section drops off sharply in the energy range from 1700
barns to < 100 barns from 0.1 to 0.5 ev. Ho has approximately 5000 barn resonance peaks at 4
and 10.5 ev, respectively, but has a strongly negative linear slope from 1000 barns at 2.0E-4 ev
to < 10 barns at 1.0 ev. In addition, Ho is one of the least abundant of the lanthanides.
Four burnable poisons stand out as most promising: Gadolinium (Gd), Europium (Eu),
Erbium (Er) and Dysprosium (Dy). Gadolinium has a sharply decreasing total cross section of
500,000 barns at 0.0001 ev to 9000 barns at 0.1 ev with resonance peaks of 200 and 1700 barns
at 1.1 and 1.15 ev, respectively. Gd's cross section is roughly 1/v from 0.1 to 1 ev and is 600
barns at 0.3 ev. The seven sequential isotopes in the Gd chain lead to some replenishment of
the 155 and 157 isotopes. This reduces the rate at which it burns out ( but also increases the
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end of life residual poison). The major advantage of Gd is that it has a huge thermal cross
section which provides superior BOL excess reactivity hold down at low loading. Europium
has a very large cross section and its resonance peaks at 0.321 ev and 0.461 ev provide
excellent overlap of the 239pu resonance peak. However, the slope of the cross section through
the thermal range is only slightly shallower than Gd. Europium can provide a strong negative
contribution to FTC. Erbium has a smaller but flat thermal cross section tail from
approximately 1000 barns at 0.004 ev to 125 barns at 0.1 ev and so will require a greater
loading than Gd or Eu to achieve the same excess reactivity effect. However, its resonance
peaks of 200 and 1500 barns at 0.460 and 0.584 ev, respectively, provide a significant negative
contribution to FTC and MTC. Er's flat thermal cross section tail at low thermal energies
make it ideal for inhibiting reactivity increase as a result of moderator thermal spectral shifts.
The smaller thermal cross section produces less of a reactivity peak as it bums out but results in
some residual negative EOL reactivity. Dy's cross section decreases linearly from 6000 barns
at 5.0E-4 ev to 110 barns at 1.0 ev and it has a 200 barn resonance peak at 2 ev. Dy has a larger
thermal cross section than Eu but significantly smaller than Gd and it does not have the
advantage of resonance peaks in the energy range of interest. Table 4.9 summarizes some of
the literature on burnable poison use adapted from Ayoub and Driscoll [A-6]. Initial depletion
calculations confirmed that Eu burned out too quickly, producing an unacceptable plutonium
fuel power peak at approximately mid-cycle. Of the four poisons selected from cross section
analysis, Gd and Er appear to be most promising. They are readily mixed with A120 3 and have
excellent neutronic properties. Consequently, fuel design efforts focused on the use of these
two as homogeneous burnable poisons.
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4.3.5 Thorium as a Fertile Material. Thorium (Th) by production of 233U can flatten the
reactivity vs. burnup profile of non-uranium fuel. It can also function as a chemical spoiler to
complete chemical recovery of Pu from fresh fuel or the residual remaining in spent fuel. The
thermal absorption cross section for 232Th is roughly three times that of 238U. Thus, Th can be
used in place of BPs to hold down excess reactivity, and increases cycle length by increasing
the allowable 239pU loading.
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Table 4.9 Summary of Burnable Poison Uses
Absorber Tvie(s) References Notes
* As oxide in glass or in [Y-l] * Extensive Experience
Boron A120 3  [S-7] Base
* ZrB2 coating (IFBA) on * Available as Enriched
UO2 pellets B10
* B4C * Forms Helium Gas =>
not good for homogeneous
use
* Gd203 admixed with UO2  *Resonance structureGadolinium
* Miscible in A120 3  [T-4] enhances MTC
Erbium * Er203 admixed with U0 2  [J-l], [C-2], [G-7] * matches low loading Pu
* Miscible in A120 3  fuel depletion
* Could also be put into
Zircaloy clad
Hafnium * HfO2 admixed with UO2  [P-l] * May not burn out fast
enough
* Used in selected control
rod applications
* Lack of Experience
* Ho & Dy burn out too
Others: slowly
Sm, Cd, Eu, * Oxides Admixed with 02 [P-l], [F-5] * Sm & Eu burn out too fast
In, Ho, Dy. * Cd, In are alloyed with
Ag and used in PWR
control rods
* Dy is proposed for use in
the HWR and Pu burning
version of the CANDU
reactors
The flux in the Pu fuel assemblies is highly epithermal. Unfortunately, the effective
resonance absorption cross section for thorium is less than that of 238U (when heavily self-
shielded). The net effect of using 232Th in place of 238U (without lattice re-optimization) is a
reduction in the overall conversion ratio relative to MOX and UO2 fuels. From a proliferation
standpoint, some small weight percent of 238U is also required to denature the 233U produced.
4.3.6 Clad Composition. Stainless steel cladding's chemical and mechanical properties are
superior to those of Zircaloy. It is not now widely used commercially in LWRs due to its
higher capture cross section which results in increased parasitic neutron losses. Enrichment
requirements increase from 3.4 to 5 weight percent in switching from Zircaloy to stainless steel
clad unit cells.[E-1] This leads to a 7% increase in LWR fuel cycle costs. However, this cost
increase does not apply to WGPu dispositioning because there are no enrichment costs. In
addition, the reactivity penalty is not critical for peripheral assembles. Achievement of
extensive plutonium destruction via high burns may make the added chemical durability of
stainless steel over Zircaloy cladding well worth the reactivity penalty.
4.4 Literature Survey of Non-Uranium Plutonium Fuels
This section summarizes work and related experience on non-U plutonium fuels. A recent
OECD report provides an excellent summary of the work on non-uranium fuel development
and is summarized in Table 4.9 [P-2].
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PuO2-ThO2 Canada Theoretical CANDU - WGPu dispositioning
Germany Theoretical PWR - Pu/Th fuel cycle
Theoretical & - Once-through Pu incineration
Japan Experimental LWR - Experimental synthesis only in
A120 3
PuO 2-CeO 2  France Experimental PWR - Minor actinide incineration
- Scheduled for 1996
Germany Experimental PWR - Reduced plutonium production
Brazil
Switzerland Experimental LWR - Sol-gel ceramic synthesis
PuO 2-HfO2  Switzerland Theoretical LWR - BP survey study
PuO2-ZrO2  Canada Theoretical CANDU - WGPu dispositioning
Switzerland Theoretical & LWR - Sol-gel ceramic synthesis
Experimental - Irradiation testing has begun
PuO 2-Y2 0 3  France Experimental PWR - Minor actinide incineration
- Scheduled for 1996
(Pu-RE)O2  France Theoretical Fast - Pu incineration
EutecticsDispersion
Theoretical & - Once-through WGPu
PuO2-A120 3  Japan Experimental LWRs incineration
- With ZrO2 or ThO2
- Experimental synthesis only
Switzerland Theoretical PWR - Effect of neutron absorbers
PuO 2-CeO 2 in MIT Theoretical PWR - Peripheral Once Through Cycle
A120 3  - WGPu & RGPu destruction
PuO2 - Switzerland Experimental LWR - Sol-gel ceramic synthesis
(Ln)A150 12
PuO 2-BeO Canada Theoretical CANDU - WGPu dispositioning
Japan Theoretical FBR - once-through Pu incineration
PuO 2-MgO France Experimental LWR - NpO2-MgO production of 
23 8Pu
France Experimental Fast - Pu incineration
Pu0 2- France Experimental PWR - Minor actinide incineration
MgA1204
France Experimental Fast - Pu incineration
Switzerland Experimental LWR - Sol-gel ceramic synthesis
Pu-W US (INEL) Theoretical LWR - metal allow and
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4.4.1 Thorium-Pu and Cerium-Pu Fuels. There has been substantial use of Th as a fuel
material. Both the Elk River and Indian Point reactors used U0 2-ThO2 in a solid solution fuel.
Indian Point used up to 7 w% 235U0 2 fuel in a ThO2 matrix. ThO 2 irradiation performance was
found to be similar to that of UO2. Thorium has also been used as in a UC 2-ThC2 carbide fuel
in the US Peach Bottom and British Dragon high temperature gas reactors. Thoria (ThO2) and
ceria (CeO 2) can form a fluorite solid solution with PuO2. Thorium can be used without
adding BPs. Ceria is neutronically inert and so requires the addition of rare earth poisons
(RE).
Recent work investigating the use of thorium to increase the destruction of WGPu in
LWRs reported that a standard 1100 MWe PWR loaded with WGPu 238U MOX consumes
239pu at a rate of 420 kg/year. However, net total Pu inventory is reduced by only 220 kg/year
[G-1]. It is estimated that a thorium MOX core is capable of destroying 239pu at a rate of 900
kg/year.
Pin cell studies indicate that PuO2-ThO 2 fuel has acceptable plutonium loading, a
comparable FTC and a more negative MTC as compared to UO2 [S-1]. WGPu loading of
85.8 gms/rod was possible providing a 4 yr bumrnup to 100% total plutonium destruction. At a
typical PWR discharge burnup of 33,000 MWd/MT, 239pu and total plutonium destruction of
72.6 and 55% were realized. However, the plutonium discharge isotopics were comparable to
that of a reference uranium MOX fuel.
4.4.2 Zirconium and Aluminum Matrices. Akie et al. investigated inert ceramic matrices for
LWR destruction of WGPu [A-1]. Two fluorite-structure ceramics were recommended: PuO2-
ThO2-A1203 and PuO2-ZrO 2(Y20 3, Gd2 03)-A1203 . In both matrices, metal oxides are single
phase particles dispersed in a second A1203 , alumina, phase eutectic. The Y203, Gd20 3 are
added to stabilize zirconium oxide. Alumina, thoria and stabilized zirconia have a high
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solubility for both actinides and fission products. The alumina is used to provide a chemically
durable shell for the fuel particles producing a stable waste form suitable for geologic disposal.
Parratte et. al. examined the physics of elemental B, Dy, Er, Hf, Sm, Eu, and Ho as
burnable poisons for use in an alumina reactor grade plutonium dispersion fuel [P-l]. Using a
PWR pin cell, they looked at reactivity swing, temperature and void coefficient behavior, and
total plutonium destruction all as a function of burnup. Control rod worths were examined
using a 15x15 assembly with Ag/In/Cd clad in stainless steel. In a once through cycle, they
reported 70% destruction of the total plutonium with the residual being 30w% 24pu and less
than 8w% 239pu. They concluded that it was possible to achieve acceptable reactivity
coefficients with a carefully chosen mix of burnable poisons in a non-uranium Pu fuel.
Sterbentz et.al. completed a rough feasibility study of potential fuels for the destruction
of WGPu in LWRs. [S-I] They examined plutonium oxide, aluminum-plutonium and
plutonium carbide fuels. The melting point of aluminum-plutonium fuel is too low for standard
LWR power applications. It was only considered in a low temperature, low pressure, non-
power producing reactor option. Plutonium oxide fuels were favored over plutonium carbide
fuels because of their larger operating experience base and more mature manufacturing
technology. BOL pin cell neutronic analysis was performed on PuO2-ZrO 2 and PuO 2-ZrO2 -
ThO2 matrices with Gd, Eu and Er as burnable poisons. They found that LWR BOL reactivity
and reactivity coefficient constraints force unacceptably low loading of plutonium unless either
thorium or BPs are used. The PuO02-ZrO 2-ThO2 matrix yielded acceptable BOL reactivity and
negative reactivity coefficients for reasonable Pu loading without the need for BPs. PuO2-ZrO2-
BP compositions with Er, Gd and Eu all yielded negative FTCs but only Er and Eu also yielded
negative MTCs. However, Pu0 2-ZrO2-Eu20 3 had a positive MTC at lower Eu mass loading.
They further concluded that current mixed oxide manufacturing processes and equipment could
be used to manufacture a PuO2-ZrO2-BP fuel with little modification.
4.4.3 Tungsten-Pu Fuels. Tungsten (W) has a very large resonance to thermal cross section
ratio and has been proposed as a substitute to provide the negative Doppler lost by removal of
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238U in non-fertile fuels. Tungsten's resonance behavior is similar to that of 238U making it an
excellent neutronic substitute. Chang [C-1] proposed several methods for using W to avoid
extensive reactor control redesign in burning weapons grade uranium, WGU, and WGPu.
Tungsten oxide has a low melting point of 1430 OC but could be used as part of a metal alloy in
dedicated WGPu burning reactors operated at low power, temperature and pressure. For high
temperature power reactor use, tungsten metal, with a 3410 oC melting point, could be
incorporated either as a central pin or in a sleeve arrangement. Alternately power could be
derived from the burning of the weapon grade material in an A1203 Zr -stabilized matrix
allowing operation at high temperature.
4.5 Fuel Matrix Selection.
RGPu and WGPu are both highly enriched in fissile isotopes. Hence, PuO 2 must be
diluted to achieve acceptable neutronic properties. With the exception of thoria (ThO 2), the
host fuel matrices are neutronically inert. Consequently, their fissile, fertile and BP atom
densities can be adjusted to produce essentially the same neutronic performance regardless of
the host material. Selection criteria lie in their material properties, ease of fabrication and
experience base. This section presents filter logic to narrow the field of candidates. Figure
4.4 is a flow chart showing the decision points leading to a recommendation of three
candidate fuels for development: zirconia, alumina and TRISO.
The matrix constituent decision path has two major decision points. First the periodic
table is reduced to a handful of potential elements based on the requirement that the matrix
be neutronically inert (i.e. do not want capture reactions in matrix materials). The second
constituent element requirement is that it form the preferred crystalline structures and that the
structure be chemically stable and compatible with the cladding. The matrix selection path is
more involved.
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There are many fuel matrices not listed in table 4.9, including silicides, nitrides and
carbides which could be investigated for non-uranium plutonium fuel incineration. The goal
of this work is limited to identifying a potentially acceptable plutonium elimination fuel for
use in current PWRs rather than to develop the best fuel possible. Consequently, the large
existing fabrication and performance experience base of oxide fuels give it a huge advantage
over other potential fuel matrices. Plutonium fuels require remote handling and fabrication
techniques. Such processes are already used for the production of MOX and are more easily
adapted for non-uranium oxide fuels. The performance of MOX fuel is more sensitive to
variations in the manufacturing process due to plutonium's more pronounced variability in
stoichiometry. This makes it more critical to select a fuel which will allow use of the
existing MOX experience base to the maximum extent possible in the development of a new
non-uranium fuel. The compatibility of oxide fuel with cladding has been investigated in
detail and the properties and stability of oxide ceramics are more defined and proven. Thus,
an oxide fuel is likely to take less time and expense to develop and qualify.
Exclusion of uranium from the fuel matrix necessitates the use of incorporated
burnable poisons to set the desired neutronic properties. Thus, the crystalline structure of the
oxide matrix must be able to incorporate plutonium and burnable poisons. Peroskovites,
Fluorites, Yag, Rutile and Yag oxides are capable of incorporating actinides and rare earths.
The vacancies in fluorite structures make them particularly amenable to the incorporation of
fission products. The closer the host cation's radii are to those of the substitution ions the
less strain placed on the host phase crystalline structure. Several ceramic oxides are capable
of incorporating both the actinides and rare earth burnable poisons. Table 4.10 lists potential
host crystalline structures and typical formulas [D-1]. As mentioned previously, fluorites are
known to be exceptionally stable as nuclear fuels due to their ability to readily incorporate
fission products without phase change. Thus, the fluorite structure is recommended for this
application.
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Structure Example Formula
Fluorite (Zr,Act. or Lanth.)O 2+x
Peroskovite (Sr,Ba)(Ti,Zr)0 3
Spinel MgA120 4
Yag Y3A15012
Zirconolite CaZrTi20 7
Rutile TiO 2, RuO 2
Matrix Constituent Selection Path Matrix Selection Path
Figure 4.4 Fuel Constituents and Crystalline Matrix
Seletion Logic Flow Chart
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The next level of decision in figure 4.4 is whether or not to disperse the fluorite mix
into an inert matrix or to use it directly as a solid solution. The ceramic properties of the fuel
can be enhanced if a dispersion matrix is used; the thermal conductivity can be increased,
fission product retention enhanced and a more stable spent fuel form produced over that
achievable with the fluorite ceramic. Alumina forms a natural fluorite structure with rare
earths that can also incorporate a second fluorite PuO 2 phase. In addition, the inert
dispersion matrix can host the RE oxides. For example, Peroskovites (LnAl20 3) are a
particular form of alumina found in nature and are particularly stable with high melting
points. The lanthanide series contains the rare earth burnable poisons used to manipulate the
fuel's neutronic characteristics as discussed in section 4.3.4. Table 4.11 lists Peroskovites of
interest [K-1]. The lanthanides in table 4.11 can be added to help tailor the reactor physics
properties of the fuel. There is more experience with TRISO fuels in which one would coat
PuO2 particles with three carbon layers, [A-4, A-5] than for alumina or zirconia fuels.
Extensive development and testing is required to bring each of these candidates to
practical use. A solid solution fluorite fuel can be developed that will meet minimum
performance requirements. Dispersion fuel is not widely used nor manufactured. The
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Table 4.12 Peroskovites, 1nAl41O 3
Lanthanide Melting Point, OC
Cerium, Ce 2030
Samarium, Sm 2040
Europium, Eu 2047
Gadolinium, Gd 2069
Dysprosium, Dy 1940
Holmium, Ho 1980
Erbium, Er 1963
i
potential benefits must be weighed against the potential added cost and time required to
develop a dispersion fuel.
4.6 Selected Fluorite and Dispersion Fuel Matrices.
This section describes the two solid solution fluorite and two dispersion fuels selected
in section 4.5: PuO2-ThO2, PuO2-(Zr/Ce)0 2-REOI. 5 alumina (A1203) and TRISO fuel
particles in a silicon carbide (SiC) binder material. The proposal is to clad and assemble these
fuel matrices to produce an otherwise standard PWR assembly. Consequently, the cladding
still serves as the primary fission product barrier as in normal UO2 fuels. An excellent
summary of the properties of alumina, zirconia, graphite and silicon carbide as nuclear fuel
matrices is available elsewhere [H-I].
4.6.1 PuO2 -ThO 2. Table 4.12 provides the properties of PuO2 and ThO 2. Comparison with
UO2 properties in table 4.4 shows ThO 2 properties are almost identical to those of U0 2.
Consequently, the solid solution should have properties comparable to MOX. PuO2-ThO 2
fuels have been irradiated satisfactorily. PuO2 and ThO 2 also have a fluorite crystalline
structure and can form a solid solution. ThO 2 has the same thermal conductivity and thermal
expansion coefficient as U0 2. PuO2 has a similar linear expansion coefficient but a lower
thermal conductivity than UO2. Consequently, MOX fuel has a lower thermal conductivity
than U0 2.
PuO2 has a more pronounced variable stoichiometry with temperature than does UO2
[H-4] PuO2 evolves oxygen on melting, decreasing its Pu:O ratio to 1.6. This variation in
stoichiometry affects the thermal conductivity. Hyperstoichiometric compositions typically
have lower thermal conductivities. Thus, the performance of MOX fuel is more sensitive to
variations in the manufacturing process. This makes it more critical to select a fuel which
will allow use of the existing MOX experience base to the maximum extent possible in the
development of a new non-uranium fuel. Pu also reacts with Zr-II [H-2]. The lower mass
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number fission product yield peaks at a higher mass than for uranium. Thus, plutonium
fissions produce more noble metals such as ruthenium, palladium and rhodium increasing the
amount of free oxygen available and subsequently the oxygen potential in the fuel.
I nermai tonaucuvity
(200-1000 oC)
Melting point
Specific Heat @ 100 oC
Stability Range
Theoretical density
-2 W/m-OC
2400 0C
253.3 J/Kg-°C
up to melting point
11.46 gem/cm 3
3.6 W/m-OC
3250 0C
291.0 J/Kg- C
up to melting point
9.56 gm/cm3
4.6.2 Stabilized Zirconia and Ceria. Zirconia forms a distorted monoclinic fluorite which is
not suitable for incorporating Pu. However, it can be stabilized by the addition of a third
oxide to form a stable face centered cubic fluorite. The REs that must be added for neutronic
performance reasons can also serve to stabilize the zirconia. Degueldre et. al. reported that
the heavier the lanthanide, the greater its ability to stabilize ZrO2 in the preferred fluorite
structure [D-l]. Erbium was found particularly effective. The major drawback of the
zirconia matrix is the low conductivity of ZrO2. It may be possible to overcome this
drawback by mixing in a stabilizing Ln oxide of higher conductivity. CaO can also be used
to stabilize zirconia and at 15 mol% has been reported to increase conductivity above 2.0
W/m-oK[S-1] at 1500 oK. However, it did not increase the conductivity significantly at
anticipated temperatures. Annular pellets may also be used to reduce the centerline
temperature. An annulus of half the pellet diameter was found to drop the centerline fuel
temperature by 600 degrees to 1300 OC at a 400 w/cm power density [D-l ].
Cerium is neutronically inert and is unique among the lanthanides in that it forms a
fluorite structure and so can be mixed to form PuO 2-CeO 2 particles. It exists in both the +3
and +4 oxidation states, has an ionic radius similar to plutonium and is a good plutonium ion
analog. It can be added to the oxide particle mix to enhance the chemical proliferation
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barrier of the fuel. Ceria's thermal conductivity is better than zirconia at 900 OK but drops
off to be approximately equivalent at expected operating temperatures. Cerium can be used
to stabilize zirconia. However among the lanthanides, it is the least effective stabilizer.
Thermal Conductivity
(@ 1000 oC)
Melting point
Specific Heat @ 100 OC
Linear Exgansion Coefficient
(20-1400 C)
Stability Range
Theoretical density
2.0 W/m-OC
2770 0C
457.2 J/Kg-°C
9.6E-6 '/oC
up to melting point
5.85 gm/cm 3
1.3 W/m-oC
2600 0C
460 J/Kg- C
1.1E-05 '/oC
up to melting point
7.28 gm/cm 3
There is a dearth of published data on the irradiation stability of zirconia under a fast
fluence. Most of the available data were derived for waste form applications involving alpha
damage studies. One available report cited a 21% reduction in ZrO 2 thermal conductivity for
a fluence of 2 x 1020 n/cm 2 (E > 100 ev). More research needs to be done in this area.
Specifically the irradiation stability of ternary zirconia fuel must be explored.
4.6.3 Alumina Fuel Matrix. An alumina, A1203, dispersion fuel matrix provides design
flexibility in meeting cycle reactivity requirements. PuO 2 is combined with zirconia and/or
ceria to form a fluorite crystalline structure. The fluorite particles are homogeneously
dispersed in a second aluminate, aluminum-lanthanide, Ln, oxide, phase. An alumina fuel
matrix can accommodate the fissile and poison loading required to create the novel fuel
neutronic properties necessary for seamless integration into the peripheral location of a PWR.
Since the alumina is proposed as a substitute for UO2, its mechanical and chemical properties
must be comparably or better suited to this application than those of U0 2. Alumina's thermal
conductivity is high for a ceramic, exceeding that of UO2 by more than a factor of three [G-
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1]. Compared to UO2, this would reduce alumina's peak centerline temperature and gradient
by a factor of three for the same power density. Consequently, fewer problems with
temperature gradient driven phenomena such as fission product gas pressure buildup and
fission product migration are expected. This is the major advantage of an alumina dispersion
fuel as compared to a solid solution PuO2-ZrO2(stabilized) matrix. Alumina's volumetric
specific heat exceeds UO2's by 30%; a potential increase in stored energy is offset by the
lower temperature. The higher heat capacity will allow the absorption of more decay heat
under accident conditions. Alumina's melting point is lower but comparable to that of UO2
and likely to be well above anticipated transient temperatures which should also be lower due
to the higher heat capacity. Linear expansion coefficients are also comparable. The matrix
density is not critical; the fissile density can be varied to achieve the desired reactor
characteristics. Alumina's chemical stability is excellent for this application. Under normal
operating conditions the alumina is clad and therefore isolated from water. There is no
autocatalytic reaction under high temperature accident conditions and its corrosion rate in
flowing steam up to 1430 oC is on the order of millimeters/year [H-3]. Alumina is used in
some LWRs as a burnable poison host and as insulation pellets at the end of fuel pins.
Akie et al. [A-I] have synthesized both non-fertile and thorium loaded alumina matrices
for the burning of WGPu and found that alumina combines well with fission products.
Simulated spent fuels displayed excellent durability as waste forms.
Some questions remain regarding the neutron irradiation stability of alumina fuel
matrices. Alumina undergoes significant swelling under fluences appropriate to fusion
applications. Clinnard, investigating the use of a-A1203 as an insulator for fusion
applications, reported 3-10 vol% swelling under irradiation of 925 and 1100 OK up to
fluences of 1 - 2 x 1026 neutrons/meter2, (n/m2) [C-3]. In a more definitive study, Clinnard
and Hobbs report 1.9-3.5 vol% swelling in a-A1203, also referred to as corundum, irradiated
at 925 oK to fast fluences, E > 0.1 Mev, of 0.3 and 2.3 x 1026 n/m2 respectively.[C-2] The
anisotropic nature of the swelling is likely to cause grain boundary cracking. In addition, the
alumina matrix absorbs and combines with fission products to form new crystals which add
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to the strain. However, a subsequent report defined a threshold fluence of 1 X 1025 n/rm2,
below which no significant swelling of a-A120 3 was observed [K-3]. A typical PWR
peripheral fast neutron flux of 1 x 1013 n/cm2 -sec leads to a fluence of 3 x 1024 n/m2 each
year of continuous operation. Hence in a peripheral location, the 1025 fluence threshold
would not be exceeded. The addition of lanthanides chemically stabilizes alumina and may
also result in additional radiation resistance. UO2 fuel typically undergoes fission product
gas induced swelling and cracking. To minimize potential pellet clad interactions the
swelling is (in part) compensated for by cladding design. A similar accommodation in design
may be possible for any irradiation-induced swelling encountered in Alumina fuel. Like U0 2,
neutron irradiation degrades alumina's thermal conductivity. A recent report indicates that
after 18 months of irradiation the thermal conductivity may decrease to approximately that
of ZrO 2, which is below fresh U0 2 (F-1). These and other material issues must be the subject
of a significant fuels development and testing program. Nevertheless, it seems likely that an
alumina fuel similar to the design described above would prove satisfactory as a fuel.
4.6.4 TRISO Fuel Matrix Description. Pu-ThO 2-ZrO2 kernels or non-fertile PuO2-ZrO 2-BP
kernels can be used to destroy Pu in a PWR. Again, cerium can also be added to enhance
chemical proliferation resistance. For the non-thorium variant a lanthanide poison oxide,
Ln20 3, similar to that discussed for the alumina matrix, is used to tailor the cycle reactivity
profile and optimize the net plutonium destruction. The burnable poison particles would be
coated and mixed with the TRISO fuel particles and formed into compacts. The compacts
are then loaded into Zircaloy fuel pins. Alternatively, the TRISO and burnable poison
particles can be loaded directly into the Zircaloy cladding with compactable graphite or
silicon carbide material: the compactable material fills the spaces between the particles to
enhance thermal conductivity. Loading the cladding with a compactable material-TRISO
particle mix would permit the use of remote vibratory compaction as a fabrication technique
The TRISO particles being considered here are similar in design to those used in the
PC-MHTGR reactor dispositioning option described in chapter 2, section 3. The TRISO fuel
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matrix has the advantage of being a more tested fuel alternative to an alumina or zirconia fuel
matrix. The material performance of TRISO fuel with PuO2 and PuO2-ThO2 kernels has
already been tested. Various configurations and compositions from reactor grade to enriched
plutonium loaded TRISO fuels were tested in both the Dragon and Peach Bottom reactors to
burnups up to 747,000 mega-watt-days per metric ton of heavy metal, (MWd/MT) with a fast
neutron fluence of 1.5 x 1025 n/m 2, E > 0.18 Mev [G-2]. The results were mixed, depending
on the Pu:O ratio used and there is some conflict among the conclusions that were drawn.
However, since in the present application the cladding is available as a primary fission
product retention barrier, the TRISO fuel spheres could be expected to provide more than
adequate performance, especially when compared to UO2. Elimination of the outer silicon
carbide layer to reduce cost may even be justifiable since the cladding will be the designated
design barrier to fission products release. The maximum strength of the kernel without the
layer would be the limiting factor; this would be especially true for vibratory compaction fuel
pin fabrication.
Both graphite and SiC properties are very dependent on the manufacturing process.
However, modern forms produced for nuclear applications are excellent matrix candidates:
table 4.14 lists their properties. Even at EOL fluences their thermal conductivity exceeds that
of UO2 by nearly an order of magnitude. High purity reactor grade graphite irradiated in the
Oak Ridge High Flux reactor up to fluences of 3 x 1026 n/m2 expanded by only 2 vol% [H-5].
SiC irradiated at 1300 OK is projected to have a useful life of 2-3 x 1026 n/m2 [H-6]. Stored
lattice damage energy is of no practical concern for irradiation temperatures of 500 oC. SiC
has a slightly larger absorption cross section than graphite. However, this is not problematic
for non-uranium plutonium fuel for this application since RGPu and WGPu are diluted to the
desired enrichment. Hence there is no associated cost of additional enrichment. SiC may be
preferable to graphite due to its greater resistance to oxidation under accident conditions.
Graphite can experience an autocatalytic reaction sequence under very restrictive but
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plausible conditions of high water vapor content, temperature > 650 oC, adequate supply of
oxygen with a gas flow capable of removing gaseous combustion products.
(@ 1000 oC)
Sublimation point **
Specific Heat @ 100 oC
Stability Range
Theoretical density
** sublimation in a vacuum
1500 C
720 J/Kg-°C
up to melting point
12.0 gm/cm
1950 "C
666 J/Kg-°C
up to melting point
40.1 gm/cm 3
4.6.5 Application of Thermal Performance Metrics to Recommended Fuel Matrices. Table
4.15 presents the properties and resultant metric ratios for the recommended zirconia,
alumina and TRISO (considered as a SiC matrix). Alumina and SiC matrices have
acceptable performance metrics. Zirconia's substandard performance is primarily due to its
low thermal conductivity. Erbia, which is added primarily for reactivity control and which
helps to stabilize zirconia in the preferred mono-clinic fluorite structure, may also improve
the thermal conductivity of the zirconia. CaO can also be used to stabilize zirconia and at 15
mol% has been reported to increase conductivity to above 2.0 W/m-oK[S-1] at 1500 oK.
However, zirconia's thermal conductivity must be increased by a factor of two to achieve
UO 2 margin ratios > 1.0. Consequently, annular pellets may be required to reduce the
centerline temperature. An annulus of half the pellet diameter was found to drop the
centerline fuel temperature by 600 degrees to 1300 OC at a 400 w/cm power density [D-l ].
Table 4.16 Summary of Recommended Fuels Thermo- sical rformance
Candidate p Tmr k Cp kTm a
Matrix (gm/cm3) (C) (W/m-K) (J/K-kg) kTMP -U02 aOu
ZrO2  5.85 2770 2.0 457.2 0.5 0.5
A120 3  3.97 2000 7.0 775.7 1.4 1.6
SiC 3.22 1950 15 666.6 2.9 5.0
U0 2 10.97 2820 3.6 235.7 1.0 1.0
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4.7 Fabrication Technology.
The oxide and TRISO fuel matrices were selected in part due to the potential for easily
adapting existing fabrication designs and operations to produce the non-uranium fuel. This
section examines the relevant existing fabrication techniques with regard to suitability for
this application.
4.7.1 Oxide Fuel Fabrication. Sterbenz et al (1993) provide an excellent overview of the
issues regarding fabrication of PuO 2 fuels for WGPu disposition in reactors [S-1]. Figure 4.5
depicts a typical UO2 or MOX fabrication process. The oval overlays mark steps which will
need to be altered to produce a non-uranium fuel. UF6 feed stock comes from enrichment
processes for enriched fuels. U30 8 is the feed stock for natural uranium fuels and nitrate
solutions of uranium and plutonium are the product of reprocessing. There are three major
processes used to produce oxide fuel powders: Co-conversion, Co-precipitation and
Integrated Dry Route/Mechanical Blending. The process selected depends on the type of
feed stock, the degree of homogeneity required and the desired product solubility.
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AFigure 4.5 Typical Fuel Fabrication Flow Sheet
Co-conversion, also known as thermal microwave denitration, is the most direct method to
produce a homogeneous solid solution. Microwaves are used to drive off nitrogen from
reprocessing product streams. There is no direct contact between the material and the heating
medium so that it is very amenable to remote handling. However, the process is energy
intensive. This process would require a nitric acid solution of the Zr/Ce, Pu, BP or Pu,Th
mix feed stock to produce the non-uranium solid solution fluorite fuels. These solutions are
readily available as product streams from plutonium recycling of PWR spent fuel.
Co-precipitation of UO2 and MOX fuels is accomplished by the addition of
hydroxides to a nitrate solution of the actinides. However, the hydroxides can be gelatinous
causing a handling problem. Alternately, oxalates can be precipitated. These techniques are
not directly transferable to the PuO2 -(Zr/Ce)02-BP1 .5 ternary fuels. Significant development
is likely to be required. This process will be more easily adaptable to production of PuO2-
ThO2.
In dry route processing, PuO2 is typically produced through precipitation of Pu from
nitrate solution through hydroxide or oxalate precipitation. The precipitate is then fed
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through a rotary kiln and an orbital screw blender to produce the powder. For (Ce/Zr)0 2-
PuO 2 based fuels the individual oxide powders would be procured and mechanically blended.
They would not necessarily form a solid solution. Solid solutions are generally desirable
because the product pellet has a poor nitric acid solubility. However, low solubility would
make plutonium recovery more difficult and hence enhance proliferation resistance of the
fresh fuel. There is a potential problem in that a non-solid solution fuel may have degraded
thermal conductivity. The degree of homogeneity is dependent on how finely ground the
powders are prior to mixing. Alternately, a pre-pelletizing process can be employed after
mixing to increase homogeneity. For example, dry ball milling is a mechanical pulverizing
and mixing technique using simple low cost equipment to control the degree of homogeneity.
A balance could be struck between desirable solid solution properties such as thermal
conductivity and the lower solubility of a of a more dispersion-like fuel
Early MOX fabrication processes added PuO 2 powder to already granularized UO2
[H-9]. The resulting product was actually an interstitial dispersion of PuO2 among the
original UO2 granules. However, the thermal conductivity of the pellets was too low. The
process was then modified to blend PuO 2 and U0 2 powders. The mix is then pelletized and
sintered to produce a UO2 matrix in which is dispersed fine plutonium-rich oxide particles.
The blending process was further modified to enhance PuO2 solubility by directly
micronizing the PuO 2 powder with U0 2. In a once-through non-uranium fuel cycle,
proliferation resistance may be enhanced by making the PuO2 less soluble. These processes
may be adapted to produce PuO2 particles in an alumina matrix.
The alumina can be produced by mixing the appropriate amounts of the oxide
constituents. The mixture is then pelletized, sintered and loaded into standard PWR Zircaloy
cladding pins similarly to UO2 pellets. Thus, they can be manufactured in standard MOX
fabrication facilities. The alumina pellets produced by Akie et. al. are extremely chemically
stable and are not soluble in standard PUREX nitric acid dissolution procedures, thus adding
to the chemical proliferation barrier [A-1].
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4.7.2 TRISO Fuel Fabrication. General Atomics has designed a TRISO fuel fabrication
process as part of their proposal to DOE for WGPu dispositioning studies [G-3]. Although
TRISO fuel technology is less mature than MOX technology, it may be more directly
applicable to a non-uranium plutonium dispersion fuel. Figure 4.4 shows the proposed steps
of the process. Again the ovals indicate steps which will need to be altered for non-uranium
Pu dispositioning. The main changes will be the type of kernels fabricated and the
introduction of a fuel rod fabrication step. For RGPu fuel the plutonium will already be in a
nitrate solution. The extent of changes in the purification and kernel formation processes due
to changes in the chemistry of the feed stock are likely to be similar in extent to those
required to adapt MOX technology.
The PC-MHTGR uses channels in graphite fuel blocks rather than fuel rods. Rod
fabrication would entail loading of the compacts similarly to loading of UO2 pellets.
Alternatively, vibratory compaction of a TRISO particle-graphite/SiC mix poured directly
into the fuel rods could be used in place of compacts. Vibratory compaction densities up to
90% have been achieved using systems with three different particle sizes [H-2]. Remote
vibratory compaction has been used successfully in extensive long term production of MOX
fuel pins for the BOR-60 liquid metal reactor [H-4]. Remote handling capability becomes
even more critical if this cycle is to be adopted for the burning of RGPu.
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Figure 4.6 TRISO FUEL Fabrication for the GA PC-MHTGR
4.8 Peripheral Assembly Fuel Cycle.
PWRs comprise over two thirds of operating US commercial reactors. Thus, it would
be convenient to be able to achieve a deep burn of plutonium in PWRs. A PWR fuel cycle
using non-plutonium producing fuel in the peripheral assemblies is proposed. The fuel is
specifically designed to yield a large net plutonium destruction while operating in the
peripheral assembly locations. Peripheral assemblies constitute approximately 20-25% of the
core and have a smaller contribution to overall core properties due to their location. Thus,
the impact on core characteristics of the lower delayed neutron fraction and larger fission
thermal and resonance cross section of 239Pu relative to 235U is reduced. Using only
peripheral assemblies allows greater flexibility in matching the fuel design with the fuel cycle
needs, and has been taken advantage of in the past. For example, LWR cycles have shifted
from an original cycle management which placed the freshest assemblies on the core
periphery, thereby minimizing power peaking, to current low leakage management where the
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oldest fuel assemblies are shuffled to peripheral locations to mitigate vessel fluence and gain
in overall neutron economy. These changes were achieved through more detailed design of
the fuel rather than with reactor modification. It is estimated that current LWRs can be
licensed to operate with 1/3 MOX loading in the core interior without modifications [N-2].
This same sort of flexibility could be used to run the novel plutonium fuel assemblies at a
higher loading and power to increase the throughput and net plutonium destruction.
Conversely, the lower peripheral assembly plutonium loading could be used to enhance
discharge isotopics and neutron economy. The usual lower power density of peripheral
assemblies would reduce the performance requirements of the fuel. Alumina and TRISO
type fuels are examined for use in this peripheral cycle scheme.
4.9 Conclusions
Using 239Pu as the primary BOL fissile species results in a fuel which is substantially
neutronically different from 235U/U0 2 fuel, In addition, eliminating uranium from the fuel
matrix greatly enhances the ability to destroy plutonium, but it also presents several
additional challenges. Table 4.1 lists the many variables which can be manipulated to
overcome these challenges. However, initial investigation indicates that the proper mixture
of homogeneous burnable poisons can produce acceptable initial plutonium loading, MTC,
FTC and reactivity versus burnup profiles. This is further confirmed in the literature. Thus,
only the fuel composition needs to be altered to provide the once-through PWR plutonium
elimination which is sought.
The fissile, fertile and BP atom densities determine the neutronic performance and
hence the degree of plutonium destruction achievable. There are several candidate fuel
matrices which could incorporate these neutronically active ingredients while providing the
necessary material properties. However, the goal is to select a fuel which will allow the safe
destruction of plutonium within existing operating margins. It is also preferable to
accomplish this goal with the smallest cost and development effort possible. Development of
the "best possible" plutonium destruction fuel possible is neither desired nor required. As
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long as its material properties are not or do not degrade to be worse than U0 2's, the
neutronically inert fuel matrix has a negligible effect on the capacity for plutonium
destruction. The minimum performance requirements are readily established as "no worse
than UO2" which comprises the bulk of the core. Fluorite oxides have the largest experience
base and the most mature manufacturing infrastructure. Consequently, they are selected as
the best candidate for containing the plutonium.
A zirconia-plutonium-oxide burnable poison ternary fuel may offer a viable solid
fluorite solution option. However the thermal performance drawbacks due to it's poor
thermal conductivity must be overcome. Alternatively, the plutonium containing crystalline
structure can be dispersed in an inert non-fluorite matrix to enhance material properties and
fission product retention. Oxide dispersion matrices are preferred because their production
should require less modification of existing technology. Alumina is selected as a dispersion
matrix over other oxides because its ability to incorporate fission products, good thermal
metric performance and its chemical stability as a spent fuel form. TRISO particles dispersed
in a graphite or SiC matrix is selected as a dispersion matrix for potential superior
performance and direct applicability of existing technology to non-uranium plutonium fuel
kernels. All of the fuel forms selected appear to be able to be manufacturable without
significant development of new technology.
MOX fuel fabrication techniques and experience bases should be readily adaptable to
non-uranium oxide fuel production. For the once-through cycle being proposed, a balance
between solid solution and dispersion properties is desirable. If an acceptable balance can be
struck, the simplicity and flexibility of the integrated dry route process is preferable to co-
precipitation or co-conversion techniques.
Finally, using only the peripheral locations of the PWR allows greater flexibility in
tailoring both the plutonium destruction rate and core neutron economy. The resultant impact
on current LWR operations and cycles is minimized. Designing a plutonium elimination
option which is equally viable in existing as well as advanced PWRs enhances the potential
throughput of plutonium. This makes the long term objective of mitigating the risk of
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proliferation through first reduction, and then control of the size, of the worlds plutonium
stockpile more easily achievable.
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMPUTATIONAL CODES, MODELS AND
TECHNIQUES
This chapter discusses the models, codes and calculations used to develop and evaluate the
non-uranium plutonium oxide fuel in the peripheral PWR fuel cycle advocated here. Chapter 4
discusses some of the specific neutronic challenges presented in using a PWR core partially
loaded with non-uranium plutonium fuel. These neutronic challenges are greater for WGPu
isotopics than for RGPu. Thus. all calculations were carried out using WGPu isotopics in order
to be conservative. Specifically the following data are calculated: pin to pin power peaking
factors, discharge isotopics, the fuel reactivity vs. burnup profile, core average reactivity
coefficients and whole core reactivity. All the models are based on a PWR core comprised of
standard 17 x 17 Westinghouse assemblies. Fuel compositions are developed to support an 18
month fuel cycle with a capacity factor of 0.8. Thus, the base 18 month fuel cycle is repeated at
440 EFPD long periods.
The first section describes the computer codes used and their application to depletion
calculations. The second section describes the depletion benchmark calculations and results. The
third section describes the use of the computer models and calculation techniques for deriving the
required information.
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5.1 Code Descriptions
Three computer codes were used to perform depletion calculations: ORIGEN version 2.1,
MCNP version 4A and MOCUP [C-4, B-5, M-4]. CASMO-3 was used for depletion benchmark
comparison and temperature coefficient calculations. ORIGEN, Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and
Depletion code, is a zero dimensional depletion code which employs a matrix exponential method
to explicitly calculate the transmutation, decay and production of nuclides. MCNP, Monte Carlo
N-Particle Transport code, is a general purpose Monte Carlo code for calculating the continuous
energy transport of neutrons, photons and electrons in a three dimensional system. ORIGEN and
MCNP are widely used codes and will be discussed here only as is necessary to explain their
interaction with MOCUP. CASMO-3 is a multi-group two dimensional transport theory code for
burnup calculations on PWR and BWR pin cells and assemblies. It is widely used in industry
calculations and will not be described in detail here. The reader is referred to the CASMO-3
manual for details [E-4]. MOCUP, MCNP4A-ORIGEN Coupled Utility Programs, was developed
at INEL.
5.1.1 MCNP-ORIGEN2 Coupled Utility Program (MOCUP) Depletion Calculations. A complete
description of the MOCUP code can be found in the MOCUP manual [M-4]. This section will
describe how MOCUP was used to perform depletion calculations. As the name implies, MOCUP
serves as a conduit for passing information between MCNP and ORIGEN. Nuclide-specific cross
section information calculated by MCNP is manipulated by MOCUP and provided to ORIGEN.
Depletion composition changes effected in ORIGEN are tracked by MOCUP and used to create
MCNP input decks. Thus, composition and reactivity changes are calculated as a function of
burnup. No modification to either ORIGEN or MCNP is required to treat nuclides explicitly in
depletion calculations. This allows accurate depletion of novel fuels and geometries through a
series of MOCUP time intervals and ORIGEN time steps. Time intervals refer to the change in
burnup between MCNP reaction rate calculations and subsequent ORIGEN nuclide cross section
updates. Time steps refer to the individual ORIGEN depletion commands, IRP or IRF, within each
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MOCUP time interval. Several ORIGEN time steps are used to complete the burnup specified for a
single MOCUP time interval. Figure 5.1 shows the flow of depletion calculation information
between MOCUP, ORIGEN and MCNP.
ORIGEN contains one-group cross section libraries and fission product yields for all the
nuclides of potential interest. However, these one-group cross section libraries are produced using
sophisticated reactor physics codes which collapse multi-group libraries based on specific standard
reference reactor geometries and fuel compositions. Consequently, the accuracy of the results that
can be produced using these one group cross sections decreases as the actual system being
evaluated moves further away from the reference basis for the particular library being used.
Consequently, the ORIGEN cross section libraries are of limited use in evaluating new fuel
compositions. Fortunately, ORIGEN has a built in feature which allows substitution of user
supplied one group cross sections for ORIGEN cross sections. In the present instance, substitute
cross sections are derived for the actual composition and geometry from MCNP flux and nuclide
reaction rate tallies. A new set of accurate one-group substitute cross sections are generated and
supplied to ORIGEN each depletion interval. The cross sections are assumed constant over the
depletion interval. The resultant ORIGEN output composition is then incorporated into a new
MCNP input and a new set of fluxes and reaction rates calculated. The entire depletion cycle is
completed in stepwise fashion.
This approach is not new. Previous work shows that if the time interval over which
constant cross sections are assumed is less than 10% of the total End of Cycle (EOC) burnup, the
error in the resultant EOC compositions is less than 1% [R-1]. MOCUP automates the process of
calculating cross sections and tracking nuclide compositions. This automation makes the process
less labor intensive, faster and less prone to clerical errors. Thus, it is more practical to precisely
treat individual fission products, thereby eliminating the need for lumped fission product
approximations. MOCUP is comprised of three modules, mcnpPRO, origenPRO and compPRO
which are used consecutively in each depletion time interval. Figure 5.2 is a detailed flow diagram
of the file information through the MOCUP modules, ORIGEN and MCNP.
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Figure 5.2 Detailed Flow Chart of MOCUP, MCNP,
ORIGEN and User Supplied Files
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The user specifies the cell flux, cell volume and nuclide reaction rates to be calculated via
specifically formatted comment card text strings in the MCNP input file. The mcnpPRO module
input includes the MCNP generated input and output files along with specifically formatted flux
multiplier and nuclide correspondence tables generated by the user. The flux multiplier table
contains flux normalization factors for each cell being depleted and the nuclide correspondence
table provides the ORIGEN nuclide identifiers which correspond to MCNP nuclide identifiers (i.e.
ZAIDs). The mcnpPRO module calculates one group cross sections by dividing each nuclide
reaction rate by the flux, both of which it reads from the MCNP tally file. The cell volume, read
from the MCNP output file, flux and one group cross sections are written to a MOCUP
intermediate mcnpPRO output file (MPO).
The origenPRO module combines composition information, mcnpPRO output and a user
supplied ORIGEN skeletal input file to produce the Modified ORIGEN Input file (MOI).
Composition information is extracted from the MCNP input file for the time zero interval and
thereafter from an ORIGEN Composition File, (OCF), it generates at the end of each ORIGEN
depletion run. The ORIGEN skeletal file contains standard ORIGEN input parameters with the
exception of composition and substitute cross section card information. The origenPRO module
extracts the cross section and composition information from the MPO file and writes it to the MOI
file; origenPRO then runs ORIGEN via a user modified script file, and uniquely renames the
ORIGEN output files to correspond to the time step and MCNP cell depleted. It also extracts the
composition information from the ORIGEN output file and generates the OCF to be integrated into
the ORIGEN skeletal file by origenPRO during the next time interval.
The third module, compPRO, reads the composition information from the OCF files and
updates the MCNP depletion cell nuclide compositions producing a new MCNP input file for the
next time interval. One clockwise revolution around figure 5.2, beginning with the MCNP input
files and ending with the compPRO output of the MCNP input file for the next time interval,
equates to one time interval. The process is repeated for multiple depletion intervals ranging in
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length from tenths of a GWd/MT during the initial bum-in period to several GWd/MT between
cross section updates later in the cycle.
5.1.2 Selection of Key Nuclides. ORIGEN calculates the transmutation, decay and production of
over 1700 nuclides. Thus, the composition information for virtually all nuclides are automatically
tracked through the depletion calculations. However, a small subset are of specific interest or have
a sufficient macroscopic cross section to significantly affect the reactivity and depletion behavior of
the fuel. Hence, the number of nuclides for which one group cross sections must be calculated
through MOCUP and MCNP can be greatly reduced without significant error.' The remaining
nuclide cross sections can be drawn from the original ORIGEN library without appreciable effect
on the resultant depletion reactivity and composition information.
The nuclides for which cross section information must be supplied to ORIGEN are selected
based on four criteria: magnitude of effect on reactivity, importance of the nuclide itself or as part
of a chain producing other important nuclides, and availability of MCNP cross section data.
Actinides with 90 < Z < 96 are tracked because they are of interest. Calculation of the cross
sections for all the fission products would ensure that all reactivity effects were accounted for.
However, this would be inordinately cumbersome and not all fission products need be tracked to
account.for the vast majority of fission product impact on reactivity. Selection of the key fission
products most responsible for the overall fission product effect on reactivity is an iterative process.
ORIGEN produces an output table listing fractional neutron absorptions by fission product
nuclides. Using this table, a list of fission products for which MCNP derived cross sections are to
be used can be compiled. Initially, the set of fission product nuclides individually responsible for
greater than 0.1% of neutron absorptions at the EOC are selected. The depletion calculations are
then repeated, providing ORIGEN with MCNP derived cross sections for the nuclides selected.
The ORIGEN neutron absorption table is re-checked, a new list compiled, and the depletion
calculations repeated. After a few iterations, a definitive set of key fission products to be tracked
'A benchmark was conducted and errors quantified. See section 5.2.
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can be distilled. The set of fission product nuclides listed in table 5.1 account for more than 95% of
all fission product neutron absorptions. The cross sections for these fission products are calculated
using MCNP data. The remaining fission product cross sections are used directly from the
ORIGEN library: hence, no fission products are neglected. The less critical fission products are
included on an approximate level.
Table 51 S ed ct
Kr83 Ag109 Nd143 Sm150
Zr93 1129 Nd145 Sml51
Tc99 Xel31 Nd147 Eu151
Rul01 Cs133 Pm147 Sm152
Rul03 Cs134 Sm147 Eu153
Rh103 1135 Nd148 Eu154
Rh105 Xel35 Pm148 Eu155
Pd105 Cs135 Pm149 Gdl57
Pdl 08 Prl41 Sm149
5.2 Benchmark Calculations
A benchmark of the MCNP version 4A, ORIGEN version 2.1 and MOCUP depletion code
system described in section 5.1 is presented. This section first describes the specifications and then
the results of a PWR pin cell benchmark calculation.
5.2.1 Description of Benchmark and Specifications. Initial novel fuel compositions were screened
using a PWR pin cell model benchmark described in EPRI report NP-6147 vol. 1 & 2 with
amplifying information found in an ECN report ECN-C--93-088 [ F-2, G-6]. Table 5.2 provides the
pin cell specifications and table 5.3 lists the nuclide number densities used for the initial MCNP
input file. The temperatures listed in table 5.2 indicate the temperature at which available MCNP
ENDF V cross sections were evaluated. The temperature of the materials themselves were set
equal to the benchmark value and the densities used were exactly those defined in the ECN report
as listed in table 5.3.
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The MCNP PWR pin cell model consists of a cylindrical fuel rod surrounded by a
concentric cladding cylinder which is in turn encased in a square cell filled with light water
moderator. The cell is modeled as 25 cm long with reflective boundary conditions at the axial
ends and sides of the square cell (hence as an infinite lattice). The initial source neutron particle
distribution is staggered every 4 cm to effect efficient sampling. The EPRI report pin cell differs
in that the square water box is approximated by an equivalent diameter concentric annular
cylinder and white or isotropic boundary conditions; this is known as the Wigner-Seitz
approximation of an infinite square lattice. The square cell used here is a more precise physical
representation of an infinite square lattice [G-6]. The impact of this difference is discussed in detail
later. Figure 5.3 is a cross section of the cell as modeled with MCNP.
I.I
Parameter Benchmark Value As Used Value
Hot Fuel Radius 0.41169 0.41169
Hot Clad Inner Radius 0.41169 0.41169
Hot Clad O.R. 0.47587 0.47587
Hot Pin Pitch 1.25984 1.25984
Fuel 922.04 900
Clad 614.04 600
Moderator 572.04 600
Fuel U0 2  U0 2
Fuel Density 10.142603 10.1431
Enrichment 3.9% 3.9%
Cladding Zr-2 Zr-Nat
Moderator light water light water
Moderator Boron (ppm) 500 500
Specific Power (W/gU) 43.72 43.72
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I Table 5.2. Benchmark Pin Cell Specifications
U 1.1 179tljrlo
235U 8.93440E+20
238U 2.17301E+22
160 4.52432E+22
Zr-Nat 3.87351E+22
1H 4.87183E+22
160 (mod) 2.43608E+22
'OB (mod) 4.01063E+19
lB (mod) 1.62861E+19
Table 5.4 presents the as-modeled specifications of the pin cell. As indicated in Table
5.3, a 43.72 W/gm U constant specific power is required. For a constant number density, the cell
volume fixes the mass of the uranium in the MCNP pin cell. The 43.72 W/gmU equivalent for
the ORIGEN fuel cell power is 5.204E-3 MW. The ORIGEN constant power IRP command was
used. A pin power of 5.204E-3 MW equates to a burnup rate of 22.87 days per gigawatt-
day/metric ton of heavy metal (GWd/MT). Thus, the ORIGEN skeletal files required by
MOCUP were constructed based on a 22.87 day unit of time.
H 20
Cell Edge
Figure 5.3. MCNP PWR Pin Cell Cross Section
The original purpose of the EPRI benchmark study was to investigate variations in
reactivity and burnup results between the technical staffs of different utilities. A consortium of
utilities performed controlled calculations on PWR pin cells. Infinite multiplication constant
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(Kinf) values were reported as a function of burnup for five codes: Cell2 using ENDF/B-V
cross section data, ECELL using STD cross section data, CASMO2 using both CASMO2 and
alternately CPM cross section data, CPM2 with CPM data and CASMO3 with CASMO3 data.
In the following discussion of results, reactivity (rho) units were derived from Kinf values for
plotting purposes due to the more convenient near-linear function of reactivity change with
burnup.
Fuel Cell Volume
Fuel Mass
Uranium (Heavy Metal) Mass
Cell Power
Burnup Rate
13.3116 cm"
135.021 gms
119.022 gms
5.20366E-3 MW
22.87 days = 1 GWd/MT
5.2.2 Benchmark Results. The largest and smallest reported rho values were extracted from the
EPRI report at each burnup to serve as reference brackets for comparison with MOCUP rho
values. Figure 5.4 and 5.5 present the results from an early benchmark run. Note in figure 5.4,
the initial rho is greater than the high reference value, indicating a need for model refinement.
Figure 5.4 also shows some random oscillation in the values. These oscillations are more
pronounced in figure 5.5. Figure 5.5 is a plot of the difference between the average reference
value and the high benchmark, low benchmark and MOCUP reactivity values as a function of
burnup. The oscillating line is the difference between the average reference reactivity and the
MOCUP calculated pin cell reactivity. Note that the amplitude of the oscillations increases with
burnup.
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Figure 5.4. Benchmark PWR Pin Cell Reactivity vs Burnup
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Since MCNP is a Monte Carlo code, its results are statistical in nature. The precision of
values is measured as a relative error and is dependent on the number of samples, known as
neutron history tracks, used to produced the results [B-5]. This relationship is quantified by:
RS- S / X (5.1)
R oc(1 / N) (5.2)
where N is the number of histories, R is the relative error, S, is the standard deviation of the
mean and X is the estimated mean value. The relative error is reported as a percentage of the
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mean. Thus, a value of 100 with a relative error of 0.10 means that there is 68% confidence that
the true value lies in the interval from 90 to 110 and 95% that the value is between 80 and 120.
Equation 5.2 implies that in order to halve the relative error the number of histories run must be
increased by a factor of four. The resulting increase in the computer processing unit time
illustrates the weakness of Monte Carlo methods. This relative error in the MCNP flux and
reaction rate calculations is passed on through MOCUP to ORIGEN where they are propagated
in the depletion calculations and eventually result in the oscillations seen in figures 5.4 & 5.5.
The import of these oscillation in terms of the reliability of the results is addressed in detail later.
Two modifications were made to the initial MCNP model and a second set of benchmark
calculations conducted. First, the MCNP neutron thermal scattering tables option for the light
water moderator was selected. These tables provide more exact scattering cross section values
below 4ev. This refined light water thermal scattering treatment reduces the zero burnup Kinf
from 1.1334 to 1.3046, which falls within the brackets of the lowest and highest EPRI reported
values. Second, the number of MCNP histories per MOCUP time interval were increased from
52,250 to 300,000. This is expected to produce a reduction in the relative error for flux and
reaction rate values by { 1/(5.71) 1/2 } or a factor of 2.4. Table 5.5 compares the relative errors for
the 52,250 and 300,000 history MCNP calculations for some key nuclide reactions calculated at a
burnup of 10 GWd/MT. The reduction in relative error is slightly better than expected.
Figure 5.6 compares the reactivity results of this second set of benchmark depletion
calculations with the reference benchmark values as a function of fuel bumup. There is better
overall agreement due to the enhanced light water scattering treatment used in this set of MCNP
calculations.
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Errors @10GWd/MT
-.o ,,
0.0051 0.002 2.55
0.0073 0.0029 2.52
0.0058 0.0023 2.52
0.0046 0.0017 2.71
0.0053 0.0021 2.52
0.00562 0.0022 2.55
Rgure 5.6. Benchmark of Reactivity vs Bumup
(w/MCNP thermal scattering treatment)
-..o. High Rho
--- MOC. Rho
.. • .. Low Rho
Bumup (GWcdT)
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the effect of reduced MCNP tally flux and reaction rate relative errors on
the oscillations. Comparison of figures 5.5 & 5.7 reveals the effects of the two changes in the
MCNP runs of the two set of benchmark calculations. First, figure 5.7 reactivity values start off
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0.0023
0.0025
0.0072
0.0023
0.0032
238U
239Pu
238U
239pU
24°pU
241Pu
Average
rl UFr
V.V %llT- V.IVV I
0.0056
0.0062
0.00193
0.0057
0.00866
3.29
2.48
2.68
2.48
2.71
within the benchmark reference brackets. Secondly, although the oscillation patterns are similar,
it is important to note the reduction in their magnitude from a maximum at 36 GWd/MT of
approximately 0.021 to 0.013 (difference between MOCUP reactivity and the average of the
reference values). This reduction can be attributed to reduced relative flux and reaction rate
errors as a consequence of the larger number of MCNP histories run in the calculations
represented in Figure 5.7. Producing accurate nuclide composition vs burnup data is critical
to evaluation of deep burn plutonium disposition options. Hence, a CASMO-3 model of the
PWR pin cell was also run to provide isotopic composition information as a function of burnup
for comparison with the MOCUP system results. Figure 5.8 presents a comparison of results
generated by the MOCUP system and CASMO for key nuclide and total fission product fuel
weight percents at selected burnups. The shaded regions are the difference between the MOCUP
and CASMO values. At the end of 36GWd/MT all nuclide compositions agree within 0.02%
with the exception of 238U. The discrepancy between MOCUP and CASMO3 238U composition
grows consistently with burnup to reach a -0.11 w% difference at 36GWd/MT. Likewise, the
difference in fission product weight percents grow steadily with burnup to reach 0.07 w% at
36GWd/MT.
Figure 5.7 Difference in Reactivity from Average of the Reference values vs Bumup
(w/MCNP thermal treatment and increased # of
Ap
(P-PAVG)
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5.2.3 Discussion of Benchmark Results. Error propagation can be managed in two ways.
Equation 5.1 shows that increasing the number of MCNP histories used in each time interval
produces more precise reaction rate and flux values. Running a large number of MCNP histories
is expensive in computer time and is not required for all depletions. In practice, rough screening
calculations were completed using only a moderate number of histories. Promising results were
subsequently checked and refined using a large number of histories. MCNP relative errors
propagate with the number of ORIGEN time steps. However, too few ORIGEN time steps can
produce errors resulting from the matrix exponential method used in ORIGEN [M-4]. A balance
must be struck between the MCNP error propagation and the number of ORIGEN time steps to
reduce the overall error.
Assuming valid modeling, MCNP tally results are considered precise and reliable if the
relative error is < 0.05. However, the propagation of a 0.05 relative error through multiple
ORIGEN depletion time steps results in an unacceptably high relative error in the output
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composition as evidenced in figure 5.5. The MOCUP user manual recommends a relative error
in the flux and reaction rate calculations of less than 1% [M-4]. Theoretically, a 1% relative
error in the flux and cross section could propagate through five ORIGEN time steps to produce a
3.2% relative error in resultant ORIGEN output composition. Considering that the 36GWd/MT
depletion of the PWR pin cell took 23 MOCUP time intervals with a total of roughly 200
ORIGEN depletion steps, one begins to question the validity of this depletion scheme. However,
the composition data calculated via MOCUP shows stable trends and excellent agreement with
CASMO data as a result of the self correcting nature of depletion calculations.
Relative error is a misnomer. What is really being described is confidence intervals. The
true value could very well be the exact value calculated. In practice these errors will be random
and will tend to be self correcting. Underestimation of a reaction rate and hence the cross section
will result in under-depletion of that nuclide in a time interval. This will produce a reaction rate
higher than the true value leading to accelerated depletion in the following time interval. The
higher reaction rate will produce a larger cross section causing acceleration of the depletion of
the nuclide in the next time step. This is why the error curves in figures 5.4 and 5.5 show
oscillations that tend back toward zero. The random nature of the relative error in the MCNP
calculations produces the irregular nature of the oscillations.
Note that at 36 GWd/MT, the figure 5.7, delta rho value is reduced by a factor of 1.6
relative to figure 5.5. This reduction is accomplished through an increase in the number of
MCNP histories run by a factor of 5.7 which reduced the relative error of individual reaction rate
calculations by a factor of approximately 2.6.
The EPRI report codes are multi-group, deterministic codes while MCNP uses fewer
approximations because it is a continuous energy, Monte Carlo code. Thus, the EPRI codes and
MCNP determine the quantities of interest through fundamentally different techniques. This
results in some systematic differences in their results. MCNP is generally considered the
reference tool against which other codes are checked [G-6].
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The EPRI report codes were limited in capability to a Wigner-Seitz cylindrical pin cell
approximation with white/isotropic boundary conditions. The square cell modeled in MCNP is a
more accurate representation of actual square lattices found in PWRs. Comparisons of the
results produced by these two cell models indicate that the Wigner-Seitz cell Kinf may be as
much as 0.3% lower than a cell with identical specifications modeled as a square cell [G-6].
Further examination revealed that part of this difference may be found in differences in 238U
resonance absorptions. DE Kruijf et al. reported that two MCNP models, one with square cell
reflective boundary conditions and one with cylindrical isotropic boundary conditions but
identical in all other respects, were run using approximately 30 million histories to produce small
relative errors [D-5, D-6]. The cylindrical model produced 1.3% higher absorptions resulting in
an underestimation of the escape probability, p, of 0.34% and a 0.0034 lower Kinf value. This
readily explains why the MCNP Kinf is at the upper edge of the benchmark range for fresh fuel.
At 36 GWd/MT burnup, the MOCUP Kinf is 0.012 units or 1.25% greater than the average
reference benchmark value. Thus, this systematic difference between the EPRI code techniques
and MCNP cannot completely account for the high MOCUP Kinf value at the end of the bunup
period.
The difference in fission product weight percent is not surprising. Fission products (as
well as actinides) are handled explicitly in the MOCUP system. ORIGEN calculates fission
production, decay and transmutation reactions during an individual burnup step for each nuclide
and then sums the results to produce their new concentrations. Similar to the ECN and other
benchmark work, thirty-five fission product nuclides were selected for MOCUP tracking. At the
start of each time interval, the fission product absorption rates were calculated by MCNP,
corresponding cross sections were calculated by mcnpPRO and input into ORIGEN by
ORIGENPRO. The end of step compositions were updated in the MCNP input for the next time
interval. These thirty-five fission products accounted for an average of 95% of the total fission
product absorption. Thus, the MOCUP system allowed for very specific modeling of fission
product composition and absorptions.
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In contrast, CASMO uses decay and production chains to predict a cumulative yield of 23
individual nuclides and two lumped fission products. Significant differences in the ORIGEN and
CASMO libraries have been reported. For example, Gruppelar et al. (1993) report a 155Eu
CASMO yield of 6.08E-7 as compared to the ORIGEN yield of 1.63E-8 [G-6]. This leads to a
factor of two difference in the CASMO and ORIGEN 155Eu concentrations. Surprisingly, the
CASMO concentration is the lower of the two. The 155Eu capture cross sections provides the
answer. The CASMO 155Eu cross section is 4.09E3 barns compared to ORIGEN's 3.63E3 barns.
To further illustrate the potential magnitude of the differences in fission product cross section
libraries, the WIMS cross section libraries have a 155Eu capture cross section of 1.19E4, a factor
of three higher than ORIGEN. These sorts of differences in fission product treatment and library
values cause the consistently growing discrepancy between MOCUP and CASMO fission
product weight percents. The lower fission product weight percent in MOCUP in turn leads to a
trend of increasingly higher Kinf values relative to the benchmarks. The oscillations caused by
the relative error propagation are superimposed on and somewhat mask this trend.
The very slightly low MOCUP 238U concentration contradicts the higher 238U resonance
absorption caused by the previously discussed Wigner-Seitz approximation. This can not be
readily explained but is not of sufficient magnitude to be of concern here. One possible
explanation is that the resonance absorption difference is overcome by relative error oscillations.
Similarly, the differences in 235U and 239pU compositions are small and appear to be artifacts of
the relative error oscillations.
5.2.4 Conclusions of Benchmark Calculations. The MCNP, ORIGEN, MOCUP code system
has demonstrated a good ability to reproduce expected reactivity and isotopic results for PWR
pin cell depletion. It has the advantage of not requiring multi-group and geometry
approximations as well as an extensive cross section library. Relative error is a concern but can
be managed through judicious use of ORIGEN time steps and specification of a sufficient
number of MCNP histories to refine rough results.
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Section 5.3 reviews the models and calculation techniques used to develop and evaluate
the non-uranium plutonium deep bum PWR peripheral cycle advocated here.
5.3 Models and Techniques
This section describes the use of four different PWR models - an MCNP pin cell, an
MCNP 34 pin model, a CASMO3 pin cell model, and an MCNP 1/8th symmetry core model - in
the development of the proposed non-uranium fuel to be used in the periphery of PWRs to
substantially eliminate plutonium. These models were used to determine the neutronic
characteristics of the fuel as a function of burnup as well as to evaluate how it would interact
with the non-peripheral fuel assemblies in the PWR core.
Chapter 4 discusses some of the specific neutronic challenges presented in using a PWR
core partially loaded with non-uranium plutonium fuel. WGPu contains substantially less 240Pu
than RGPu. 240Pu assists in holding down excess reactivity and providing resonance absorptions
which make moderator and fuel temperature coefficients more negative. Thus, these neutronic
challenges are greater for WGPu isotopics. Accordingly, all calculations were carried out using
WGPu isotopics in order to be conservative. Specifically the following data are calculated: pin to
pin power peaking factors, discharge isotopics, the fuel reactivity vs. bumup profile and reactivity
coefficients. The following sections describe each of the four models and how they are used to
calculate the required information. All the models are based on a PWR comprised of a standard 17
x 17 Westinghouse assemblies. The characteristics of the core and assemblies are listed in table
5.6. Fuel compositions are developed to support an 18 month fuel cycle with a capacity factor of
0.8. Burnup is usually measured in MWd/MT, however, non-uranium fuel has a much lower
heavy metal content than standard UO2. Consequently, burnup is measured in units of effective
full power days (EFPD) to provide a consistent basis for comparison. One EFPD is equal to the
burnup achieved when one pin is run at core average 100% power (i.e. q'=5.688 Kw/ft) for one
day. Thus, the base 18 month fuel cycle is repeated at 440 EFPD long periods. In other words,
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the fuels must be developed to support core residence times which are multiples of 440 EFPD.
The next sub-section details how depletion calculations were conducted.
Table 5.6 Westinghouse Core and Asembly
Design Parameters
Design Parameter Value
Number of Assemblies per Core 193 assembles
Assembly Type square, 17 x 17 rod slots
Number of Fueled Rods per Assembly 264 rods
Overall Outside Assembly 21.4 cm
Dimensions
Number of Rods per Core 50,952 rods
Rod Pitch 1.26 cm
Rod Outside Diameter 0.9497 cm
Clad Thickness 0.0572 cm
Clad Material Zircaloy-4
Gap Thickness 0.01651 cm
Core Average Linear Power 5.688 Kw/ft
5.3.1 MCNP 34 Pin Model Power Peaking Calculations. As discussed in chapter 4, the large
thermal fission cross section of plutonium can produce significant power peaking in the
plutonium pins adjacent to U0 2 assemblies. Thus, finding a plutonium fuel composition which
produces acceptable pin to pin radial power peaking is a key development criteria. Figure 5.9 has
two drawings of the same 34 pin model which simulates a single row of pins across two 1 x 17
assemblies; the upper picture is the full length 34 pin model and lower picture is a close-up
truncated view. This 34 pin model is used to determine pin to pin power peaking and facilitates a
detailed look at the interface region. The model simulates the interface between a peripheral
assembly and its radially adjacent inboard assembly. The dashed line in the lower close-up view
indicates where the row is truncated. Candidate non-uranium plutonium fuel compositions are
loaded into the 17 peripheral assembly pins adjacent to the core reflector region. These 17 pins
simulate a peripheral plutonium assembly. The left 17 pins adjacent to the core interior are
loaded with standard 3.9 w% UO2. A reflected boundary condition is imposed on the left most
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model surface adjacent to the core interior. Thus, the inner 17 UO2 pins simulate the rest of the
PWR core interior. The assembly dimensions, core baffle plate, reflector region and core barrel
are explicitly modeled to simulate the Westinghouse Seabrook PWR. The moderator is H20
with 500 ppm boron. This model is used in the first step of the depletion process.
Upper Full View
Figure 5.9. MCNP 34 Pin Row Two Assembly Pin Model
Fresh non-uranium candidate fuels are loaded into the outer (right) 17 PuO 2 pin slots with
fresh 3.9 w% U0 2 in the inner (left) 17 pin slots.. The MCNP model is run and the power
deposited in each of the 34 pins is tallied. Peripheral assemblies comprise roughly 25% of the
total number of assemblies in a core. Thus, the 17 interior U0 2 pins represent 3/4 and the 17
PuO 2 outer pins represent 1/4 of the total number of pins in the core. The power deposited in
each pin is normalized to the core average pin power to produce a radial peaking factor for each
pin. The core average pin power is calculated by:
Core Average = f{( average power in UO, pins) x 31 + (average power in PuO Dpins)I
Pin Power 4
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The individual pin power radial peaking factors are then calculated relative to the core average
pin power by:
Radial Pin Power Peaking Factor = (individual pin power) (5.2)
(core average pin power)
The peaking factors are plotted against their radial location in the model. Seabrook fuel
management calculations set a 1.5 maximum radial pin peaking factor to ensure that the overall
highest peaking factor is less than 2.5 when combined with axial peaking factors. A 1.5
maximum radial peaking factor was adopted here. In addition to the power, the fast and thermal
flux for each pin are also tallied and normalized to the core average. Figure 5.10 shows typical
resultant power, thermal and fast flux profiles. The ordinate axis values are the pin values
normalized to core average values. The abscissa values are the pin numbers from pin number
one, which correlates to the left-most UO 2 pin directly adjacent to the reflected left vertical core
interior surface in Figure 5.9, to pin number 34, which correlates to the right-most PuO 2 pin
directly adjacent to the core baffle. The interface is marked by the dashed line to the left of the
first PuO 2 pin (adjacent to the U0 2 assembly) which is pin number 18. As expected, the thermal
flux decreases sharply at the interface due to the larger thermal absorption cross section of 2 39pU
relative to 235U. The fast flux remains unaffected by the interface, displaying a standard radial
cosine flux shape at the core periphery. Looking at the power peaking moving radially outward
from pin number 18 to 34, the power peaks in pin number 18 because of the plutonium fuel and
still relatively large thermal flux. The power then drops in pin number 19 which has the same
WGPu loading as pin number 18 but sees a lower thermal flux due to the shielding by pin
number 18. Pin number 20 produces a second power peak because it has three times the 239PU
number density of pins number 19 and 18. The power drops off in pins 21 through 34 which
have the same 239Pu number density as pin number 20 but see a decreasing thermal flux due to
increased shielding by the inboard PuO 2 pins.
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Plutonium Fuel: 11w% WGPu, 32w% Ce, 53 w% Th, 3w% U and B, Ho, Sm
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Figure 5.10 Example Pin Radial Power,
Thermal and Fast Flux 34 Pin Model Results
The 34 pin model is used to determine the pin power relative to core average. The actual
pin power is the product of the pin's peaking factor and the assumed core average linear power,
5.688 Kw/ft. This power is assumed constant over a MOCUP depletion time interval and used to
perform depletion calculations using the MCNP Pin Cell model and ORIGEN. Running
individual depletion calculations on each of the 34 pins would require 34 MCNP pin cell and
ORIGEN calculations for each time interval. This is avoided by using the average power over a
number of pins and depleting them as one composite pin. Four pin cell models are used to
deplete the 34 pins. Referring to figure 5.9, UO 2 pins numbered 1 through nine are depleted as
one pin labeled STD1. Similarly, UO2 pins 10 through 17 are depleted as STD2, PuO 2 pins 18
through 24 are depleted as OX1 and pins 25 through 34 are depleted as OX2. These composite
pins are depleted using the PWR Pin Cell Model.
5.3.2 Pin Cell Depletion & Reactivity Calculations. The MCNP pin cell model is similar to the
benchmark pin cell described in section 5.2.1 with the addition of a concentric gap as shown in
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figure 5.11. Table 5.7 lists the specifications. Depletions are carried out on the pin cell with the
MOCUP MCNP-ORIGEN coupled codes as described in section 5.1.1.
Reflected Boundary Conditions
H24
Cladding
Square Cell Edge
Figure 5.11 MCNP PWR Pin Cell Cross Section
Figure 5.12 summarizes the algorithm for using the 34 pin and pin cell MCNP models
with MOCUP and ORIGEN to deplete fuel. The depletion cycle is started by loading the 34 pin
model with fresh fuel compositions and determining individual and composite average pin
powers. The fuel compositions for the four composite pins, STD1, STD2, OX1 and OX2, are
subsequently loaded into four different MCNP pin cell models. Initially, the fresh fuel
composition of STD1 and STD2 are the same and equal that of standard 3.9w% U0 2. Similarly,
the compositions of fresh OX1 and OX2 plutonium oxide non-uranium fuels are the same. The
average pin power of the pins represented by each of the four composite pins is calculated from
the 34 pin model individual pin powers as described in sub-section 5.3.1. The corresponding
average pin power is assigned to each of the four composite pins and is assumed constant during
the subsequent ORIGEN depletion. The four pins are depleted at that power for a single MOCUP
time interval following the process described in section 5.1.1. Since the pin powers for the four
composite pins differ, the composition of all four pins will be different after the first depletion
interval. The four resultant post-depletion composite pin compositions are loaded back into their
associated 34 pin model pins, the radial peaking factors are checked and a new set of composite
pin powers are calculated for the next time interval. The fuel is depleted via several time interval
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cycles. The loop repeats until the fuel has been depleted to the desired number of EFPD or the
maximum radial peaking factor of 1.5 is exceeded. The length of a MOCUP time interval
depends on the previously accumulated burnup.
Hot Fuel Radius 0.40132
Gap Outer Radius 0.41783
Hot Clad O.R. 0.47498
Hot Pin Pitch 1.2598
Fuel 922.04
Clad 600
Moderator 600
Materiails__
Fuel non-uranium Pu fuel
Fuel Density function of matrix
Enrichment variable
Cladding Zr-2
Moderator light water
Moderator Boron (ppm) 500
Core Average Power (Kw/ft) 5.688
The length of the depletion time interval is chosen to be less than 10% of the total
discharge burnup (as described in section 5.1.1) but also depends on the previously accumulated
burnup. During the first approximately 50 EFPD, the composition of the fuel is rapidly
changing. Initially, xenon and samarium equilibrium concentrations are burning in and the
percentage changes in the fission product concentrations are large. Thus, the cross sections
change more rapidly than later in the fuel cycle when the relative percentage of composition
change is lower. Since the cross sections are assumed constant over a time interval, smaller
depletion intervals are used to burn-in fresh fuel. Burnmtin time intervals of one day for the first
five days are used to allow xenon and samarium to reach equilibrium. Next, 10 and 20 EFPD
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intervals are used until the accumulated burnup on the fuel reaches approximately 100 EFPD.
After approximately 100 EFPD, the intervals are increase to 10% of the total EFPD. The next
section discusses how the information gleaned from this algorithm is used to develop the non-
uranium plutonium fuel.
Figure 5.12 Pin Power - Depletion Algorithm
5.3.3 Analysis of Depletion and Pin Power Peaking Information. The algorithm depicted in
figure 5.11 characterizes the fuel as a function of burnup. In addition to the pin to pin power
peaking, reactivity and composition data are calculated. These two pieces of information are
used to analyze the performance of candidate fuel compositions and to gain insight into how to
alter the composition to improve performance.
An MCNP pin cell infinite medium multiplication factor, Kinf, is calculated for each
MOCUP depletion interval. Individual fuel reactivity versus burnup profiles are constructed
from these MCNP pin cell Kinf calculations. Figure 5.13 is an example profile for standard 3.9
w% UO2 fuel and three different non-uranium fuel compositions, 10 w% WGPu with erbium as a
poison, 10 w% WGPu with gadolinium as a poison and low loading non-uranium fuel at 3w%
WGPu with erbium. These curves help determine how fuel performance can be improved. In
general, the closer the U0 2 and PuO2 pin reactivity profiles match, the more even the resultant
power distribution over the cycle. A pin's reactivity profile is a function of how fast the fissile
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plutonium is burning out relative to the poison. For example, the 10 w% WGPu non-uranium
fuel with gadolinium pin reactivity is negative and relatively constant over the first 200 EFPD.
This is because the 255,000 barn thermal capture cross section of 157Gd dominates the neutron
captures. By approximately 220 EFPD the '5 7Gd is nearly burned out and the '55Gd begins
controlling the reactivity but it is also depleted rapidly. The pin's positive reactivity slope
indicates that the poison is burning out much faster than the fissile material. By contrast, the
3w% WGPu non-uranium fuel with erbium poison has a shallow linear negative slope indicating
that the rate at which positive reactivity is being added by the poison depletion is slightly less
than the negative reactivity addition caused by fissile material depletion and fission product
build-up. Thus, erbium provides longer term reactivity control. The 10 w% WGPu non-uranium
fuel with erbium has a nearly constant reactivity profile due to the large initial fissile loading. As
mentioned above, reactivity profile information correlates to pin power peaking information.
Figure 5.14 shows the 0 and 620 EFPD pin radial power peaking profiles which correspond to
the pin reactivity profiles in figure 5.13.
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i -0.4
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i
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Figure 5.13 Exanple Reactivity vs. Bumup trofiles
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Figure 5.14 Pin to Pin Power peaking for PuO2 assembly with Three Types of Pu
The 34 pin model loading configuration is described in the figure. Note that the power
peaking of pins 18 are 19 are similar to that found in figure 5.10 and that pin number 20, which
is loaded with gadolinium, has a very low peaking factor. The fresh fuel power peaks are
acceptable. However, the gadolinium loaded pin produces an unacceptable power peak at 620
EFPD. Looking at figure 5.13, the power peak occurs because the gadolinium pin's reactivity is
increasing while the other pins have negative reactivity vs burnup slopes. The composition vs
burnup information generated by ORIGEN is also useful in understanding the causes for the
observed characteristics. Review of the ORIGEN-generated compositions confirms that the
167Gd shields 23 9Pu reducing the 239Pu consumption rate as it rapidly burns out. Thus, when the
167Gd is completely depleted it leaves behind a relatively fresh plutonium pin composition. At
620 EFPD, the pin which contained Gd has a higher reactivity than the surrounding pins resulting
in its unacceptable power peaking. The conclusion can be drawn that using a combination of
high gadolinium and plutonium loading should be avoided because it results in problematic
power peaking after about 1.5 cycles of exposure (in fixed position). Assembly rotation after one
cycle can potentially ameliorate this problem.
Finally, it is interesting to note that pins #18 and 19 are producing very little power at 620
EFPD. Looking at the composition data, it is found that the pins generate little power because
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most of the plutonium is destroyed by 620 EFPD. This conclusion is also of interest because the
purpose of non-uranium fuel is to eliminate plutonium within the 880 EFPD base cycle. Thus,
the plutonium content of the discharged fuel is a critical performance measure. Specifically, the
goal is to minimize the ratio of residual plutonium to loaded plutonium for elemental plutonium
and 23 9 Pu. Once a fuel which accomplishes this goal is found, its suitability for safe use in a core
must be determined.
5.3.4 CASMO-3 Calculation of Core Average Reactivity Coefficients. In order to be
feasible, a fuel which has acceptable power peaking vs burnup and which eliminates plutonium
must also have acceptable reactivity coefficients. To be acceptable, peripheral PuO 2 fuel
reactivity coefficients must be negative enough so that when they are averaged with the reactivity
coefficients of the rest of the core, the whole core average reactivity coefficients are within PWR
design limits. [C-5, F-4, M-6] The first step is to determine the reactivity coefficients of the
candidate fuel composition in a pin cell configuration.
CASMO3 is specifically designed for depletion calculations. A CASMO3 pin cell model
with the same specifications as found in table 5.7, is used to examine reactivity coefficients.
First, base case depletions of both UO2 and non-uranium compositions are run for a series of
depletion steps under reference conditions as found in table 5.7. Then, several branch calculation
depletions are run where a single reference parameter such as the fuel temperature is varied for
each branch calculation. Table 5.8 lists the reference parameters varied and the associated
reactivity coefficients calculated. A Kinf is calculated for each parameter value at each base case
depletion step. The difference between the base case and branch calculation Kinf is used to
determine the reactivity coefficient as shown in table 5.9.
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Table 5.8 Summary of Pin Cell Reference Parameters
and the Associated Reactivity Coeffcient
Pin Cell Reference Parameter Coefficient Units
Fuel Temperature Fuel Temperature pcm/oK
Isothermal ModeratorModerator Temperature Isothermal Moderator % delta rho / oK
Temperature
Moderator Boron Concentration Boron Worth ppm/% delta rho
Moderator Percent Void Void %delta rho/% void
Table 5.9 Summary of Reactivity Calculations
Coefficient Equation Units
Fuel Temperature (FTC) FTC = 10- * [(KTz-K.1)/KTave] pcm/rK
(T1-T2)
Isothermal Moderator MTC = 104 *[(KTi /K • % delta rho * 104
Temperature (MTC) (T1-T2) oK
Inverse Boron Worth IBW = 100 *[(KBZK/)KBII ppm / % delta rho
(IBW) (Bl-B2)
Void (VC) VC = [(K_ýy-KvL/KVIl %delta rho/% void
(Vl-V2)
Once pin cell reactivity coefficients are calculated, they must be combined to produce core
average parameters. Since this is a feasibility study rather than a licensing calculation, a weighted
approximation of core average parameters is adopted.
Subject to the validity of approximations made in the derivation of the FLARE-type nodal
codes, plus equality of the fast group flux and its adjoint (as confirmed by Mosteller [M-5] for
typical PWR Cores), and neglecting certain leakage related terms, it can be shown that the
neutron yield and reactivity coefficients should be weighted by the fast flux squared (or
equivalently by the product of fast flux and neutron source rate) when aggregating assembly node
values to obtain whole core average values [H-8]. From the near constancy of the energy release
per fission neutron and fast group migration area, it also follows that power squared weighting is
a useful, fairly accurate alternative [S-5]. A derivation of the power squared weighting scheme
from the two group neutron balance equation can be found in appendix C.
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The analytical support and numerical verification for power squared weighting are not as
strong as for more conventional lattices because of the use of fertile-free fuel in a peripheral
location. However, such weighting should be adequate for present purposes, particularly since it
will be shown that the highly conservative arbitrary application of either power weighting or
number weighting lead to results which do not move whole core kinetic parameters outside the
currently acceptable design envelope for PWR cores.
Thus, the core average reactivity coefficients may calculated three ways as necessary:
number weighting, power weighting and power squared weighting. Number weighting is most
conservative because it assumes that the peripheral assembly pins, which on average produce less
than 50% of core average assembly pin power, contribute equally in proportion to their number
in the core as higher powered interior pins. Since the peripheral pins run at less than 100% core
average power weighting is less conservative than number weighting but more conservative than
the more accurate power squared weighting of individual pin contributions to core average
kinetic parameters. The peripheral assemblies account for 25% of the core. Consequently, the
core average reactivity coefficients are calculated using the appropriate pin cell reactivity
coefficients as follows:
Let:
C, -Number Weighted Core Average Parameter,
CP =Power Weighted Core Average Parameter,
Cp 2 - Power Squared Weighted Core Average Parameter,
Cu U02 Average Parameter
C = Non - UraniumFuel ParameterPu
PWu = Average Power Generated in UO, Pins
and,
PWpu = Average Power Generated in Non - Uranium Pins
Cn [(c,*0.75) + (Cpu*0.25)], (53)
{ [C,*0.75*PW I+ [C *0.25*PW ] }
Cp = 0.75 * PW,, + 0.25 * PW(54)
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S{ [C,*0.75*PW2 ]+[C O25PW 2] }c1- (55)(025 * PW,2)+ (0.75 * PW, 2)
Finally, a 1/8th symmetry MCNP PWR coe model is used to check overall core reactivity
at the beginning and end of the cycle to ensure it is within the envelope of current PWR fuel
management practices. [C-5, F-4, M-6] The PWR Core model is an assembly level model using
the MCNP repeated structures technique to model the pins and water holes in each assembly.
The assembly specifications are the same as those listed for the 17 x 17 Westinghouse assembly
listed in table 5.6. Figure 5.15 is a top down view of the 1/8th symmetry model with the
assemblies numbered 1 through 31 showing the location of the peripheral assemblies and other
features.
Figure 5.15 1/8th Symmetry MCNP PWR Core
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5.4 Summary of Computer Codes, Models and Computational Techniques.
A 17 x 17 Westinghouse PWR assembly is used as the reference design for all computer
models. Fuel compositions are developed to support an 18 month fuel cycle with a capacity
factor of 0.8. Thus, fuels are developed to support core residence times for these peripheral
assemblies which are multiples of 440 EFPD. Table 5.10 correlates models and codes with the
required information they provide. All required information listed in table 5.10 is calculated as a
function of burnup with the exception of the 1/8th core model effective multiplication constant
(Keff).
A model with 34, 25 cm long pins arranged in a single row with reflected boundary
conditions on the top, bottom and 3 sides and a core reflector region on the fourth side is used to
model pin peaking at the interface between a peripheral PuO2 assembly and the radially adjacent
interior UO2 assembly. Results of the 34 pin model are used to determine power peaking factors
and actual pin powers. A 1.5 maximum radial power peaking factor is adopted. Four composite
MCNP pin cells, representative of the 34 pins, are depleted at constant power. A satisfactorily
benchmark MOCUP-MCNP-ORIGEN code system is used to perform the depletion calculations.
The four pin cell models are used to generate one group cross sections for a selected group of
actinides and fission products. These cross sections are substituted for ORIGEN library cross
section information with the remainder of the nuclide cross sections coming directly from the
ORIGEN libraries. ORIGEN performs depletion calculations on the fuel for a user-specified
time period. The resultant new fuel compositions at each burnup step are used to generate a new
set of cross sections for the next time interval. Hence, the fuel is depleted in a stepwise fashion.
EFPD burnup units are used instead of MWd/MT to provide a consistent basis for comparison of
non-uranium fuels and uranium fuels. The elimination of plutonium must be accomplished
within the allowed peaking factor over a residence time that is a multiple of 440 EFPD. In
addition, the presence of the fuel on the periphery must not alter the core average reactivity
coefficients beyond design margins. Core reactivity coefficients of pin cells are calculated using
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a CASMO3 model. Core average parameters can be approximated by power squared weighting
of the contribution of individual pins to the core average parameter. For this application two
more conservative weighting factors, the number of pins and the power of the pins are used as
weighting constants in addition to power squared weighting. The next chapter presents the
results of the calculations described here.
Table 5.10 Correlation of Required Information, Codes & Models
Information Code(s) Model Output
Required (-- Used As Input For)
Pin Powers
Power Peaking MCNP 34 Pin (Depletion & Core Average
Reactivity Calculations)
End of time interval fuel
Depletion ORIGEN None composition
(Power Peak Calculations)
Reactivity Vs Kinf
Burnup Flux & Nuclide
Flux MCNP Pin Cell Reaction Rates
(MOCUP)
Reaction Rates
Kinf vs Coeff. Parameter
Reactivity CASMO3 Pin Cell (Core Average Reactivity
Coefficients Calculations)
Assembly Residence MCNP & 34 Pin & None Reactivity & Composition
Time ORIGEN (Fuel Cycle Planning)
Whole Core MCNP 1/8" PWR Keff at Specific Burnups
Reactivity Model
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CHAPTER SIX: NON-URANIUM FUEL AND PERIPHERAL PWR
CYCLE RESULTS
Chapter 5 described the computational tools and techniques used to determine the
neutronic performance of a candidate non-uranium fuel relative to several fuel properties.
The criteria listed in table 6.1 distill the performance criteria from proliferation , material and
neutronic considerations, discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 5, which are appropriate for a non-
uranium fuel used to eliminate plutonium in a peripheral PWR cycle. Candidate fuel form
performance was evaluated based on the application of these criteria. Several WGPu and
poison loading combinations were investigated leading to a recommendation of plutonium-
erbium-oxide-inert diluent matrix for use in eliminating plutonium in a once through
peripheral PWR cycle. Chapter 4 details the material considerations in the selection of
candidate diluent matrices. This chapter presents the results of a neutronic evaluation of the
recommended plutonium-erbium-oxide-inert diluent matrix fuel in the peripheral PWR fuel
cycle. The first section describes the preferred fuel composition. The second section
presents discharge properties and cycle feasibility results while the third section covers
results relative to reactivity coefficients. The fourth section reviews other results from the
analysis of fuel compositions which are not recommended. The final section summarizes
these results and discusses implementation.
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A. Weapon's usability is described in chapter 3
B. Values are for critical moderator boron concentration
6.1 Proposed Fuel and Cycle.
Chapter four discusses fuel matrix selection in detail.
critical to the practical in-core performance of the fuel.
composition determine suitability for fabrication as well
Choice of a proper matrix is
The matrix properties and
as mechanical and thermal
performance. An oxide fuel matrix is recommended over other fuel forms because it satisfies
thermo-physical property requirements and is most readily adapted to current MOX
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Table 6.1 Neutronic Perfonrmance Criteria For Plutonium Disposition
Fuel Produci ng Eimination Option
rameter ono ommn
oe m Ub • heliminaote nm
Residual 239Pu 239pu / Total Pu discharged < 10 want to mns usabilitA
Residual otalPO u Total Pu / Initial Pu Loaded < 10 weapons usabilityA
i"iaposed f the peripher were loaded ,with twice buared UO)
Number of EFPDs multiple of must support 18 month
Fuel Remains in Core 440 EFPDs refueling cycle
Radial Power Pin Power/core must not be too large so as to
< 1.5 cause total power peaking toPeaking average pin power exceed 2.5.
BOL and EOC Whole Core BOL and EOC
Whole Core EOC Kinf values >1.reactivity must be within PWR
Reactivity design limits
Reactivity Coefficients (whole core average reactivity values must be within acceptable PWR design
range)
Fuel KT-K )/-900)] BOC to EOC:
Temperature units = (pcm/F) -1.30 to Typical PWR Design Values
Coefficient (FTC) -1.46
Moderator BOC to EOC:
Temperature -4-0.78 to Typical PWR Design Values
Coefficient (MTC) units = p/F x 10 -3.02
BOC to EOC:
Inverse Boron (1000-ppm)/((Knooo-K~m )/Koo) 108 to Typical PWR Design ValuesWorth (IBW) units = ppm /% 8p 96
BOC to EOC:
Void ([((Ko%-Kv%/KO)/(0%-V%)] -0.4 1B to Typical PWR Design Values
units = 8p / %void x 103 -1.43"
fabrication processes. The chapter four selection process recommends development of two
candidate oxide matrices: alumina and zirconia. However, the neutronic performance of the
fuel is not a significant function of the fuel matrix.
6.1.1 Importance of the Fuel's Inert Matrix Diluent. Several inert matrices were examined in
the course of developing a fuel which would meet the requirements in table 6.1. The number
density of the inert diluent element will necessarily be large relative to the fissile, fertile,
fissionable and poison nuclide number densities of the fresh fuel. Thus, the diluent matrix
constituents must be essentially neutronically inert to avoid depletion of the matrix and
unacceptably large parasitic neutron losses. Therefore, only elements with thermal and
resonance integral absorption cross sections less than 2 barns are considered to serve as
diluents. Given that the matrix is specifically designed to be neutronically inert, the exact
composition of that matrix has no impact on the resultant performance of the fuel. For
example, the two fuels listed in table 6.2 have nearly the same plutonium and thorium
number densities. However, one is a TRISO type fuel with an inert carbon matrix and the
other is an oxide with an alumina matrix. The two fuels were depleted at the same power
density for the same number of EFPDs. Figure 6.1 shows their reactivity versus burnup
profiles. The two fuels behave similarly because their neutronically active constituents have
similar number densities. The fact that they have totally dissimilar inert matrix compositions
has no appreciable impact on their neutronic performance ( different values of their scattering
cross sections will change resonance self shielding slightly). The plutonium discharge
isotopics and destruction performance are also nearly identical. The inert matrix is only a
structural host for the plutonium and poison nuclides from a neutronic point of view. Thus,
the results presented in this chapter for the fuel described in this section are equally
applicable to any inert matrix fuel with similar plutonium and poison loading.
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IA zirconia (ZrO 2) inert matrix was used for the bulk of the evaluations reported here.
The neutronic performance of zirconia was analyzed as a function of WGPu loading, poison
loading and poison type. Excellent performance was achieved using the fuel composition
listed in table 6.3 which is designated Oxide5.
0.300
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-0.200
-0.300
-0.400
EFPDs ( s5.68 Kw/ft)
Figure 6.1 Comparison of the Reactivity Profiles of Similarly
Loaded Fuels with Dissimilar Inert Matrices
MCNP cross section libraries were only available for 166 and 167Er. However, table 6.4
demonstrates that the 166 and 167 erbium isotopes account for 99 and 86% of elemental
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Table 6.2 Composition of Example Almina and TRISO Fuels
Nuclide/Element Alumina (atoms/b-cm) TRISO (atoms/b-cm)
.Neutronicaly Active Components
u239pu 1.42E-03 1.40E-03
24u_ 9.07E-05 8.94E-05
241pu 7.53E-06 7.42E-06
232Th 3.02E-03 3.71E-03
238U 2.12E-04 1.31E-04
Cerium 3.02E-03 0
Aluminum 3.09E-02 0
Carbon 0 6.37E-02
Oxygen 6.12E-02 1.07E-02
erbium macroscopic thermal and resonance absorption cross sections respectively. Thus, it is
acceptable to use ORIGEN library cross sections for the mass 162, 164, 168 and 170 erbium
Table 6.3 Composition of Recommended
Non-Uranium: Eiik Oxide 5
Nuclide/Element Total Oxide Matrix w%
.Neutron A e c ••ve mponents
238Pu 3.49E-04
239u 2.74E00
24°pu 1.70E-01
241Pu 6.77E-03
242u 6.51E-04
241Am 3.83E-03
166Er 4.47E-01
167Er 3.61E-01
Inert Components
Zirconium 7.04E01
Oxygen 2.53E01
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sotope % Abundancro.seiacoMacro-Product% of Total
62Er 0.14 19 2.66 0%
164Er 1.61 13 20.93 0%
166Er 33.6 20 672 4%
167Er 22.95 670 15376.5 95%
168Er 26.8 2.7 72.36 0%
170Er 14.9 5.8 86.42 1./.
Total: 16230.87 100%
Isotope I% Abundance ronan Macro-Product % of Total
162Er 0.14 500 70 1%
164 Er 1.61 111 178.71 2%
16 6 Er 33.6 100 3360 28%
167Er 22.95 300 6885 58%
168 Er 26.8 37 991.6 8%
170Er 14.9 25 37Z2.5 3
Total: 11857.81 100%
a. thermal neutron absorption cross sections in barns
b. Macro-Product is defined as the % abundance x thermal cross section
isotopes while using MCNP calculated cross sections for the more critical 166 and 167
erbium isotope cross sections. Once the composition of the fuel and the fuel cycle are
defined, it is possible to determine the plutonium throughput of the recommended option.
6.1.2 Plutonium Cycle and Throughput. In the proposed fuel cycle, the periphery of the core
is comprised of assemblies loaded with the Oxide5 fuel as listed in table 6.3. The remainder
of the core is managed like a standard three batch UO2 PWR core. The Oxide5 fuel
composition is designed for a residence time of two 440 EFPD cycles, and is then discharged.
Each Oxide5 assembly is rotated 180 degrees after the first cycle to achieve an even burnup
of the plutonium in the pins. A single transition cycle is used to produce an equilibrium cycle
where the core periphery is filled with alternating once burned and fresh Oxide5 assemblies.
Since the purpose of this Oxide5 fuel in a peripheral loading is to destroy plutonium, the rate
of plutonium consumption or throughput for this fuel and cycle is of interest.
The cycle model is based on the Westinghouse designed, Seabrook PWR core. The
Seabrook core contains 48 peripheral assemblies of a total of 193 assemblies. Each assembly
contains 289 pin slots. Nominally, an assembly is loaded with 264 pins and 25 water holes.
Since the Oxide5 assemblies will remain on the periphery throughout their core residence
time, it is assumed that the assemblies can be completely filled with 289 fuel pins. With the
fissile density listed in table 6.3, each pin contains 26.7 gms of WGPu and there are 7.73
kilograms of WGPu in each assembly. Twenty four new assemblies are loaded into the core
at the start of each cycle for a WGPu throughput of 186 kilograms per year. Thus, the 50 MT
WGPu disposition mission would take 404 reactor years. Assuming all other existing
constraints were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition the 50 MT of WGPu
in 5.6 years [N-4]. Alternately, a 1000 MWe PWR with a 0.8 capacity factor produces 243
kgs of RGPu per year [B-3]. Assuming 1/4th of the core is taken up by Oxide5 assemblies,
the remainder of the core would produce only 182 Kg of RGPu per year. Hence, a PWR
loaded with Oxide5 fuel on the periphery and UO2 assemblies in the interior would not
produce any net plutonium. Thus, the growth of RGPu inventories could be brought to a halt.
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Implementation of this solution to the growth of RGPu stockpiles requires that the radial
power peaking at the Oxide5-UO2 assembly interface must not exceed nominal PWR design
limits.
6.2 Radial Power Peaking and Depletion of OxideS Fuel
Chapter 5 contains the details of how the radial power peaking and depletion
calculations are carried out. This section presents the results of those calculation for Oxide5
fuel loaded in the periphery of a PWR.
6.2.1 Depletion Through Two Cycles. Figure 6.2 is the radial power profile for the 34 pin
model loaded with fresh 3.9w% UO2 in pins 1-17 and Oxide5 loaded in Pins 18-34.
Figure 6.2 Power Profile for
Fresh 3.9w% UO2 and Oxide5
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A maximum peak pin power of 1.27 times core average pin power occurs in the first Oxide5
pin: #18. This peak is well within the 1.5 maximum radial power peak value. The power
peaks in pin #18 due to the greater cross section of 239Pu relative to 235U. As shown in figure
5.10, the larger plutonium cross sections result in thermal flux shielding of the outer Oxide5
by the inner Oxide5 pins. Since the plutonium number densities are the same for all the
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Oxide5 pins, pin power decreases with increasing pin number moving radially outward from
the interface. As described in chapter 5, the 34 pins are divided into four sets. An average
pin power for each of the four sets is assigned to four corresponding composite pin cells
which are used to model the depletion of all 34 pins. U0 2 pins numbered 1 through nine are
depleted as one composite pin labeled STD1. Similarly, UO2 pins 10 through 17 are depleted
as STD2, PuO 2 pins 18 through 24 are depleted as OX 1 and pins 25 through 34 are depleted
as OX2.
The MCNP 1/8th core model loaded with fresh UO2 and Oxide5 assemblies had a
Keff of 1.31. Thus, a core completely loaded with fresh fuel is within typical PWR values.
Fresh core reactivity represents a conservative upper bound on the anticipated values. This
peripheral fuel cycle is intended for incorporation into an equilibrium fuel cycle via a single
transition cycle as described later in this subsection. Figure 6.3 tracks the development of the
radial power profiles through the stepwise depletion of the UO2 and Oxide5 pins.
Figure 6.3 Progression of Radial Power Peak
for Oxide5 Through the First Cycle
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As the plutonium in the inner Oxide5 pins is depleted, there is less shielding of the outer pins
and the power peak moves radially outward. The magnitude of the peak in the Oxide5 pins
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decreases relative to the fresh fuel pin #18 value for two reasons. First, the thermal flux
remains partially shielded below that which is seen by pin #18 at the start of the cycle.
Second, the pins are not as fresh as pin #18 was at the start of the cycle when they see the
increase in thermal flux. Since there is relatively low fissile loading and no fertile material in
the OxideS pins, there is a very sharp drop in power and reactivity during the first cycle. The
complete pin reactivity profile over the two cycles is discussed in more detail later in this
sub-section. At the EOC, the power in the OX1 pins has dropped well below core average.
The discontinuities in the pin power profiles at pin 27 result from our use of region-average
compositions in the assembly burnup scheme: zone average composition times the local flux
consistently overestimates the local power here and also near pin #18.
It is interesting to note that the maximum radial power peak shifts from the Oxide5
pins to the last UO2 pin adjacent to the Oxide5 assembly: pin #17. This is because the fissile
content of OX1 pins is extremely depleted during the first cycle. Table 6.5 lists OX1 and
OX2 plutonium destruction during the first and second fuel cycles. Note that there is greater
destruction of plutonium in OX1 than OX2 because OX1 has shielded OX2 during the first
fuel cycle. The first cycle ends with the maximum actual radial pin power peak well below
the 1.5 limit. At the end of the first cycle, the Oxide5 assembly is rotated 180 degrees to
facilitate an even burnout of the assembly. After the shift, the OX2 pins are numbered 17
through 24 and the OX1 pins are numbered 25 through 34. Figure 6.4 shows the radial power
profile at the end of the first cycle, 440 EFPDs, and after the rotation of the Oxide5 assembly,
440r EFPDs. The change from the 440 to the 440r EFPDs radial power profile is only caused
by the rotation of the Oxide5 assembly; there is no depletion difference between the 440 and
440r profiles. As expected, the 440r profile shows an increase in the OX2 average pin power
because the fuel is now in a higher thermal flux region. The corresponding decrease in the
OX1 average pin power peak is due to their rotation into the lower thermal flux outer region.
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Figure 6.4 Radial Power Shift as a result of Rotating
the Oxide5 Assembly at EOC One
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Rotating the Oxide5 assembly also reduces the power peak in the interface 
UO2 pin #17. The
second cycle begins with the 440r radial pin power peak profile.
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The NAS classifies the PC-MHR as beyond the spent fuel standard but not a true
elimination option because there is only 89% destruction of 239Pu and 64% destruction of
total plutonium.. As indicated in table 6.5, the second cycle increases the Oxide5 pin
plutonium destruction from values which are slightly better than non-uranium once-through
cycles such as the PC-MHR or CANDU to a true elimination option with essentially 100%
destruction of 239Pu and 93% destruction of total plutonium. Thus, destruction of plutonium
using Oxide5 in a two cycle peripheral PWR cycle meets the NAS discharge property
specifications. Figure 6.5 shows radial power peaking profile development over the second
cycle which ends at 880 EFPDs.
At 880 EFPDs, UO2 pin #17 is just reaches the 1.5 maximum allowable radial power
peak. Thus, this fuel composition and cycle meet the radial power peak specification. When
the plutonium becomes heavily depleted during the second cycle, the elimination of residual
plutonium requires the rest of the core to provide the neutrons to burn out the residual
plutonium. Thus, it must be possible for the peripheral assemblies to operate at low power
without causing unacceptable power peaking. Assemblies producing so little power in the
interior of the core would likely lead to unacceptable power peaking in adjacent assemblies.
Using a radial blanket to bum out the residual plutonium is akin to reducing the effective size
of the core. Thus, the lower power can be tolerated in the periphery of the core without
causing unacceptable power peaking. Figure 6.5a shows the reactivity profile which
correlates to the power peaking profiles of this two cycle depletion of OxideS and UO2.
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Figure 6.5 Progression of Radial Pin Power Peaking
Through the Second Cycle
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The reactivity of the OXIDE5 fuel pins, OX 1 and OX2, remains nearly constant and
consistent with that of the UO2 pins, STDI and STD2, until the 167Er is nearly completely
depleted. These relatively flat OX1 and OX2 reactivity profiles provide the relatively benign
radial peaking distributions of the first cycle. At about 300 EFPDs, the 167Er is nearly
completely depleted resulting in the loss of the positive reactivity contribution produced by
167Er depletion.' Thus, the OX1 pins begin losing reactivity at a greater rate. The OX2 pins
are shielded during the first cycle slowing their depletion of fissile material and 167Er.
Consequently, OX 1 fuel bums out faster than the OX2 pins from 300 EFPDs to the end of the
first cycle. Since the Oxide5 assembly is rotated 180 degrees at the end of the first cycle, the
OXI pins become shielded and the OX2 pins begin burning out at a faster rate over the
second cycle. Since, the OX2 pins start the second cycle partially depleted, their reactivity
drops very rapidly relative to OX 1 pins.
'Figure 6.11 shows the depletion of 166 & 167 Erbium as a function of burnup.
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Figure 6.5a Oxide5a & U 2 Reactivity vs Burnup
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Table 6.6 presents the OXI and OX2 average composite pin powers as a function of
core EFPDs. Core EFPDs are the number of days the core is operating at 100% power which
is generally equal to calendar days over an uninterrupted fuel cycle. At 440 EFPDs, the
Oxide5 assembly pins are producing power at 39% of core average pin power. By the end of
540 EFPDs they are only producing about 22% of core average pin power. At the end of the
second cycle, the Oxide5 assembly pins are producing less than 3% of core average power.
However, the Oxide5 assembly pins still produce a two-cycle average power of 47.3%. This
is a slight improvement over the average 30% produced in the periphery of PWRs using low
leakage core fuel management. So relative to current low leakage fuel management, there is
a small net gain in neutron economy using this two cycle peripheral plutonium burning
scheme. To assess potential changes in pressure vessle fluence, the net current into the
reflector region was calculated using the MCNP 34 pin model. The net current was
essentially the same for U0 2-UO2 and U0 2-Oxide5 34 pin loadings. Thus, the pressure
vessle fluence of the peripheral-Oxide5 cycle should be no more than that for standard full
U0 2 cores. The plutonium fuel will not generate much power during the time it will take to
destroy the residual plutonium. The power peaking in adjacent assemblies caused by the low
power generation would be more difficult to manage if these assemblies were located on the
interior of the core rather than on the periphery. Although probably not required, an
alternating Oxide5 assembly loading scheme is recommended to reduce the power load on
interior assemblies: i.e. every other peripheral assembly is replaced each cycle.
201
Kwffl
Core EFPDs Ox1 Power Ox2 Power Avg. Power Avg. Net EFPDs Ox1 Net EFPDs Ox2 Net EFPDs
0 4.98 2.88 3.93 0.84
1 4.91 2.96 3.94 1.69 1.07 0.62
3 4.96 2.95 3.96 5.94 3.18 1.89
10 4.98 2.96 3.97 25.57 10.63 6.32
40 4.91 2.91 3.91 25.17 42.72 25.38
70 4.86 3.09 3.97 42.66 74.32 44.12
120 4.75 3.00 3.88 41.60 126.52 77.23
170 4.39 2.55 3.47 37.21 177.51 109.44
220 3.32 2.92 3.12 67.03 224.59 136.78
320 2.80 2.80 2.80 72.04 295.94 199.50
440 0.89 3.63 2.26 48.59 367.98 271.54
540 0.58 1.96 1.27 27.27 387.19 349.53
640 0.37 0.77 0.57 12.24 399.73 391.53
740 0.27 0.31 0.29 8.75 407.68 408.06
880 0.1752 0.1133 0.14425 Note:
; "-D I a c. 5.688 Kw/ft 100% core
S 47.3% average power.
The transition from an equilibrium PWR core to a core with the periphery loaded with
plutonium can be completed via one transition cycle. For the transition cycle, fresh Oxide 5
assemblies are loaded into every other peripheral location with thrice burned UO2 loaded into
the other half of the periphery. At the end of the transition cycle, the UO 2 assemblies
remaining in the periphery are replaced by fresh Oxide5 assemblies. Thus, an equilibrium
cycle is reached with the periphery comprised of alternating once burned and fresh Oxide5
assemblies. Taken as a whole, the equilibrium periphery loading produces 54% of core
average power at the start of each cycle and 21% of core average power at the end of each
cycle. Thus, the alternating loading scheme would reduce the power burden on the interior
assemblies relative to replacing the peripheral assemblies all at once.
The 1/8th MCNP core model loaded with UO2 at a burnup of 1.5 cycles or 640
EFPDs and the entire periphery loaded with Oxide5 assemblies at a burnup of 880 EFPDs
had a Keff of 1.05. Thus, the core can still maintain criticality even if the entire periphery is
loaded with exhausted Oxide5 fuel.
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6.2.2 Summary of Radial Power Peaking and Depletion Results. Depletion calculation
results show that the Oxide5 fuel composition meets the discharge property and fuel cycle
feasibility performance criteria listed in table 6.1. Table 6.7 provides a summary.
Fresh Oxide5 has a relatively low fissile loading: about 1/3 that of standard PWR
fuel. Consequently, power production during the last 220 EFPDs of the second cycle is
minimal while residual plutonium is destroyed producing a true elimination option. Total
plutonium destruction is in excess of 90% and 100% of 239pu is destroyed. The radial power
peaking and core reactivity are within normal PWR limits throughout both cycles. Under
current low leakage core fuel management, peripheral assembly power density is only about
30% of core average power. The end of the second cycle is an extension of that concept. The
average power produced over the two cycles is 47%. Thus, there is a small net gain in
average power produced in the periphery. The next step is to confirm the Oxide5 composition
meets the reactivity coefficient specifications.
Table 6.7 Summary of Discharge Property and
Fuel Cycle Feasibility Performance of OxideS
Parameter Definition Specification Calculated Value
Discharge Properties (must substantially eliminate plutonium)
Residual 239 Pu 239 Pu / Total Pu discharged < 10% 0.0%
Residual TotaPu Total Pu / Initial Pu Loaded < 10% 7.0%
Fuel Cycle Feasibility ( non-uranium Pu fuel must not impose any restrictions greater
than those imposed if the periphery were loaded with twice burned U0 2)
Residence Time Number of EFPDs Fuel multiple of 880 EFPDs
Remains in Core 440 EFPDs
Radial Power Pin Power/core average pin < 1.5 Max peak over two
Peaking power - cycles = 1.5
BOL and EOC BOL & EOC <1.3 BOC Keff = 1.31
Whole Core Kinf values &
Reactivity >1.00 EOC Keff = 1.05
A. Weapon's usability is described in chapter 3 section 2.
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6.3 Oxide5 and Whole Core Reactivity Coefficients
Table 6.1 defines the reactivity coefficients and specifications of interest. The limits
are based on meeting standard PWR design values. Chapter 5 details how these coefficients
are calculated. This section presents the results of the reactivity coefficients calculations.
Three algorithms for weighting the Oxide5 and UOz pin cell contributions to obtain core
average reactivity coefficients are used: pin number, power and square power weighting.2
Square power weighting is the most appropriate estimation technique. The OxideS pins run
at a fraction of the core average 100% pin power. Thus, the Oxide5 relative pin power
fraction is less than 1.0. Consequently, setting the weighting function equal to the power
rather than the square of the power fraction assumes that the Oxide5 pins make a larger
contribution to the core average parameters. Thus, power weighting is more conservative
than square power weighting. Weighting the Oxide5 and UO2 pin contributions based solely
on the number of pins of each assumes that they contribute equally to core average
parameters. Thus, number weighting is the most straightforward and also the most
conservative algorithm. An additional degree of conservatism added to all of these
calculations is that power increases in peripheral assemblies are partially offset by increased
core leakage from those assemblies into the core reflector region. No credit is taken here for
the contribution of this negative feedback to core average reactivity coefficients.
All OxideS and UO2 coefficient calculations were done with a constant 500 ppm
boron concentration in the coolant which is typical of mid-cycle concentrations. Note that
CASMO3 cannot reliably calculate MTC, IBW or VC reactivity coefficients at 880 EFPDs.
CASMO3 vendors indicated that the fissile density was too low for the code to consistently
converge [B-3]. However, the power generated in the Oxide5 pins is so low by 740 EFPD,
for which reactivity coefficient data was calculated, that Oxide5 pin contributions to core
2 The algorithms for deterring core average reactivity coefficients from pin cell values are explained in chapter
5. Appendix C derives the equations used in the algorithms.
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average reactivity coefficients are negligible. This is exemplified in the fuel temperature
coefficient results for the end of the second cycle which are presented next.
6.3.1 Fuel Temperature Reactivity Coefficient (FTC). CASMO3 branching Kinf
calculations were run for 300, 600, 900, 1200, 1650 and 2100 oK fuel temperatures as a
function of burnup. The reactivity added by the change in fuel temperature from 900 oK was
calculated. Figure 6.6 shows the UO2 and Oxide5 pin cell, and reference core average FTC
vs Burnup curves. Note that the calculated UO2 pin cell FTC is lower than the PWR core
average "reference values". However, since these are not meant to be licensing or even
design level calculations, the small bias introduced into the determination of the core average
FTC is acceptable. The Doppler coefficient becomes less negative as fuel temperature
increase due to the reduced percentage increase in resonance broadening effect per degree
change in temperature. The coefficient also becomes less negative with depletion and has a
strongly positive value at the end of the second cycle. This positive value at the end of the
second cycle is somewhat suspect because of problems experienced with CASMO3 at very
low fissile densities and strongly subcritical conditions. However, even though these values
were assumed to be accurate in order to be conservative, the core average FTC values were
still acceptable. At 740 and 880 EFPDs, the Oxide5 pins are highly subcritical and only
produce an average power of 0.29 and 0.14 Kw/ft respectively. Thus, based on a power
weighting and squared power weighting, the positive Oxide5 FTC pin cell values make little
contribution to core average FTC. Figure 6.7 shows the number weighted core average FTC
values as compared to the dashed reference design average PWR values. Even using the very
conservative number weighting algorithm described in chapter 5, the core average FTC
values are consistent with the standard reference PWR values shown as dashed lines. Typical
PWR values for the FTC under hot full power conditions are -1.30 85pF x 10-5 at BOC and -
1.46 Spf/F x 10-5 at EOC [M-6].
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Figure 6.6 UO2 and Oxide5 Pin Cell FTCs vs Burnup
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Figure 6.8 shows the power weighted core average FTC values.
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The effect of the Oxide5
assemblies on the EOC FTC values is reduced due to the lower power contribution of the
plutonium pins above 600 EFPDs.
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Figure 6.9 shows the results of the most accurate (but least conservative) power squared core
average coefficient algorithm. These values are the most negative of those produced by the
three algorithms. Thus, the FTC values produced by all three algorithms indicate that the
core average FTC with peripherally loaded Oxide5 assemblies is within normal PWR FTC
values. The next reactivity coefficient of interest is the Moderator Temperature Coefficient.
Figure 6.9 Square Power Weighted Core Average
Fuel Temperature(K) Coefficient
vs Reference PWR Values
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6.3.2 Moderator Temperature Coefficient Results. The equation for the pin cell moderator
temperature coefficient is defined in table 6.1. The CASMO3 Oxide5 and UO 2 pin cell
MTCs are plotted as a function of burnup in figure 6.10. Figure 6.11 shows the depletion of
Erbium with burnup, which directly correlates to the shape of the MTC curves. As discussed
in chapter 4, erbium was selected as a burnable poison because its resonances around 0.46
and 0.58 ev provide a negative MTC. Consequently, the Oxide5 MTC becomes less negative
in direct correlation to the depletion of 167Er. Note that there appears to be no U02 pin cell
bias relative to the reference PWR core average parameters.
Figure 6.10 3.9w% U0 2 and Oxide5 Pin Cell and PWR
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Figure 6.11 Erbium Composition vs EFPDs
1.00E
9.00E
8.00E
atoms/7.ooE6.00Eb-cm 5.00oE
4.00E
3.00E
2.00E
1.00E
O.00E
166 Er
U- i167Er I
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
EFPDs (5o.68 KwIft)
The positive OxideS MTC values at > 300 EFPDs, which is near the end of the first
cycle, appears troubling at first glance. Table 6.6 shows that at the start of the second cycle
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the OX2 pins produce as much as 63% core average pin power. However, table 6.6 also
shows that due to the shielding by the OX1 pins during the first cycle, the OX2 pins have
actually only accumulated 271 EFPDs of burnup by the end of the first cycle. Thus, the OX2
pin's MTC is still slightly negative at the start of the second cycle when they are still
producing significant power. By 540 EFPDs, the Oxide5 pins average only 22% of the 100%
core average pin power. Consequently their contribution to core average properties is greatly
diminished by the time their MTC goes strongly positive at the end of the second cycle.
Figure 6.12 shows the number weighted core average MTC. The dashed 600 oK line
is a reference value of MTC for a core where the boron concentration is adjusted to maintain
the core exactly critical. Thus, as the boron concentration is reduced with increasing burnup,
the magnitude of the MTC increases in the negative direction. Thus, this line is not directly
comparable with the calculated Oxide5 values which are for a constant boron concentration
of 500 ppm. The vertical lines at the right of the chart are standard PWR EOC MTC values
for a constant 500 ppm boron concentration at the temperatures listed in the figure notes [C-
5]. The very conservative number weighted MTC values result in a positive temperature
coefficient at the end of the second cycle. Thus, we must look to the more accurate power
and power squared weighted algorithm results plotted in figure 6.13 for acceptable values.
Figure 6.12 Number Weighted vs Reference
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Both the power and square power weighting schemes produce acceptable MTC values. The
square power MTC values are a more negative and more accurate estimation of core average
MTC. The next sub-section examines the inverse boron worth (IBW) and void coefficient
(VC) results
6.3.3 Inverse Boron Worth (IBW) and Void Coefficient (VC). The inverse boron worth is
calculated in units of ppm/change in reactivity. Thus, a small value equates to a larger boron
worth. Figure 6.14 plots the results for the Oxide5 pin cell. These values are not
significantly different from the plotted reference PWR values. The Oxide BOC value is
approximately 160 as compared to the reference value of 108 and the 740 EFPD Oxide5
value of 50 compares to the 96 reference EOC value. The low BOL Oxide5 IBW is the
result of the harder spectrum produced by the large thermal plutonium cross sections. The
740 EFPD Oxide5 IBW of 50 results from the highly thermal spectrum of the over moderated
condition and almost completely depleted Oxide5 fuel. Note that the UO2 pin cell values
have a conservative bias relative to the reference core values taken from the literature: i.e.
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more ppm boron per % Sp. Thus, Oxide5 is not the limiting factor for core average boron
worth. Figure 6.15 plots the number and power weighted values.
Figure 6.14 UQO and Oxide5 Pin cell and Reference
PWR Core Average IBW vs Burnup
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Figure 6.15 plots number and power weighted IBW core average values in. The UO2 is not
depleted like the Oxide5 fuel and has a lower EOC boron worth. The Oxide5 fuel contributes
little to the power weighted core average parameter at the end of the second cycle.
Consequently, the core average IBW is lower than the Oxide5 IBW at greater than
approximately 440 EFPDs. Also, the power weighting IBW is less than the number weighted
IBW due to the power weights of the Oxide5 and UO2 contributions. Thus, the Oxide5 fuel
is not a limiting factor with respect to acceptable core average IBW reactivity coefficients.
Figure 6.15 Number & Power Weighted
Core Average IBW vs. Burnup
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The final reactivity coefficient of interest is the VC. Figure 6.16 shows the Oxide5
VC as a function of burnup for several void percents. Similar to the MTC, the Oxide5 pin
cell void coefficient becomes positive for higher burnups because the low fissile material
density results in an over-moderated condition. However, lower fissile density also equates
to lower power generation in the pins during the second cycle. As with MTC core average
values, the power weighted core average VC values are acceptable. Figure 6.17 shows the
power weighted and number weighted core average void coefficients [F-4].
Figure 6.16 U02 and Oxide5 Pin Cell and PWR Reference VC vs Burnup
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Figure 6.17 Number and Power Weighted
Core Average Void Coefficients vs Burnup
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6.3.4 Summary of Reactivity Coefficient Results. Table 6.8 summarizes core average
reactivity coefficient performance relative to reference PWR values [C-5]. All reference
values are for hot full power conditions with calculated core average values produced using
the power weighting algorithm. All calculated values are for a moderator boron
concentration of 500 ppm and hot full power conditions.
The algorithms used for calculating the core average values from the pin cell values
produces results comparable to reference core values. The core average values calculated
using the power weighted algorithm are acceptable when compared to reference core average
values despite the added conservatism of using power vice square power weighting and
taking no credit for the effect of leakage on the periphery reactivity coefficients. The BW is a
bit lower than reference PWR values but is not unreasonable. In conclusion, the Oxide5
periphery PWR core reactivity coefficients are within the design limits. The next section
reviews some analysis results for less successful fuel compositions.
Table 6.8 Summa6ry of Core Average
ReAct,_t Coefficient Results [c-5, -]
Reference Calculated Values
Values
Coefficient Condition BOL EOL BOL EOL
FTC x 105 ipPF 600 OF -2.1 -2.0 -2.3 -3.12
FTC x 105 p/OF 1200 OF -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -2.7
MTC([B= 500ppm x 10 300 OF -0.25 -0.85 -1.0
p/OF
MTC[B]=500ppm X 104  400 OF -0.6 -1.14 -1.6
8pfF
MTC[B]=500ppm x 104 500 OF -1.1 -1.76 -2.7
8p/°F
IBW ppm / 8p 108 96 137 148
VC x 103 Sp/% void -0.41a -1.43a -0.816 -1.21
a. Values are for critical moderator boron concentration
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6.4 Other Results.
The development of the Oxide5 fuel composition was an iterative process guided by
analysis of unacceptable results and intuition. The chapter 5, section 5.3.3, discussion of
figure 5.12 is an example of the sort of analysis done. This section presents results and
conclusions derived through the analysis of unacceptable fuel compositions.
6.4.1 High Plutonium and Poison Loading. Initial fuel compositions were based on a high,
10w%, WGPu loading with a corresponding high poison loading to hold down initial
reactivity. Higher loading provides greater throughput which reduces the number of reactor-
years required to complete disposition. This is a key advantage for a WGPu spent fuel
standard disposition mission. However, MOX LWR disposition options already produce a
spent fuel standard product and are a significantly more mature technology. The advantage
of the non-uranium fuel lay in its ability to produce an elimination option. Unfortunately,
there are several disadvantages to high plutonium loading with respect to an elimination
option.
Higher plutonium loading necessarily means that a larger number of fissions per
length of fuel are required to achieve a given level of plutonium destruction. A larger
number of fissions can be produced by either leaving the pins in the core longer or increasing
the power density. Both techniques place more stringent performance burdens on a novel
fuel development effort. In addition, higher plutonium loading forces greater reliance on
burnable poison control. This reduces the feasibility of using erbium as the burnable poison
because of its relatively smaller thermal and resonance cross sections. The erbium number
density would have to be nearly 10 times that of Eu and more than a factor of 20 higher than
that of Gd to provide the same reactivity hold down. However, both Eu and Gd burn out
much faster and produce a less negative MTC than Er, as explained in chapter 4 section 4.3.4.
Thus, the probability of developing radial power peaking problems midway through the cycle
is increased with Eu and Gd use. Lower radial power peaking is possible with lower
plutonium loading. For example, HTGR1 fuel had three times the fissile density of Oxide5
and used Eu to hold down excess BOC reactivity. Figure 6.18 shows the resultant peak in
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reactivity at approximately 40 GWd/MT. The burnup units are Giga-Watt-Days/Metric-Ton
Heavy Metal (GWd/MT). This increase and then decrease in reactivity is typical of high
plutonium loading fuel with Eu or Gd poison. It is also important to note that at 100
GWd/MT, there remains substantial quantities of plutonium. Table 6.10 shows the depletion
composition summary for HTGR1.
Figure 6.18 HTGR-1 Reactivity vs Burnup
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At 100 GWd/MT the HTGRI fuel is very subcritical and yet < 51% of the total plutonium
and 48% of the 239Pu has been destroyed. Eliminating the plutonium would require
significantly higher burnups and longer core residence times. Thus, the fuel would have to be
taken to very high burnups and spend a significant portion of its residence time placing a
negative reactivity load on the core. Consequently, increasing the plutonium loading usually
results in increased plutonium residuals in the discharged spent fuel. Also, the reactivity
peak mid cycle caused by rapid burnup of the Eu, tends to produce unacceptable radial power
peaking. Lower loadings produce less BOL excess reactivity; thus, the excess reactivity is
small enough to be controlled by erbium without having to resort to large erbium number
densities. Erbium burns out slower and lower radial power peaking is observed. Thus. low
plutonium loading is preferred to create an elimination option fuel.
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I Table 6.9 HTGR-1 Depletion Isotopic Summary
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U233 1.22E-01 0.49% 2.28E-01 0.92%
Pu239 4.72E+00 19.30% 3.19E+00 12.76% 1.24E+00 5.03%
Pu241 2.00E-02 0.08% 1.79E-01 0.72% 3.30E-01 1.33%
Total Fissile w%: 19.38% 13.96% 7.28%
Fertile:
Th232 1.83E+01 74.68% 1.81 E+01 72.34% 1.78E+01 72.07%
U238 6.63E-01 2.71% 6.27E-01 2.51% 5.75E-01 2.33%
Pu240 1.65E-01 0.67% 5.07E-01 2.03% 7.25E-01 2.93%
Total Fertile w%: 78.06% 76.87% 77.33%
Actinides:
Total Pu 4.91 E+00 3.89E+00 2.39E+00
Total U 6.63E-01 7.55E-01 8.29E-01
Pu238 2.16E-03
Pu242
Poisons:
Total FP 0.OOE+00 0.00% 1.70E+00 6.79% 3.33E+00 13.48%
Eu151 2.98E-01 1.22% 4.45E-02 0.18% 0.00%
Eu152 9.50E-02 0.38% 1.23E-02 0.05%
Eu153 3.62E-01 1.45% 3.04E-01 1.23%
Eu154 7.58E-02 0.30% 1.17E-01 0.47%
Eu155 3.26E-01 1.33% 1.68E-02 0.07% 3.86E-02 0.16%
Eu w%: 2.55% 2.38% 0.16%
Total gms: 2.45E+01 2.50E+01 2.47E+01
__
6.4.2 Comparison of Thorium and non-Thorium Fuels. PWR pin cell calculations of the
reactivity profile and depletion isotopics of two candidate fuel compositions are presented.
Discussion of an alumina non-fertile fuel composition is followed by review of a thorium
loaded TRISO fuel.
The fresh composition of the non-fertile alumina fuel is given in table 6.11. The fuel
consists of a Pu-CeO 2 fluorite phase dispersed in an peroskovite matrix. The Cerium, Ce,
atom density is five times that of plutonium in order to enhance the chemical separation
barrier of the fresh fuel. Note that this fuel has no control poison in the alumina matrix; none
is necessary. Figure 6.19 compares the reactivity profiles of the alumina fuel with that of
standard 3.9w% enriched U0 2 fuel. The composition of the UO2 is identical to that used in
the code benchmark discussed earlier. Figure 6.19 shows that the fresh non-fertile alumina
fuel reactivity is slightly lower than that of UO2 and the slope of the burnup curve is similar
to the that of the standard UOz fuel until late in the cycle.
These two facts seem counter-intuitive. First. the alumina fuel fissile atom density is
1.6 times that of 3.9 w% U0 2 and contains no poison; thus, a higher initial alumina reactivity
might be expected. However, the absorption cross section of 239pU is 1.7 times that of UO2.
The higher cross section coupled with the higher loading leaves the fresh alumina fuel under-
moderated. Examination of the spectrum confirms that it is highly epithermal. Thus, the
fresh fuel reactivity is suppressed below that of the UO2. Second, UO2 produces 239Pu which
reduces the rate of fissile consumption, and hence, the rate of reactivity loss. The lack of
fertile material in the alumina might suggest that its reactivity would decrease at a rate greater
than that of the standard U0 2. However, the slope of the reactivity profile is proportional to
the decrease in mass of fissile material per total mass of fissile material present. Since the
239 Pu loading is 1.6 times that of 2 35U in UO2, there is a smaller percentage decrease of total
fissile material per gram of fissile material consumed, thereby reducing the slope of the
profile making it comparable to 3.9 w% U0 2. A smaller additional effect may be that as the
239 Pu is depleted, the moderator to fissile fuel ratio increases, thus adding reactivity. Dilute
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239Pu has nearly three times the thermal capture cross section as 238U and 240pu's thermal
capture cross section is nearly 100 times that of 238 U.
Table 610 Non-.Fertile AI • mo ition
Isotoe/ement Weieht % Density (mn/cm
9Pu 9.31 5.63E-1
240Pu 0.60 3.61E-2
24 1Pu 0.050 3.01E-3
151Eu 0.00 0.00E0
153Eu 0.00 O.00E0
Ce 29.11 1.76E0
Al 33.72 2.04E0
O 27.20 1.64E0
Total 1.00 6.04
Figure 6.19 Alumina and TRISO
Reactivity vs. Burnup
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Thus, the fissile 241Pu production in WGPu fuel is comparable rate to that of 239 Pu density in
UO2 fuel The number densities of 240&241Pu in Alumina and 2 39pu in U0 2 as a function of
EFPDs in table 6.12 add some credence to this argument. A combination of these factors
may explain the parallel slope in the reactivity vs. burnup curves of U0 2 and non-fertile
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alumina fuels. As the total 239Pu atom density decreases, the rate of reactivity decrease per
gram of 239pU consumed increases and the production of 241Pu decreases leading to the
divergence in slopes at higher burnups.
Table 6.11 Comparison of Fertile Production
of Fissile Material inM UOz and Alumina Fuels
Alumina U0 2
EFPDs mPu Pu
(atom/b-cm) (atom/b-cm) (atom/b-cm)
0 9.65E-5 7.52E-6 0.0E0
329 1.63E-4 3.72E-5 9.51 e-5
658 2.17E-4 1.13E-4 1.34E-4
988 2.018E-4 1.33E-4 1.50E-4
Table 6.13 lists isotopic results for depletion of non-fertile alumina and TRISO fuels.
Nearly all of 239Pu and approximately 80% To'Pu is destroyed. The best reported MOX PWR
once through cycle isotopics results were approximately 0.1w% 238pu, 50w% 239 Pu, 30w%
240pu, 16w% 241Pu and 4w% 242Pu but with a net plutonium destruction of less than 35% [D-
4]. Next, the thorium loaded TRISO fuel pin results are considered.
Table 6.12. TRISO and Alumina Fuel Depletion Isotopics
FPDs pUw% W 24pU w% 'Puw% 242pu % est. TotPu Dest.
0 0.00 93.5 6.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
68 0.01 48.4 29.5 18.3 3.65 75.20 72.60
1317 0.17 11.9 37.6 27.9 22.4 97.4 79.60
0 _ 0.00 93.5 6.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00
68 0.01 58.3 24.6 14.7 2.19 66.87 43.27
1317 0.01 21.7 36.7 27.1 14.2 93.70 72.80
The TRISO fuel pin is assumed to have a packing density of 90 volume % of which
68% is filled with carbon from either the PyC or SiC layers or carbon compact fill material.
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The fuel kernels occupy only 22 volume % of the pin. However, the fuel kernel 239pU W%
was increased to maintain an overall pin fissile density similar to that of the alumina fuel.
The kernel composition is listed in table 6.14. Thorium provides fissile 233U. Thorium is
also an excellent aqueous plutonium analog. Special units had to be added to the PUREX
process to effect adequate separation of thorium from uranium and plutonium product
streams in thorium fuel cycles: the result was the THOREX process. 238U is loaded to
maintain end of cycle 233U w% below 20% of the total U in the spent fuel; however, use of
the minimum loading which achieves that end is required to minimize 239 Pu production. At
this low loading no significant 239Pu production was observed. The TRISO fuel is also
depleted at a constant q' of 5.68 Kw/ft, producing the reactivity profile seen in figure 6.19.
The profile closely follows the alumina reactivity except at higher burnups where the fertile
conversion has a larger effect due to the depleted 239pU inventory in the TRISO fuel. This
further supports the assertion that the slope of the reactivity burnup curve can be controlled to
a large extent through manipulation of the fissile density. The TRISO and alumina have
similarly high fissile densities and thus similar reactivity profiles.
A review of table 6.12 shows that the TRISO fuel also performs significantly better than
MOX LWR burning options but not as well as the alumina fuel. Some of the power is
provided by 233U rather than 239pU fissions. Thorium production of 233U reduces the total
plutonium and 239Pu destruction and reduces the isotopic dilution. Thus, thorium is rejected
for use in plutonium elimination fuel. Although both the TRISO and Alumina fuels produce
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plutonium destruction much greater than that of UO2, neither could be considered an
elimination option.
6.4.3 Summary of Other Results. Three major conclusions were drawn based on the results
presented in this section and the discussion in chapter 5 section 5.3.3 of figure 5.12. First,
lower plutonium loading has major advantages for producing an elimination option. Second,
lower plutonium loading reduces the required poison loading allowing the use of erbium.
Thus, a flatter reactivity profile and lower radial power peaking are possible. Third, thorium
reduces the rate of plutonium destruction and is therefore rejected for use in an elimination
option.
6.5 Summary of Oxide5 Results. The Oxide5 fuel composition, listed in table 6.3, is
designed to be resident on the periphery of the core for two 440 EFPD cycles and then
discharged. The assembly is rotated 180 degrees after the first cycle. A single transition
cycle is used to produce an equilibrium cycle where the core periphery is filled with
alternating once burned and fresh OxideS assemblies. The interior of the core is filled with
three batch UO2 assemblies. Table 6.15 summarizes the criteria performance results for the
OxideS fuel.
The OxideS composition starts out with low plutonium loading. Consequently, it
produces significant power through the first, but only half of the second, cycle. During the
last 220 EFPDs in the core the residual plutonium is destroyed producing a true elimination
option. Total plutonium destruction is in excess of 90% and eventually all of the 239pU is
destroyed. The radial power peaking and core reactivity are within normal PWR limits
throughout both cycles. The average power produced over the two cycles is 47%. Thus,
there is a small net gain in average power produced in the periphery. The throughput of the
proposed cycle is acceptable.
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The WGPu throughput of this cycle is 186 kilograms per year; a 50 MT WGPu
disposition mission would take 404 reactor years and assuming all other existing constraints
were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition the 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years
[N-4]. Alternatively, a PWR loaded with Oxide5 fuel on the periphery and UO2 assemblies
in the interior would not produce any net plutonium. Thus, the growth of RGPu inventories
could be brought to a halt.
Discha Properties (must substantiall eiminate plutonium)
Residual want to minimize
239pu 0% < 10%A weapons usabilityA
Residual want to mmmzePlutonium 7% < 10%Plutoniuweapons usabilityA
Fuel Cycle Feasibility (non-uranium Pu fuel must not impose any restrictions greater than
those imnosed if the neripnherv were loaded with twice burned UO.
. . . . . f .. . . . . Ii ---- - -- - --r- -.. .. . . . . . .. . ..... . . . . . . .. .
Residence Time 880 EFPDs multiple of must support 18 month440 EFPDs refueling cycle
Radial Power Max peak over two must not be too large so
Radial Power cas to cause
Peaking total power peaking to
exceed 2.5.
Whole Core BOL andBOL and EOC BOC Keff = 1.31 <1.3
Whole Core & EOC reactivityEOC Keff = 1.05 must be within PWRReactivity >1.00 design limits
Reactivity Coefficients (whole core average reactivity values must be within acceptable
PWR design range
FTCc BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = -1.85 to -1.30 to Typical PWR Design
(pcm/oF) -1.7 -1.46
MTCc BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = -1.76 to -0.78 to Typical PWR Design
p/oF x 104 -2.7 -3.02 Values
IBW BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = 137 to 108 to Typical PWR Design
ppm /% bp 148 96
VC BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = -8.6 to -0.41" to Typical PWR Design
8p / %void x 103 -12.1 -1.43
B  Values
A. Weapon's usability is described in chapter 3
B. Values are for critical moderator boron concentration
C. Values at normal operating temperatures.
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The calculated reactivity coefficients for the PWR core with Oxide5 assemblies loaded in the
periphery are comparable to reference PWR core average values. This is despite the added
conservatism of using power rather than square power weighting. Thus, Oxide5 assemblies
can be used in the periphery of a PWR to eliminate plutonium.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Scope and Objectives
The risk of nuclear proliferation associated with the liberation of 100 metric tons of
weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) from US and Russian nuclear arsenals and increasing
world reactor grade plutonium (RGPu) stockpiles has led proliferation experts to call for
world-wide management of plutonium [B-l, N-l, M-3, V-1]. One of the key tenets of
proposed plutonium management plans is the reduction of stockpiles to the minimum levels
consistent with needs. The only way to irrevocably reduce stockpiles is to destroy the
plutonium through fission and transmutation. The most promising method for effecting large
scale transmutation of plutonium in a timely manner is through burning it in light water
reactors.
This thesis examined the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water
reactor radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. Several
constraints are considered including impact on proliferation risk, acceptability of resultant
core physics parameters, and fuel performance and manufacturing feasibility. Elimination is
defined as substantially complete destruction of plutonium. Large scale use of non-uranium
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fuels for plutonium disposal will require a significant research and development effort. The
goal of this work is to suggest a starting point for that development.
7.2 Background and Motivation for Work
Plutonium of nearly any isotopic composition can be used to produce an explosive
critical mass.1 Figure 1.1 plots the critical mass for a simple nuclear weapon design
consisting of a metal sphere surrounded by a thick neutron reflecting uranium metal shell, as
a function of the metallic uranium or plutonium sphere isotopics [R-2]. The difficulties in
producing such a weapon with RGPu are not appreciably greater than those encountered with
WGPu [M-1]. Approximately 10 kilograms of the plutonium found in typical once-through
light water reactor spent fuel would be sufficient to build a simple nuclear explosive which
would have an approximate yield of one kiloton. A one kiloton yield would have a lethal
range roughly one third that of the Hiroshima explosion [N-2]. Thus, a very simple RGPu
weapon could be used to destroy a significant portion of a large city and cover the rest in
radioactive fallout. Plutonium theft by a non-national entity is the reference nuclear
proliferation scenario of concern in this thesis.
The basic information required to assemble a nuclear weapon from its raw materials
has been public for many years [T-2]. Unlike uranium, plutonium can not be denatured to
prevent its use as weapons material and as such is uniquely suited to support fast chain
reactions. Therefore, physical control of plutonium and other weapons usable fissile
materials is the primary means of limiting the proliferation of nuclear destruction capabilities.
Plutonium which is comprised primarily of 238pu Or 242Pu is of little practical use in nuclear explosives. However, these
exceptions are inconsequential since the vast majority of the world's plutonium is of an isotopic composition which
makes it of practical weapons use.
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Figure 7.1 Critical Mass of Uranium and
Plutonium as a Function of Isotopic Mix [R-2]
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The world inventory of plutonium is already large and is growing rapidly at a rate of
70 MTs/year [N-1]. Total plutonium stockpiles will reach 1700 MTs by the year 2000.
Separated RGPu is being produced at the rate of 20 MT/year which exceeds consumption and
will result in a stockpile of approximately 170 MTs by the year 2000. In addition, the INF
and START treaties will liberate approximately 100 MTs of WGPu for disposal. The
reliability of international safeguards in deterring and detecting diversion of plutonium for
non-peaceful purposes is a function of the size and physical form of the stockpile which must
be safeguarded.2 Consequently many experts have called for reduction of world inventories
of plutonium [M-2, N-1, V-l]. The primary way currently available to reduce plutonium
stockpiles is to fission it in light water reactors.
Unfortunately, neutron capture in the 238U present in MOX produces 239Pu, thereby
reducing the maximum net plutonium destruction possible. Plutonium destruction in a light
water reactor with a mixed oxide core destroys only approximately 30-40% of the total
2 For example, Pu in the form of fuel assemblies which can be counted are easier to safeguard than Pu in the separations partof a reprocessing plant where it is dissolved in various radioactive solutions [M-2].
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plutonium loaded while non-uranium plutonium fuel can destroy nearly twice that amount
[D-4].
7.3 Summary of Proposed US WGPu Reactor Disposition Options and the RGPu
Mission
This section summarizes the proposed options for burning 50 MT of US WGPu.
Table 7.1 summarizes the key destruction capabilities of example reactor vendor proposals
for disposal of 50 MT of WGPu in 25 years. The Combustion Engineering System 80+ PWR
and the General Electric BWR-5 designs represent currently operating LWRs. The
Westinghouse PDR1400 is an evolutionary PWR design and the General Electric ABWR is an
advanced BWR design. The General Atomics Plutonium Consumption - Modular High
Temperature Gas Reactor (PC-MHR) is most efficient for plutonium destruction because it
uses non-uranium fuel. However, the PC-MHR reactor and fuel technology is the least
mature option. The Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors have extremely flexible
reactivity control systems and are estimated to require the shortest lead time before WGPu
burning operations could begin. These reactors produce spent fuel which makes the
plutonium roughly as inaccessible as the plutonium in conventional spent fuel; thus, they
meet the NAS defined "spent fuel standard". WGPu accounts for 6% of the worlds
plutonium stockpile. Thus, making the metallic WGPu pits more unattractive for weapons
use than RGPu in spent fuel provides little additional proliferation risk reduction unless the
larger RGPu stockpile is also subject to elimination. However, the NAS states in its 1994
report on weapons grade plutonium disposition that "Further steps should be contemplated,
however, to move beyond the spent fuel standard and reduce the security risk posed by all the
world's plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated; the need for such
a step already exists and will increase with time" [N-l]. This suggests that there are two
distinct plutonium disposal missions: WGPu disposal and RGPu disposal.
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WGPu plutonium disposal mission proposals are designed to convert 50 MTs of
metal pits into a product which meets the spent fuel standard in approximately 25 years. The
RGPu mission involves reducing the proliferation risk of the complete world stockpile of all
plutonium [M-2, N-1, V-1]. To reach a condition of no net production of RGPu, 60-70MT of
RGPu must be destroyed annually. This will require a broad application of plutonium
elimination technology. Over 60% of operating US light water reactors are PWRs [N-4]. A
fuel which could eliminate plutonium in a once-through PWR cycle could be used for an on-
going RGPu disposal mission as well to complete a WGPu mission. In the present work,
metrics for quantifying the proliferation risk associated with the disposition products were
developed and WGPu MOX spent fuel, WGPu borosilicate glass and WGPu non-uranium
spent fuel were compared.
Table 7.1 Summary of US WGPu Reactor D tion Options
Metric Reference Designs
System-80 BWR-5 PDR1400 ABWR PC-MHR CANDU
Throughput (MT WGPu/Rx-yr)
1.5 1.06 1.56 1.2 0.28 1.05
Discharge Isotopics (k nn Isotope/kgm total Pu Mass)
2Pu 0 0.010 0.02 0.006 0.003 0.001
239u 0.609 0.421 0.54 0.590 0.275 0.513
0.234 0.353 0.227 0.270 0.302 0.375
241Pu 0.137 0.151 0.151 0.105 0.327 0.086
m242P 0.027 0.066 0.062 0.028 0.093 0.024
Destruction Fraction (kgm loaded/kgm discharged)
2 3 9Pu 0.49 0.71 0.53 0.61 0.89 0.63
Total Pu 0.22 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.64 0.34
Average Burnup (GWd/MTHM)
32.5 39.2 40.0 39.0 590.2 9.7
% Pu in HM
3.7 2.0 1.1 4.1 96.1 1.0
Discounted (4%) Life Cycle Cost Revenue) in $M - Government Ownership
not avail. not avail. (759) (552) (1324) not avail.
Discounted (4%) Life Cycle Cost (Revenue) in $M - Utility Ownership
not avail. 1313 1111 1113 (660) 1481
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7.4 Quantification of the Proliferation Resistance Inherent in Disposition Products
Quantification of proliferation resistance is controversial [N-2]. However, it is
important to be able to gauge approximately how proliferation resistant the end product of a
disposition option is relative to other products and the spent fuel standard. Such
quantification can not only help in selecting which options are most useful for plutonium
disposition but it can also illuminate where the emphasis of future improvements to fuel cycle
proliferation resistance can be made. This section details an approach for such quantification.
It is offered as a logical and objective starting point for discussion and modification rather
than the definitive method. The intent is to quantify the inherent resistance of disposition
option products themselves. Inherent proliferation resistance refers to the barriers that
prevent a terrorist with access to a disposition product from making a nuclear device.
7.4.1 Definition of Metrics. Table 7.2 lists the metrics proposed for quantifying the
proliferation resistance of final disposal products. The metrics measure disposition product
properties which act as a barrier to producing a weapon from the plutonium contained in the
product. Two barrier types were identified: disposition product matrix barriers and
plutonium weapons usability. Disposition product matrix barriers are those barriers
presented by the matrix against recovery of the plutonium contained in it. Plutonium
weapons usability barriers are those barriers against using the plutonium once it is recovered
from the matrix.
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7.4.2 Example Computation and Comparison of Proliferation Resistance Spent WGPu
MOX, a WGPu Borosilicate Glass Log and Spent WGPu Non-Uranium Fuel. Table 7.3 lists
the metric values for the three disposition products. Metric values are converted into scores
using scoring functions. The spent fuel standard was used as the minimum acceptable
proliferation barrier performance. Consequently, metric values equivalent to those for spent
fuel received a score of zero with a negative score given for sub-spent fuel performance and a
positive score for proliferation resistance beyond spent fuel's. Investigating the optimum
shape for these scoring functions was beyond the scope of this work. Simple linear scoring
functions were used similar to the example critical mass scoring function in figure 7.2.
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7.2 Inherent Plutonium Dispo roduct Barrier
Metrics
Criteria Type of Units/Scale
Measurement
Fissile Density Quantitative kg fissile Pu/m3 host
Dissolution Quantitative gms/liter
Separation Quantitative dimensionless
Radiation Barrier Quantitative years
plunium Weapons Usabilit
Isotopic Quantitative gms fissile/gm Pu
Critical Mass Quantitative kg Pu
Neutron Emission Quantitative n/sec-kg Pu
Decay Heat Quantitative w/gm Pu
1. The separation metric is calculated by ratioing separation distribution
coefficients if the data can be found. Alternately it is calculated as an ionic
radius ratio as described in section 3.2.3.
I
-I I
Metric (units Spent LEU HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-U Fuel
in Table 7.2) Log MOX
Fissile Density 158 18.34 97.48 1.55
Dissolution 167 not applicable 167 211
Separation 40 0.12 40 0.37
Radiation 160 145 160 160a
Barrier
P..lautionumWmonsUsabilitzy
Isotopic 68.6 94.5% 69.1% 10.2%
Critical Mass 15.4 12.0 16.6 48.3
Neutron 3.3 x 105  5.3 x 104  4.4 x 105  1.4 x 106
Emission
Decay Heat 10.3 2.3 14.4 10.3
a. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
Maximum
Value
Spent Fuel
Value
Critical
Mass
(Kgms)
Minimum
Value
Metric Score
Figure 7.2 Example Critical Mass Metric
Value to Metric Score Function
Table 7.4 presents the results of scoring of each metric for the three disposition products.
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ITable 73 Raw Metric Values
Within the two barrier types, individual metric scores were weighted from zero to one
based on their relative importance in creating the barrier. For example, the neutron emission
rate of RGPu will not prevent producing a one kiloton terrorist weapon. However, a weapon
can not work unless a critical mass has been accumulated. Thus, from a terrorist threat
scenario viewpoint, the critical mass metric is more important and its contribution to the
weapons barrier is given greater weight. The weights within each barrier type sum to unity;
hence, equal weight is given to matrix and plutonium weapons usability barriers. The
relative resistance of each barrier type for each disposition product is quantified by the sum of
the associated metric scores and weights. Table 7.5 presents the results for the three
disposition products considered here.
Table 7.4 Metric Score Summary
Metric Spent LEU HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-U Fuel
Log MOX
D2isosition Product Matrix Barriers
Fissile Density 0.00 0.89 0.39 1.00
Dissolution 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.26
Separation 0.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.99
Radiation 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00Barrier
_______Plutonium Weaons Usability
Isotopic 0.00 -0.82 -0.02 1.00
Critical Mass 0.00 -0.22 0.04 1.00
Neutron 0.00 -1.00 0.10 1.00
Emission
Decay Heat 0.00 -1.00 0.51 0.00
a. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
The barrier scores are added to produce a single number rating of the proliferation
resistance of an individual disposition product. The products are then ranked. Table 7.6 lists
the final results for the example comparison of WGPu disposition products of spent MOX, a
borosilicate glass log and spent non-uranium fuel. The top scoring product is ranked number
1 and is the most inherently proliferation resistant product while the lowest scoring product is
ranked number 3 and is the least inherently proliferation resistant product.
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Table 7.5 Metric Wei
ghts, Contributions 
and Barrier 
Type 
Scores
Metric Weight HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-
Functions Log MOX U Fuel
Fissile 0.3 0.27 0.12 0.30
Density I
Dissolution 0.1 0.00 0.00 -0.03
Separation 0.1 -0.10 0.00 -0.10
Radiation 0.5 
-0.094 0.00 0.00
Barrier
Matrix Barrier Score - 0.074 0.12 0.18
PlutniumWeapons Uabili
Isotopic 0.4 -0.33 0.01 0.40
Critical Mass 0.4 -0.09 0.01 0.40
Neutron 0.1 -0.10 0.00 0.10
Emission
Decay Heat 0.1 -0.10 0.051 0.00
Usability Barrier Score -0.62 0.07 0.90
a. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
-I I
HLW Glass Spent WGPu MOX WGPu Non-U Fuel
Matrix Barrier Score 0.074 0.12 0.18
Weapons Usability Score -0.62 0.07 0.90
Overall Score -0. 49 0.19 1.08
Ranking 3 2 1
7.4.3 Discussion of Example Proliferation Resistance Quantification. Although all the
options exceed the spent fuel standard for fissile density, the non-uranium spent fuel clearly
offers greater proliferation resistance as a result of eliminating more plutonium. The selection
of 1.1 w% plutonium in the glass log is based on proposed options but is probably on the low
end of loadings being considered [N-2]. A lower or higher loading would produce larger and
smaller fissile density respectively. The chemical barrier matrix metrics, dissolution and
solubility, show that MOX meets the spent fuel standard based mainly on the properties of U0 2.
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I Table 7.6 Overall Ranking of Inherent Proliferation Resistance
I
The glass and non-uranium zirconia matrix options appear less chemically resistant than the
MOX. However, these numbers are the most suspect in the group because they are based on
data which was not specifically derived for this application and consequently has a limited
applicability. Finally, as expected, all the options meet the spent fuel standard for a radiation
barrier and the differences in the barrier metric scores are small.
The advantages of near complete elimination of plutonium in the non-uranium fuel
substantially enhances the plutonium weapons usability barrier. The non-uranium spent fuel
residual plutonium is mostly 242Pu making it quite useless for nuclear explosive purposes. On
the other extreme, the fact that no plutonium is transmuted shows up as a strong weakness of
the vitrification option. The MOX option falls between the two as might be expected since
plutonium usability metrics essentially measure the degree of plutonium transmutation
accomplished.
As a result of the enhanced plutonium weapons usability barrier, the non-uranium spent
fuel provides the best proliferation resistance. The MOX spent fuel provides the next best
performance but scores only slightly above the spent fuel standard which equates to a score of
zero. The vitrified waste form is the least proliferation resistant product because of the low
barrier to use of the separated plutonium, which remains weapons grade. This substandard
performance of the vitrified waste form is based on the assumption that both the matrix level
and plutonium usability barriers are of equal merit. However, the matrix level barriers would
have to be considered approximately 8 times more important than the plutonium usability
barrier for the vitrified waste form to meet the spent fuel standard: an improbable assumption.
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7.5 Material and Neutronic Considerations and the Selection of a Non-Uranium Fuel
Matrix.
The goal is to develop a fuel which eliminates plutonium and can be integrated into
current LWR fuel cycles with minimum perturbation to existing cycles. Thus, there are two
primary sets of in-core performance criteria such a fuel must satisfy: thermo-physical
performance and neutronic. Acceptable thermal and mechanical performance means that the
presence of non-uranium fuel in the core does not impose any additional operational or
transient restrictions beyond those which normally apply to a standard PWR core. Peripheral
assemblies comprise approximately 25% of a PWR core. Consequently, as long as the non-
uranium fuel loaded into the periphery performs at least as well as standard UO2, no
additional restrictions should be required. Thus, U0 2 characteristics are used as baseline
minimum performance standard. A long term fuel development and testing effort will be
required to ascertain the performance of a non-uranium fuel.
To be neutronically acceptable, the fuel must not alter core physics parameters and
power distribution beyond acceptable PWR design limits. Neutronic considerations are the
subject of the next section and neutronic performance results are covered in section 7.7.
7.5.1. Non-Uranium Plutonium Fuel Neutronic Considerations. Plutonium neutronic properties
differ significantly from those of uranium. This presents some problems at the interface
between Pu and U0 2 assemblies. In addition, the absence of 2 38U in non-uranium Pu fuels
necessitates that a substitute must be found to perform the neutronic functions of 238U in UO2
fuel. Table 7.7 presents a summary of these neutronic challenges.
Thorium is rejected as a matrix constituent because the production of 233U detracts from
the destruction of 239Pu. Burnable poisons are one potential fuel design solution to compensate
for the potentially unacceptable nuclear design characteristics of non-uranium plutonium fuels.
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Burnable poisons (BP) serve three purposes: they provide beginning of cycle (BOC)
excess reactivity control; allow increased fissile loading; shape the reactivity vs. burnup curve
over the cycle; and provide resonance absorption negative contributions to FTC and MTC. A
BP with a thermal cross section that is larger than the fissile nuclide is preferred because it will
bum out faster, leaving less residual negative reactivity at the EOC. However if the thermal
cross section is too large, the poison burns out too quickly, causing an unacceptably high excess
reactivity peak early in the cycle. A rule of thumb relationship between the poison and fissile
cross sections can be derived from the basic depletion equation. The result is that a BP for
BP
which 2 2.5 is preferable for cycle reactivity control. The second function of the BP is to
provide negative FTC and MTC. Thus, the poison's absorption cross section vs energy profile
must have a sufficient resonance cross section, preferably around the 0.3 ev 239Pu resonance
energy, and must not decrease significantly in the epithermal range. Application of these two
criteria to the list of potential poisons produces three primary candidates: Europium,
Gadolinium and Erbium. All three are rare earths and so have similar chemical properties.
Erbia is the preferred poison because it was found to be more effective for cycle reactivity and
reactivity coefficient management. Section 7.8 contains more details of the, neutronic
performance of these poisons.
The next sub-section proposes a logical means of filtering through the large number
of possible fuel matrices to identify promising candidates with which to begin a research and
development effort.
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Parameter
Isothermal Moderator
Temperature
Coefficient
(MTC)
Prompt Fuel
Temperature
Coefficient
(FTC)
Cold to Hot
Reactivity Swing
Installed Reactivity
Control Rod Worth
Boron Worth
Xenon Worth
Fission Product
Poisons
Local Power Peaking
Delayed Neutron
fraction
Plutonium Core
1. WGPu
compositions are
much less negative
2. RGPu
compositions are
slightly less negative
1. WGPu
compositions are
much less negative
2. RGPu
compositions are
slightly less negative
Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Increased
Increased
Reduced
Reason for
Difference
1. Reduced resonance
absorption plus
spectral shift
2. Same as above but
with increased 240Pu
resonance absorptions
1. Reduced resonance
absorption
2. same as above but
with increased 24°Pu
resonance absorptions
Less Negative MTC
Lower allowable
fissile loading
More epithermal flux
More epithermal flux
More epithermal flux
Increased yields
Increased water worth
PPu < Pu
Potential
Consequence
1. Unacceptable
transient behavior
2. Unacceptable
transient behavior
1. Unacceptable
transient behavior
2. Unacceptable
transient behavior
Reduced cold born
requirements
Shorter cycle length
Possible increase in
number of rods
Increased boron
requirements
Improved stability
Reactivity penalty -
shorter cycle
More complex fuel
management
Unacceptable
transient behavior
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7.5.2 Narrowing the field. This sub-section presents the filter logic used to narrow the field
of candidate fuel matrices. A fluorite type oxide fuel matrix is recommended for further
study. Figure 7.3 is a flow chart showing the decision points leading to a recommendation of
three candidate fuels for development: zirconia, alumina and TRISO.
Constituent Selection Path Crystalline Matrix Selection Path
Figure 7.3 Fuel Constituents and Crystalline Matrix Selection
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7.5.3 Thermal Performance Criteria. The non-uranium ceramic material which will
incorporate the plutonium and absorber atoms must possess thermo-physical properties which
give it in-service performance as good or better than U0 2. It is therefore worthwhile to
develop a set of metrics to compare properties of potential plutonium fuel ceramics to UO2.
Thermal performance is defined by the licensing and design limits imposed on fuel. Three
performance areas are of specific interest: thermal margin to melting, transient time constant
for quenching, and stored energy.
1. Thermal Margin to Melting: Let TCL, TMp be the normal operating centerline temperature
and the ceramic melting point respectively. Figure 7.4 illustrates the relationship of these
temperatures:
AT -
4flk
Figure 7.4 Fuel Temperature Profile
AT is the difference between fuel outside edge temperature, TFO, and TCL. AT is therefore
equal to the linear heat generation rate, q', divided by the product of the thermal conductivity
of the material, k, and 4nt. The relative thermal margin to melting can be calculated by the
following expression:
M arg in T - A1 - q(7.1)T,, 4 7rkT (7.1)
Thus, for the same q' a material with a larger value of kTup will have a larger thermal
margin to melting.
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2. Stored Energy. Stored energy must be removed via emergency cooling systems in the
event of a Loss of Coolant Accident, LOCA. The more energy stored in the fuel during
normal operation the greater the heat load on cooling systems. The stored energy, Es, is
approximately equal to the product of the heat capacity, cp, the density, p, and the average
fuel temperature AT = 1/2(AT):
Es= pc AT cp(7.2)
=A 8 11 k
In this expansion, one recognizes the thermal diffusivity parameter a as:
k
Oa C(7.3)
Thus, ceramic material ao values can be used as a comparison metric. A larger value of a is
preferable from a stored energy consideration.
3. Transient Time Constant. The transient time constant characterizes the rate of decay of
the fundamental mode during quenching. It is determined by the thermal diffusivity, a, in
expressions of the form:
P = Poe -a  2 t  (7.4)
where X is in units of inverse length.
Table 7.8 summarizes the above considerations. The ratio of the metric values to that
of UO2 must exceed or equal that of U0 2 to ensure adequate performance. It is important to
note that the thermal conductivity is a strong function of crystalline structure, purity, fluence
and temperature and quoted values vary considerably in the literature. Thus, the values
presented are more illustrative of potential performance and must be confirmed as part of the
fuel development and testing program.
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Table 7.8 Summary of Proposed Thermo-physical Performance
Criteria
Metric New Matrix ValueThermal Limit or Performance Constraint UO2 Matrix ValueConsideration
- normal operating thermal kT > 1.0
margin to melting
LOCA Performance - maximum allowable stored a > 1.0
energy
Table 7.9 presents the properties and resultant metric ratios for the recommended zirconia,
alumina and TRISO (considered as a SiC matrix). Alumina and SiC matrices have
acceptable performance metrics. Zirconia's substandard performance is primarily due to its
low thermal conductivity. Erbia, which is added primarily for reactivity control and which
helps to stabilize zirconia in the preferred mono-clinic fluorite structure, may also improve
the thermal conductivity of the zirconia. CaO can also be used to stabilize zirconia and at 15
mol% has been reported to increase conductivity to above 2.0 W/m-oK[S-1] at 1500 OK.
However, zirconia's thermal conductivity must be increased by a factor of two to achieve
U0 2 margin ratios > 1.0. Consequently, annular pellets may be required to reduce the
centerline temperature. An annulus of half the pellet diameter was found to drop the
centerline fuel temperature by 600 degrees to 1300 OC at a 400 w/cm power density [D-l ].
Table 7.9 Summary of Recommended Fuels
Thermo-phsical Performance
Candidate p TMO k Cp kTMP
Matrix (gm/cm3) (oC) (W/m-K) (J/oK-kg) kTMP -U02 ,_Uao
ZrO2  5.85 2770 2.0 457.2 0.5 0.5
Al20 3  3.97 2000 7.0 775.7 1.4 1.6
SiC 3.22 1950 15 666.6 2.9 5.0
UO 2 10.97 2820 3.6 235.7 1.0 1.0
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7.6 Computational Codes, Models and Techniques
This section discusses the models, codes and calculations used to develop and evaluate
the non-uranium plutonium oxide fuel. The neutronic challenges of a PWR core partially
loaded with non-uranium plutonium fuel are greater for WGPu isotopics than for RGPu.
Consequently, all calculations were carried out using WGPu isotopics in order to be
conservative. Specifically the following data are calculated: pin to pin power peaking factors,
discharge isotopics, the fuel reactivity vs. burnup profile, core average reactivity coefficients
and whole core reactivity. All models used are based on a PWR core comprised of standard 17
x 17 Westinghouse assemblies. Fuel compositions are developed to support an 18 month fuel
cycle with a capacity factor of 0.8, which equates to 440 EFPD.
7.6.1 Depletion Calculations. Three computer codes were used to perform depletion
calculations: ORIGEN version 2.1, MCNP version 4A and MOCUP [C-4, B-5, M-4]. CASMO-
3 was used for depletion benchmark comparison and temperature coefficient calculations.
As the name implies the MCNP-ORIGEN2 Coupled Utility Program (MOCUP) serves
as a conduit for passing information between MCNP and ORIGEN. Nuclide-specific cross
section information calculated by MCNP is manipulated by MOCUP and provided to ORIGEN.
Depletion composition changes calculated by ORIGEN are tracked by MOCUP and used to
create MCNP input decks. Thus, composition and reactivity changes are calculated as a
function of burnup. No modification to either ORIGEN or MCNP is required to treat nuclides
explicitly in depletion calculations. This allows accurate depletion of novel fuels and
geometries through a series of MOCUP time intervals and ORIGEN time steps. Time intervals
refer to the change in burnup between MCNP reaction rate calculations and subsequent
ORIGEN nuclide cross section updates. Time steps refer to the individual ORIGEN depletion
commands, IRP or IRF, within each MOCUP time interval. Several ORIGEN time steps are
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used to complete the burnup specified for a single MOCUP time interval. Figure 7.5 shows the
flow of depletion calculation information between MOCUP, ORIGEN and MCNP.
ORIGEN contains one-group cross section libraries and fission product yields for all the
nuclides of potential interest. However, these one-group cross section libraries are produced
using sophisticated reactor physics codes which collapse multi-group libraries based on specific
standard reference reactor geometries and fuel compositions. Consequently, the accuracy of the
results that can be produced using these one group cross sections decreases as the actual system
being evaluated moves further away from the reference basis for the particular library being
used. Consequently, the ORIGEN cross section libraries are of limited use in evaluating new
fuel compositions.
MCNP
* RXN Rates
SKey Nuclide * Molar Compositions
Molar Compositions FMolar CompositionsM Flux
MOCUP
* Gram Composition
Punch Files
I1I
* one group x-sections
* gm compositions
ORIGEN 2.1
Figure 7.5 MOCUP, MCNP, ORIGEN Deple
Information Flow Scheme
Fortunately, ORIGEN has a built in feature which allows substitution pf user supplied one
group cross sections for of ORIGEN cross sections. In the present instance, substitute cross
sections are derived for the actual composition and geometry from MCNP flux and nuclide
reaction rate tallies. A new set of accurate one-group substitute cross sections are generated and
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supplied to ORIGEN each depletion interval. The cross sections are assumed constant over the
depletion interval. The resultant ORIGEN output composition is then incorporated into a new
MCNP input and a new set of fluxes and reaction rates calculated. The entire depletion cycle is
completed in stepwise fashion.
A benchmark comparison of the MCNP version 4A, ORIGEN version 2.1 and MOCUP
depletion code system was conducted against a published EPRI benchmark and excellent
agreement was found.
7.6.2 Models and Techniques. Four different PWR models - an MCNP pin cell, an MCNP
34 pin model, a CASMO3 pin cell model, and an MCNP 1/8th symmetry PWR core model -
were used to determine the neutronic characteristics of the fuel as a function of burnup as
well as to evaluate how it would interact with the non-peripheral fuel assemblies in the PWR
core.
Figure 7.6 shows two drawings of the 34 pin model which simulates a single row of
pins across two 17 x 17 assemblies; the upper picture is the full length 34 pin model and the
lower picture is a close-up truncated view. This 34 pin model is used to determine pin
power and pin to pin power peaking for each depletion step. The moderator is H20 with 500
ppm boron. Four composite pin cells models are used to deplete the 34 pins. UO2 pins
numbered 1 through nine are depleted as one pin labeled STD1. Similarly, UO2 pins 10
through 17 are depleted as STD2, PuO2 pins 18 through 24 are depleted as OX1 and pins 25
through 34 are depleted as OX2. These composite pins are depleted using the MCNP Pin
Cell Model. This model is used in the first step of the depletion process.
The depletion cycle begins by loading the 34 pin model with fresh fuel compositions
and determining individual and composite average pin powers. The fuel compositions for the
four composite pins, STD1, STD2, OX1 and OX2, are subsequently loaded into four different
MCNP pin cell models. The corresponding average pin power is assigned to each of the four
composite pins and is assumed constant during the subsequent ORIGEN depletion. The four
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pins are depleted at that power for a single MOCUP time interval following the process
described in figure 7.7.
Upper Full View I
Figure 7.6 MCNP 34 Pin Row Two Assembly Model
Figure 7.7 Pin Power - Depletion Algorithm
7.6.3 CASMO-3 Calculations and Core Average Reactivity Coefficients. In order to be
feasible, a fuel which has acceptable power peaking vs burnup and which eliminates
plutonium must also have acceptable reactivity coefficients. To be acceptable, peripheral
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PuO 2 fuel reactivity coefficients must be negative enough so that when they are averaged in
with the reactivity coefficients of the rest of the core, the whole core average reactivity
coefficients are within PWR design limits. The first step is to determine the reactivity
coefficients of the candidate fuel composition in a pin cell configuration.
CASMO3 pin cell models are used to determine the standard 3.9w% U0 2 and PuO 2
reactivity coefficients listed in table 7.10. Once pin cell reactivity coefficients are calculated,
they must be combined to produce core average parameters. Since this is a feasibility study
rather than a licensing calculation, a weighted approximation of core average parameters is
adopted.
Table 7.10 Summary of Reactivity Calculations
Coefficient Equation Units
Fuel Temperature (FTC) FTC = 10 * [(Kr-KY)/KTavel pcm/OK
(T 1-T2)
Isothermal Moderator MTC = 104 *[(KT1 -KT9)/KTVi % delta rho * 104
Temperature (MTC) (T I-T2) OK
Inverse Boron Worth IBW = 100 *[( -K)/KIppm/%deltarho(JEW) (B l-B2) ppm / % delta rho(IBW) (B I-B2)
Void (VC) VC = r(KLvKv,1)Kvl %delta rho/% void(Vl-V2)
Subject to the validity of approximations made in the derivation of the FLARE-type
nodal codes, plus equality of the fast group flux and its adjoint (as confirmed by Mosteller
[M-5] for typical PWR Cores), and neglecting certain leakage-related terms, it can be shown
that the neutron yield and reactivity coefficients should be weighted by the fast flux squared
(or equivalently by the product of fast flux and neutron source rate) when aggregating
assembly node values to obtain whole core average values [H-8]. From the near constancy of
the energy release per fission neutron and fast group migration area, it also follows that
power squared weighting is a useful, fairly accurate alternative [S-5]. A derivation of the
power squared weighting scheme from the two group neutron balance equation can be found
in appendix C.
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The analytical support and numerical verification for power squared weighting are not
as strong as for more conventional lattices because of the use of fertile-free fuel in a
peripheral location. However, such weighting should be adequate for present purposes,
particularly since it will be shown that the highly conservative arbitrary application of either
power weighting or number weighting lead to results which do not move whole core kinetic
parameters outside the currently acceptable design envelope for PWR cores.
7.7 Results
This section presents the results of analysis of the proposed fuel cycle and PuO 2 fuel
composition. The performance criteria listed in table 7.11 were distilled from proliferation,
material and neutronic considerations. The neutronically inert matrix is only a structural host
for the plutonium and poison nuclides and has negligible impact on the neutronic
performance of the fuel. Thus, the results presented are equally applicable to any inert matrix
fuel with similar plutonium and poison loading. Several WGPu and poison loading
combinations were investigated. A plutonium-erbium-oxide inert-diluent matrix is
recommended for use in eliminating plutonium in a once through peripheral PWR cycle. Gd
and europium burned out too fast resulting in unacceptable power peaking in the middle of the
cycle.
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Tble 711 Neutaoulc Performance, Criteria For Plutonium Disposition
Fuel Producina an Elimination Option
DIemtion Spaecification ICo.mmnts
23 Twant to minimizeResidual 239pU 2u /TotalPudischarged < 10 weapons usabilityA
want to mnsmze
Residual Tota'pu Total Pu / Initial Pu Loaded < 10 waomusabilim
el Cycle Feuasbiity ( non-uranium Pa fbel must not impose any restrictions greater than those
imposed if the periphery were loaded with twice burned U0 2 )
Residence Time Number of EFPDs multiple of must support 18 month
Fuel Remains in Core 440 EFPDs refueling cycle
Radial Power Pin Power/core must not be too large so as to
< 1.5 cause total power peaking toPeaking average pin power exceed 2.5.
BOL and EOC Whole Core BOL and EOC
Whole Core EOC Kinf values >1.00 reactivity must be within PWR
Reactivity design limits
Reactivity Coefficients (whole core average reactivity values must be within acceptable PWR design
ramze)
Fuel BOC to EOC:[(( Kr-Keoo)/Kooo)/T900)]*10Temperature units = (pcmKF) -1.30 to Typical PWR Design Values
units = (pcm/F)Coefficient (FTC) 
-1.46
Moderator BOC to EOC:
Temperature -0.78 to Typical PWR Design Values
Coefficient (MTC)units = pF x 10 -3.02
BOC to EOC:
Inverse Boron (1000-ppm)/((Kloo-K )/K ooo) 108 to Typical PWR Design ValuesWorth (IBW) units = ppm /% 6p 96
BOC to EOC:
[((Ko-Kv%)/Ko.,)/(0%-V%)]Void (VC) units = 8 p / %void %) -0.4 1l to Typical PWR Design Valuesunits = 6p / %void x 103 
-1.43'
A. Weapon's usability is described in chapter 3 section
B. Values are for critical moderator boron concentration
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7.7.1 Description of the PuO 2-Er2O3-inert matrix Fuel and Peripheral Cycle. A zirconia
(ZrO2) inert matrix was used for the bulk of the evaluations reported here. The neutronic
performance of zirconia was analyzed as a function of WGPu loading, poison loading and
poison type. Excellent performance was achieved using the fuel composition listed in table
7.12 which is designated OxideS.
Table 7.12 Composition of Recommended
Non-Uranium Fuel: Oxide 5
Nuclide/Element Iw%
Neutronically Active Components
2 3 8
u 3.49E-04
239pu 2.74E00
240Pu 1.70E-01
241Pu 6.77E-03
242Pu 6.51E-04
241Am 3.83E-03
166Er 4.47E-01
167Er 3.61E-01
Inert Components
Zirconium 7.04E01
Oxygen 2.53E01
In the proposed fuel cycle, the periphery of the core is comprised of assemblies loaded with
the OxideS fuel as listed in table 7.12. The remainder of the core is managed like a standard
three batch U0 2 PWR core. The Oxide5 fuel composition is designed for a residence time of
two 440 EFPD cycles and then discharged. Each Oxide5 assembly is rotated 180 degrees
after the first cycle to facilitate an even burnup of the plutonium in the pins. A single
transition cycle is used to produce an equilibrium cycle where the core periphery is filled with
alternating once burned and fresh Oxide5 assemblies. Since the purpose of this Oxide5 fuel
and peripheral cycle is to destroy plutonium, the rate of plutonium consumption or
throughput for this fuel and cycle is of interest.
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Twenty four new assemblies are loaded into the core at the start of each cycle for a
WGPu throughput of 186 kilograms per year. Thus, the 50 MT WGPu disposition mission
would take 404 reactor years. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72
operating US PWRs could disposition the 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years [N-4]. Alternately, a
1000 MWe PWR with a 0.8 capacity factor produces 243 kgs of RGPu per year [B-3].
Assuming 1/4th of the core is taken up by OxideS assemblies, the remainder of the core
would produce only 182 Kg of RGPu per year. A PWR loaded with OxideS fuel on the
periphery and UO2 assemblies in the interior would have zero net plutonium production.
Thus, the growth of RGPu inventories could be brought to a halt. Implementation of this
solution to the growth of RGPu stockpiles requires that the radial power peaking at the
Oxide5-U0 2 assembly interface must not exceed nominal PWR design limits.
7.7.2 Radial Power Peaking and Depletion Cycle Results. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 are the radial
power peaking factor profiles (pin power divided by core average pin power) for the 34 pin
model loaded with fresh 3.9w% U02 in pins 1-17 and Oxide5 loaded in Pins 18-34 and the
progression of the profile with burnup over the first 440 EFPD cycle.
Figure 7.8 Radial Power Profile for
Fresh 3.9w% U02 and Oxide5
1.40
1.20
1.00Relative
Radial 0.80
Power 0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Pin Number
A maximum peak pin power of 1.27 times core average pin power occurs in the first Oxide5
pin: #18. This peak is well within the 1.5 maximum radial power peak value. Power peaks in
pin #18 due to the greater cross section of 239Pu relative to 235U. As shown in figure 7.8, the
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large plutonium cross section results in thermal flux shielding of the outer Oxide5 by the
inner Oxide5 pins. Since the plutonium number densities are the same for all the Oxide5
pins, pin power decreases moving radially outward from the interface. The 1/8th MCNP core
model loaded with fresh UO2 and Oxide5 assemblies had a Keff of 1.31.
As the plutonium in the inner Oxide5 pins is depleted, there is less shielding of the
outer pins and the power peak moves radially outward. At the EOC, the power in the OX1
pins has dropped well below core average. The discontinuities in the pin power profiles at
pin 27 result from our use of region-average compositions (i.e. OX1 and OX2) in the
assembly burnup scheme: zone average composition times the local flux consistently
overestimates the local power here and also near pin #18. The first cycle ends with the
maximum actual radial pin power peak well below the 1.5 limit.
Figure 7.9 Progression of Radial Power Peak
for Oxide5 Through the First Cycle
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Table 7.13 lists OX1 and OX2 plutonium destruction during the first and second fuel
cycles. Note that there is greater destruction of plutonium in OX1 than OX2 because OX1
has shielded OX2 during the first fuel cycle.
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EFPDs
0
1
3
10
40
70
120
170
220
OX1
%T°tpu
0.0%
0.2%
0.7%
2.2%
9.1%
15.8%
26.9%
37.8%
47.9%
% mPu
0.0%
0.4%
1.1%
3.7%
14.7%
25.4%
42.3%
57.9%
71.0%
87.9%
98.1%
99.3%
99.8%
99.9%
100.0%
79.8%
84.1%
87.0%
88.9%
91.0%
OX2
% 23pu
0.0%
0.2%
0.6%
2.2%
8.8%
15.2%
26.4%
36.9%
45.6%
67.0%
84.8%
97.3%
99.8%
100.0%
100.0%
%TOtpu
0.0%
0.1%
0.4%
1.3%
5.4%
9.4%
16.4%
23.3%
29.1%
44.6%
60.2%
77.5%
87.4%
91.6%
95.0%
<==End of First Cycle
<==End of Second Cycle
The NAS classifies the PC-MHR as beyond the spent fuel standard but not a true
elimination option because there is only 89% destruction of 239Pu and 64% destruction of
total plutonium.. As indicated in table 7.13, the second cycle increases the Oxide5 pin
plutonium destruction from values which are slightly better than non-uranium once-through
cycles such as the PC-MHR or CANDU to a true elimination option with 100% destruction
of 239Pu and 93% destruction of total plutonium. Thus, destruction of plutonium using
Oxide5 in a two cycle peripheral PWR cycle meets the discharge property elimination option
specifications in table 7.11.
At the end of the first cycle, the Oxide5 assembly is rotated 180 degrees to facilitate
an even burnout of the assembly. After the shift, the OX2 pins are numbered 17 through 24
and the OX1 pins are numbered 25 through 34. Figure 7.10 shows the radial power peak
profile at the end of the first cycle, 440 EFPDs, and after the rotation of the Oxide5 assembly,
440r EFPDs.
252
63.6%320
440
540
640
740
880
~iicJ~i~oaet~ I
-----
Figure 7.10 Radial Power Profile Shift Between First and
Second Cycles Due To Oxide5 Assembly Rotation
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Rotating the Oxide5 assembly also reduces the power peak in the interface UO2 pin #17. The
second cycle begins with the 440r radial pin power peak profile. Figure 7.11 shows radial
power peaking profile development over the second cycle which ends at 880 EFPDs.
At 880 EFPDs, U0 2 pin #17 just reaches the 1.5 maximum allowable radial power
peak. Thus, this fuel composition and cycle meet the radial power peak specification. The
elimination accomplished during the second cycle necessitates Oxide5 pin power reduction to
near zero as the rest of the core provides the neutrons to burn out the residual plutonium. An
assembly producing so little power in the interior of the core would likely lead to
unacceptable power peaking in adjacent assemblies. The assemblies on the periphery
normally run at lower powers. Using a radial blanket to burn out the residual plutonium is
akin to reducing the effective size of the core. Thus, the lower power can be tolerated in the
periphery of the core without causing unacceptable power peaking. At the end of the second
cycle, the Oxide5 assembly pins are producing less than 3% of core average power.
However, a single assembly of Oxide5 pins still produces a two cycle average power of
47.3%. Thus, there is a slight increase over the average 30% produced in the periphery of
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PWRs using low leakage core fuel management, but, the increase is not so large as to cause
significant changes in core vessle fluence. To further assess potential changes in pressure
vessle fluence, the net current into the reflector region was calculated using the MCNP 34 pin
model. The net current was essentially the same for UO2-UO2 and UO2-Oxide5 34 pin
loadings. Thus, the pressure vessle fluence of the peripheral-Oxide5 cycle should be no more
than that for standard full UO2 cores. Taken as a whole, the equilibrium periphery loaded
with fresh and once burned Oxide5 assemblies produces 54% of core average power at the
start of each cycle and 21% of core average power at the end of each cycle. Thus, the
alternating loading scheme would reduce the power burden on the interior assemblies relative
to replacing the peripheral assemblies all at once.
Figure 7.11 Progression of Radial Pin Power Peaking
Through the Second Cycle
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Figure 7.12 shows the reactivity profile which correlates to the power peaking profiles
of this two cycle depletion of Oxide5 and U0 2. The reactivity of the OXIDE5 fuel pins, OX 1
and OX2, remains nearly constant and consistent with that of the UO2 pins, STD1 and STD2,
until the 167Er is nearly completely depleted as shown in figure 7.13. These relatively flat
OX1 and OX2 reactivity profiles provided by the erbium depletion rate result in the relatively
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benign radial peaking distributions of the first cycle and demonstrate why Er is the preferred
burnable poison. Erbium also provides a negative influence on the FTC and MTC providing
acceptable core average reactivity temperature coefficients.
Figure 7.12 Oxide5 & UO2 Reactivity vs Bumup
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Figure 7.13 Er Composition vs EFPD
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7.7.3 Oxide5 Core Average Reactivity Coefficient Results. As described in sub-section
7.6.3, three algorithms for weighting the Oxide5 and UO2 pin cell contributions to core
average reactivity coefficients are used: number of pins (NW), power (PW) and square power
weighting (PW2). Square power weighting is the most accurate estimation technique.
However, the Oxide5 pins run at a fraction of the core average 100% pin power so that power
weighting is more conservative than square power weighting. Weighting the Oxide5 and
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UO2 pin contributions based solely on the number of pins of each assumes that they
contribute equally to core average parameters. Thus, number weighting is the most straight-
forward and also the most conservative algorithm. All Oxide5 and U0 2 coefficient
calculations were done with a constant 500 ppm boron concentration in the coolant. The fuel
temperature coefficient results, commonly referred to as Doppler coefficient, are presented
first.
Figure 7.14 shows the UO2 and Oxide5 pin cell, and reference core average FTC vs
Burnup curves. The FTC becomes less negative with depletion and has a strongly positive
value at the end of the second cycle. At 740 and 880 EFPDs, the Oxide5 pins are highly
subcritical and only produce an average power of 0.29 and 0.14 Kw/ft respectively. Thus,
based on a power weighting or squared power weighting the positive Oxide5 FTC pin cell
values make little contribution to core average FTC. Note that the calculated UO2 pin cell
FTC is lower than the PWR core average "reference" values. However, since these are not
meant to be licensing or even design level calculations, the small bias introduced into the
determination of the core average FTC is acceptable.
Figure 7.14. 3.9w% UO2, Reference PWR Core Average and
Oxides Fuel Temperature (°K) Coefficient vs. Burnup
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Figure 7.15 shows the number weighted core average FTC values as compared to the dashed
reference design average PWR values. Even following the very conservative number
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weighting algorithm, the core average FTC values are consistent with standard reference
PWR values shown at 600, 900 and 1200K Power weighting further improves the FTC
relative to standard PWR values as shown in figure 7.16.
Figure 7.15 Number Weighted Core Average Fuel
Temperature Coefficient and Reference
PWR Values vs Bumup
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Figure 7.16 Power Weighted Core Average Fuel
Temperature( 0 K) Coefficients
vs Standard PWR Values
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The CASMO3 Oxide5 and UO2 pin cell and reference PWR core average MTCs are
plotted as a function of burnup in figure 7.17. The depletion of erbium with burnup , given in
figure 7.13, directly correlates to the shape of the MTC curves. As discussed in section 7.6.1,
erbium was selected as a burnable poison because its resonances around 0.46 and 0.58 ev
provide a negative MTC. Consequently, the Oxide5 MTC becomes less negative in direct
correlation to the depletion of 167Er. Note that there appears to be no U0 2 pin cell bias
relative to the reference PWR core average parameters.
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Fortunately, by the time the pins lose all their erbium they are sufficiently depleted so that
they are producing relatively little power. Thus, their contribution to the core average MTC
is minimal as can be seen in figure 7.18 of the power and square power weighted MTCs
which fall close to the reference PWR values.
Figure 7.18 Square Power Weighted & Reference PWR Core Average
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Inverse boron worth (IBW) is calculated in units of ppm/change in reactivity. Thus, a
small value equates to a larger boron worth (which is desirable). Figure 7.19 plots the results
for the UO2 and Oxide5 pin cell and reference PWR core average. These values are not
significantly different from the plotted reference PWR values. The Oxide BOC value is
approximately 160 as compared to the reference value of 108 and the 740 EFPD Oxide5
value of 50 is to be compared to the 96 reference EOC value. The low BOC Oxide5 IBW at
the BOC is the result of the harder spectrum produced by the large thermal plutonium cross
sections. The 740 EFPD Oxide5 IBW of 50 results from the highly thermal spectrum of the
over moderated condition and almost completely depleted Oxide5 fuel.
Figure 7.19 UO2 and Oxide5 Pin cell and Reference
PWR Core Average IBW vs Bumup
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Note that the UO2 pin cell values have a conservative bias relative to the reference core
values taken from the literature: i.e. more ppm boron per % Sp. The the core average power
weighted IBW values, shown in fugure 7.20, are lower than those for OxideS. Thus, Oxide5
is not the limiting factor for core average boron worth.
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The final reactivity coefficient of interest is the void coefficient (VC). Figure 7.21
shows the Oxide5 and UO2 VCs as a function of burnup for several void percents. U0 2 pin
cell values fall close to the core average PWR values. The Oxide5 pin cell void coefficient
becomes positive for higher burnups because the low fissile material density results in an
over-moderated condition. However, lower fissile density also equates to lower power
generation in the pins during the second cycle.
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Figure 7.21 UO2 and Oxide5 Pin Cell and
PWR Reference VC vs Burnup
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Figure 7.22 shows the power weighted and number weighted core average void coefficient
[F-4]. As with the MTC, the low power of the higher burnup Oxide5 pins reduces their
contribution to core average values and results in void coefficient values comparable to
standard PWR averages.
Figure 7.22 Number and Power Weighted
Core Average Void Coefficients vs. Burnup
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7.7.4 Conclusions on Oxide5 Performance. Table 7.14 summarizes Oxide5 performance
relative to the selected criteria. The Oxide5 composition starts out with low plutonium
loading. Consequently, it produces significant power through the first but only half of the
second cycle. During the last 220 EFPDs in the core the residual plutonium is destroyed
producing a true elimination option. Total plutonium destruction is in excess of 90% and
essentially all of the 239Pu is destroyed. The radial power peaking and core reactivity are
within normal PWR limits throughout both cycles. There is a small net gain in average
power produced in the periphery. The throughput of the proposed cycle is acceptable.
The Oxide5 periphery PWR core reactivity coefficients are comparable to reference
PWR values.
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Table 7.14 Summary of Neutronic Performance Criteria For
PlWtonium  ipoition FuaelPro ing an Elintion Option
Oxide Peripheral
Parameter Calculated Core Snecification Comments
Averaae Value
Residual want to minimize
0% < 10% weapons usabilityA
Residual 7% < 10% want to minimize
Plutonium weapons usability
Fael Cycle Feasibilit ( non-uranium Pu fel must not mpoe any restrictions greater than
those imposed f th periphery were loaded with twice barned UO)
multiple of must support 18 month
440 EFPDs refueling cycle
must not be too large so
Max peak over twoRadial Power cycle = 1.5 < 1.5 as to cause
Peaking total power peaking to
exceed 2.5.
Whole Core BOL and
BOL and EOC BOC Keff = 1.31 <1.3W CEOC reactivityWhole Core &EOC Keff = 1.05 must be within PWRReactivity >1.00 design limits
Reactivity Coefficients (whole core average reactivity values must be within acceptable
PWR design range
FTCc BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = -1.85 to -1.30 to Typical PWR DesignValues(pcm/fF) -1.7 -1.46
MTCc BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = -1.76 to -0.78 to pical PWR Design
Values
/pF x 104  -2.7 -3.02
IBW BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = 137 to 108 to Typical PWR DesignValues
ppm / % sp 148 96
VC BOC to EOC: BOC to EOC:
units = -8.6 to -0.41B to Typical PWR Design
Bp / %void x 103  -12.1 1.43B  Values
A. Weapon's usability is described in chapter 3
B. Values are for critical moderator boron concentration
C. Values at normal operating temperatures.
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7.8 Conclusions
Plutonium, both WGPu and RGPu, can be used to produce nuclear explosives. One
of the primary means for preventing proliferation is through plutonium safeguards and
security measures. The production of RGPu in current once-through LWR fuel cycles
exceeds consumption, resulting in growing global stockpiles of plutonium, which will strain
these measures. The bulk of this RGPu is in spent fuel but spent fuel radiation barriers will
diminish below IAEA minimum self protecting levels in less than 160 years after discharge
[N-1]. Proliferation experts call for world-wide management of plutonium [B-1, N-1, M-3,
V-l]. One of the key tenets of proposed plutonium management plans is the reduction of
stockpiles to minimum levels consistent with needs. The only way to irrevocably reduce
stockpiles is to destroy the plutonium through fission and transmutation. LWRs dominate the
population of reactors worldwide; thus, the most promising method for effecting large scale
transmutation of plutonium in a timely manner is through burning it in light water reactors.
MOX technology in current light water reactors is sufficient to reduce the risk of
proliferation posed by WGPu to the level of the much larger stockpiles of RGPu.
Consequently there is no need to develop a new technology to disposition WGPu. However,
current LWR WGPu disposition options are limited in their ability to destroy plutonium
because they use fertile MOX fuel. The PC-MHR has nearly double the WGPu destruction
capabilities of the MOX options because it uses a non-uranium fuel. However, the PC-MHR
option also requires new reactor technology and it does not eliminate plutonium. The RGPu
mission will require the disposal of 60-70 MTs/year in order to halt the growth of stockpiles.
A large number of new reactors would be required; thus, reliance on new reactor technology
to complete the RGPu mission is impractical. Non-uranium fuel could provide the ability to
eliminate plutonium with current reactors. Plutonium disposition products in which the
plutonium has been substantially eliminated with a non-uranium fuel provide significant and
quantifiable additional barriers to proliferation.
264
Development of no-uranium fuels for PWR use will require a large research and
development effort. Based on material considerations, stabilized zirconia, alumina or TRISO
particle inert fuel matrices are promising candidates for the start of the development effort.
The plutonium-erbium oxide-inert-matrix composition, designated here as Oxide5, is
recommended. Using the periphery of the PWR allows the non-uranium fuel to be run at low
power which is necessary during the destruction of residual plutonium. Oxide5 used in the
periphery of a PWR will destroy essentially 100% of the 239pu and > 90% of the total
plutonium loaded in the fuel in two 440 EFPD core burnup cycles. The resultant core
average and cycle properties are comparable to nominal PWR core parameters. Thus, the
proposed cycle is feasible. The plutonium throughput of such a cycle can result in no net
production of plutonium in PWRs.
7.9 Future Work.
This thesis was a scoping and feasibility study which can serve as a starting point for
a much larger fuel development and qualification program that must be undertaken if non-
uranium fuels are to be used to eliminate plutonium in PWRs. As such there is a great deal
of refinement that must be accomplished to turn the proposed fuel and fuel cycle into a
working cycle.
The primary area of work outstanding is material development and testing of non-
uranium matrices. The work done here was purely a paper study. Non-uranium fuels must be
fabricated and irradiated. Fabrication processes must be developed and scaled to production
levels. In addition, the recommended Oxide5 fuel composition represents one possible
solution rather than a complete list of all possible solutions. Thus, more scoping studies
looking at different fuel and poison combinations are possible. More precise calculation of
core average parameters using NRC licensing level codes will also be required. In particular,
a specific reactor should be selected and a realistic sequence of future core loading cycles
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examined to effect transition to and operation of an "equilibrium cycle". In addition, the the
chanhe in core vessle fluence due to this cycle will need ot be quantified. Finally, this study
has demonstrated that the periphery of the core can be used to destroy plutonium nuclides at
low powers. Thus, it may be possible to extend this technique to the destruction of other
undesirable highly radiotoxic actinides such as Np, Am and Cm which are limiting nuclides
for high level waste repository design [S-6].
The crude metrics and weighting functions used to evaluate the WGPu glass
log, spent MOX fuel and spent non-uranium fuelin chapter 3 are probably adequate for
selecting between an array of widely different options as in the given examples. More
refined versions are probably called for if one is to discriminate within a given catergory of
options (such as between different non-U fuel types). This could well be a profitable subject
for futrure work, in which case attention is recommended to evaluation of more appropriate
(e.g. non-linear) scoring functions, and to better metrics for dissolution.
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Appendix A Nomenclature
Al 20 3
BP
CANDU
CE
CS
D
Dy
EOC
Er
Eu
FMEF
FPF
FSU
FTC
Gd
GWd/MT -
Ho
High Level -
Fission Product
Waste
IBW
IFBA
IAEA
IMTC
INF
Kinf
Keff
LWR -
Alumina
Burnable Poison
Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor
Combustion Engineering
Containment and Surveillance
Chemical Distribution Coefficient
Dysprosium
End of Fuel Depletion Cycle
Erbium
Europium
Fuel Manufacturing and Evaluation Facility (located in Hanford, WA.)
Fuel Processing Facility (located in Idaho Falls, ID)
Former Soviet Union
Fuel Temperature Reactivity Coefficient or Doppler Coefficient
Gadolinium
Gigawatt-days/Metric Ton of Heavy Metal
Holmium
HLW
Inverse Boron Worth
Integrated Fuel Burnable Absobers
International Atomic Energy Agency
Isothermal Moderator Temperature Coefficient
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty
Infinite Medium Multiplication Constant
Effective Multiplication Constant
Light Water Reactor
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MOI - Modified ORIGEN Input file
MPO - MOCUP mcnpPRO Output File
MHR - Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor
MWd/MTHM - Mega-Watt-Days per Metric Ton of Heavy Metal
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OCF - MOCUP Origen Composition Files
PC-MHR - Plutonium Consumption - Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (by
General Atomics)
PWR - Pressurized Water Reactor
Pu - Plutonium
RE - Rare Earth Poisons
RGPu - Reactor Grade Plutonium
Rho - Reactivity
SiC - Silicon Carbide
Sm Samarium
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Th - Thorium
US - United States
VC - Void Coefficient
W - Tungsten
WF Weight Function
WNF WGPu Non-Uranium Fuel
WNP1 Washington Nuclear Project Unit #1
WNP2 Washington Nuclear Project Unit #2
WNP3 Washington Nuclear Project Unit #3
w% weight percent
Zr0 2 Zirconia
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Appendix B Detailed Metric Values and Scoring Calculations
Introduction
This appendix is provided to give a clear example of the calculations supporting the
comparison of the inherent proliferation resistance barriers of HLW spiked vitrified logs,
spent WGPu MOX fuel and spent WGPu non-uranium fuel (WNF) disposition products.
Detailed calculations are presented only for the WNF disposition product. The calculations
for the other two disposition products are similar. Chapter 5 details the computer code
models and methods used to derive the data from which the metric values are calculated.
B.1 WGPu Non-Uranium Fuel (WNF) Raw Metric Values. Table B.1 lists a summary of the
metrics proposed to evaluate the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium disposition
products.
The first metric value is fissile density. The fissile density is derived from the WNF
discharge composition in grams and the volume of the MCNP pin cell model used for
depletion calculations. The WNF pin cell contains 1.026 x 10-3 grams of 23 9Pu and
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B.1nherentItonium Disposition Form Barrier Metrics. I
Criteria Type of Units/ScaleMeasurement
Fissile Density Quantitative kg fissile Pu/m3
host
Dissolution Quantitative gims/liter
Separation Quantitative dimensionless
Radiation Barrier Quantitative years
Pluton.um nWteavons.. sab y
Isotopic Quantitative gms fissile/gm Pu
Critical Mass Quantitative kg Pu
Neutron Emission Quantitative n/sec-kg Pu
Decay Heat Quantitative w/kgm Pu
1. The separation metric is calculated by ratioing separation distribution
coefficients if the data can be found. Alternately it is calculated as an ionic
radius ratio as described in section 3.2.3.
~2~L·I~··~-~··II~·IL111111
I I
1.961 x 10-2 grams of 241Pu. The pin cell is 13.3116 cm3 resulting in a fissile density of 1.55
Kgs of fissile Pu/m 3 of disposition product.
The dissolution metric value is the solubility of Zr(NO3) 2 listed in Lange's chemistry
handbook as 211 grams/100 grams of H20 at 40 oC [L-2]. Also listed in the same table is the
solubility of UO2(N0 3)2 as 167 grams/100 grams of H20. Thus, the two metric values are
directly comparable and used for metric scoring without further manipulation. Plutonium is
removed from borosilicate glass by leaching rather than dissolution. Thus, the dissolution
metric is not applicable to the borosilicate glass log. A neutral value will be assigned in the
metric scoring step. Were it available, data on the rate of dissolution or leaching for all the
forms considered might be a more appropriate choice.
The separation metric values are derived from reported distribution coefficients for
relevant metal ions dispersed between phases of tri-butylphosphate in an organic solvent and
aqueous nitric acid [B-3]. The coefficients are dimensionless measures of moles of an ion in
the organic phase per moles of the same ion in the aqueous phase. The distribution
coefficients are normalized to that of plutonium. The normalized value indicates how the ion
will be distributed relative to plutonium, and hence, how easily separable it is. If the ratio of
the ion distribution coefficient to that of plutonium is relatively small, the ions will be easily
separable. Table B.2 lists the relevant raw and normalized coefficients. Pu and U clearly
separate into the organic phase leaving the other elements in the aqueous phase. The relative
number of ions will also influence the absolute distribution of the metals. An ion with a
small distribution coefficient may still wind up in the organic phase if it is present in
significant enough quantities. This will force multiple separation stages to effect a given
separation. Therefore, the metric value is the sum of the products of the normalized
distribution coefficients and the component mole ratio ( i.e. the number of moles of each non-
plutonium metal in the dispositon form divided by the number of moles of plutonium). Mole
ratios for spent WNF are calculated directly from final molar composition data listed in an
ORIGEN depletion code output table. The HLW vitrified glass log form is designed with 20
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w% fission products. The separation metric for MOX was dominated by uranium because of
both its large normalized distribution coefficient and the large uranium content in MOX.
Table B.2 shows the WNF separation metrics calculation. Uranium is not part of the WNF,
however, the values for uranium are included in table B.2 to show why the MOX separation
coefficient is so large relative to the vitrified log or WNF.
,_ Table B.2 Separation Metric Calculation
Type Significance/ Mole Distribution Normalized Product
of Representative of Ratio Coefficient Distribution (Mol x
Ion Coefficient Norm)
Pu Plutonium 1.0 18.5 1.0 N/A*
Zr Matrix Constituent 63.1 0.09 0.0049 0.34
Rare Earths Fission Products 24.0 0.022 0.0012 0.029
MOX fuelU 0.00 33 1.78 0.00
constituent
* Not Applicable WNF Separation Matrix Value 0.37
The next metric is the radiation barrier. The radiation barrier over the time scales of interest
here are set by the fission products. Thus, it is assumed that spent LEU, WGPu MOX and
WNF all have similar radiation barriers. Short lived fission products are essentially gone 15
years after discharge. Since the average half life of long-lived fission products is 30 years,
the radiation emissions of spent fuel decrease by 50% every 30 years. Assuming a 2000
rem/hr at 1 meter barrier remains 15 years after discharge, the radiation barrier is 125 rem/hr
at 135 years and 62.5 rem/hr at 165 years after discharge [N-l]. Therefore, we conservatively
assume that the barrier of all three spent fuels will be below 100 rem/hr by 160 years after
discharge. The glass log is designed to start out with a 2,000 rem/hr @ Im barrier; thus, its
barrier will last 15 years less than spent fuel barriers. The metric value is the number of years
for the radioactive barrier to decay to the 100 rem/hr at 1 meter threshold.
The first weapons usability barrier metric is the isotopic measure of percentage of
fissile plutonium isotopes discharged in the WNF. WNF discharge isotopics w%s are 1.54,
0.51, 18.1, 9.66 and 70.2 for 238, 239, 240, 241, and 242 Pu, respectively. Consequently, the
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isotopic metric value is (9.66 + 0.51) = 10.17 %. The critical mass of the plutonium mix was
determined using an MCNP model of a bare plutonium metal sphere of the WNF discharge
isotopic composition and a density of 19.8 gm/cm3. The radius of the sphere was adjusted
through several iterations to reach an effective multiplication constant (Keff) of 1.00. At a
radius of 8.35 cm, the WNF spent plutonium has a metal sphere MCNP Keff of 1.00233 +
0.00600. This equates to a plutonium mass of 48.28 kgs.
The neutron emission and decay heat rate were calculated the same way. Each
isotope of plutonium has an associated neutron emission and decay heat rate as indicated in
table B.3 (values are taken from table 1.1). Individual decay heat and neutron emission rate
contributions to total values were calculated for each isotope based on their weight fraction of
total plutonium. Thus, the neutron emission and decay metric values for WNF were 5.21 x
106 neutrons/sec-kg and 10.3 Kw/ton respectively.
Discharge Isotopi Neutron Emisslo Neutron Emisslor Deca Heat Deca Heat
te weight fraction (neutrons/sec-k oi u n kWton) Contribution
1.54E-02 2.60E+06 4.00E+04 5.60E+02 8.62E+00
239Pu5.00E-03 2.20E+01 1.10E-01 1.90E+00 9.50E-03
240Pu 1.81E-01 9.10E+05 1.65E+05 6.80E+00 1.23E+00
241 Pu 9.66E-02 4.90E+01 4.73E+00 4.20E+00 4.06E-01
242Pu 7.02E-01 1.70E+06 1.19E+06 1.00E-01 7.02E-02
Total: 5.21E+06 I Total: 1.03E+01
Table B.4 lists the plutonium isotopics for the other two disposition products and spent LEU:
WGPu 
spent MOX 
and glass log.
Table BA S
p
t ne LEU. S
p
t ne MOX 
and 
Borosilicate 
Glass 
Lo
g
otosI
p
sci
272
Isotope Spent LEU Spent WGPu MOX Borosilicate Glass Log
(from table 1.1) (Westinghouse PDR 1400) (WGPu isotopics)
38u 1.3 2.00 0.012
3p 60.30 54.00 93.80
_ _u f24.30 22.70 5.80241pu 8.30 15.10 0.23
2 2Pu 5.00 6.20 0.22
--~-~~~--- --
I
Table B.5 summarizes all the WNF metric values, as well as for the borosilicate glass log and
the WGPu MOX spent fuel.
STable B Ra* Metric Values
Metric (units Spent LEU HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-
in table B. 1) Log MOX U Fuel
Product Matrix Barriers
Fissile 158 18.34 97.48 1.55
Density
Dissolution 167 not applicable 167 211
Separation 40 0.12 40 0.37
Radiation 160 145 160 160 a
Barrier
Plutonium Weapons Usability
Isotopic 68.6 94.5% 69.1% 10.2%
Critical Mass 15.4 12.0 16.6 48.3
Neutron 3.3 x 105 5.3 x 104 4.4 x 105 5.21 x 106
Emission
Decay Heat 10.3 2.3 14.4 10.3
B. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
B.2 Conversion of Metric Values into Metric Score. The next step in the evaluation process
is to convert the metric values into metric scores via metric scoring functions. Since spent
fuel is defined as the minimum performance standard, spent fuel scores zero for all metrics.
The slope of the linear scoring functions are derived by taking the inverse of the range from 0 to
1 or 1 to zero. All functions are of the form shown in figure B. 1.
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Maximum
Value
Spent Fuel
Value
Minimum
Value
Metric Score
Figure B.1 Example Metric Scoring Function
All the disposition products have a lower fissile density than spent LEU resulting in
only positive values. The 1.55 non-uranium value is the best and so defines the upper bound of
the range and equates to a 1.00 score. The difference between LEU spent fuel and non-uranium
fissile densities is 156.45 Kg/m 3. Taking the inverse produces a linear slope of 6.4 x 10-3 score
units/unit difference in density of the option form and spent fuel. Thus, the MOX score is
[(158.0 - 97.5) x (6.4 x 10- )] = 0.387. The score for the vitrified log is similarly calculated
[(158.0 - 18.4) x (6.4 x 10-3 )] = 0.893. All of the options perform better than spent LEU,
hence, all fissile density scores are greater than 0. Figure B.2 shows the associated scoring
metric.
WNR
1.55
LEU
158
KL fissile
= 6.4 x 10"
Metric Score
Figure B.2 Fissile Density Scoring Function
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The dissolution metric scoring function range from 0 to 1 and 0 to -1 are based on the
spent fuel metric value thus defining boundary values of 0 and 334 gm of matrix
constituent/liter of H20 on either end of the ordinate axis. Since a lower solubility is preferable,
a -1 metric score equates to the higher solubility of 334 gm of matrix constituent/liter of H20.
This metric value range produces a linear scoring function slope of 6.0 x 10-3 score
units/relative difference in solubility as shown in figure B.3. Since the matrix of spent fuel and
LEU is the same, the solubility difference is zero and so MOX scores zero. The 211 gm
Zr(N0 3)2/liter of H20 solubility of a zirconia matrix is larger than that for a UO2 matrix . The
score is calculated by: [6.0e-3*(167-211)] = - 0.264. Note that selection of the range was
somewhat arbitrary and selection of a different range would alter the function slope, and hence,
produce a different WNF score. Plutonium is removed from borosilicate glass by leaching
rather than dissolution. Hence, the glass log is assigned a neutral spent fuel value of zero.
Figure B.3 shows the associated scoring metric.
91 - T VT T
U X LEU
0
LEU
167
liter
2 x LEU
334
6 x 10
Metric Score
Figure B.3 Dissolution Scoring Function
The 2.5 x 10.2 score units/unit difference slope in the separation metric value is defined
by assigning a -1 score to the 0.12 low vitrified log value; thus the log receives a score of -1.
The WNF does not fair much better with a score [2.5 x 10.2 *( 0.368 - 40)] = - 0.99. Both the
non-uranium zirconia fuel and the vitrified log have significantly lower separation scores than
MOX as a result of their lack of significant quantities of uranium. Figure B.4 shows the
associated scoring metric.
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LEU
40
Separation
Log
0.12
= 2.5 x 10'2
Metric Score
Figure B.4 Separation Scoring Function
There is little difference in radiation barrier metric values. The +1 score is defined as
150% of the spent fuel radiation barrier or 240 years. Likewise, the -1 score is equated to 80
years for an equivalent slope of 1.25 x 102. As described above, MOX, LEU and non-uranium
fuel are assumed to all have approximately the same radiation barrier resulting in metric scores
of 0.00 for all three. The vitrified log's radiation barrier metric value is 15 years less and so
earns a slightly negative score: [1.25 x 10-2 * (145 - 160)] = - 0.188. Figure B.5 shows the
associated scoring metric.
2.0 x
LEU c I.. s n w n-2-v
LEU
160
Years
Log
145
0.5 x
LEU
Metric Score
Figure B.5 Radiation Scoring Function
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1.43 xuJ IV
The isotopic scores are calculated with two different scoring function slopes. The 0 to
1 abscissa score range is defined by the 68.6% spent LEU fuel value, at 0, and non-uranium fuel
value of 10.17 % yielding a 1.0 value for WNF. The 0 to -1 ordinate range is limited by a
maximum of 100% fissile plutonium. Thus, there are two different slopes: 3.2 x 10.2 from 0 to
-1 and 1.71 x 10"2 from 0 to 1. The MOX score is [(68.6 - 69.1)* 3.18 x 10-2] = -0.016 and the
glass log score is [(68.6 - 94.5)* 3.18 x 10ff2] = -0.824. Figure B.6 shows the associated scoring
metric.
WNF
10.11
LEU
68.6
% Fissile
Log
94.5
Physical
limit
1tnn
= 1.71 x 10"
Slope = 3.2 x 10' 2
Metric Score
Figure B.6 Isotopic Scoring Function
Similarly, the critical mass slope from -1 to 0 is limited by a zero critical mass
constraint which produces a slope of 6.5 x 10-2. The positive score slope, from 0 to 1, is defined
by the 48 kg non-uranium fuel critical mass for a slope of 3.0 x 10-2. The resultant Log score is
[(12.0 - 15.4)* 6.5 x 10-2] = -0.22 and the MOX score is [(16.6 - 15.4)* 3.0 x 10-2] = 0.036.
Figure B.7 shows the associated scoring metric.
WNF
Ai32ei 2a .1
LEU
15.4
Log
12.0
Physical
limit
e= 3.UXI -
Slope = 6.5 x 10.2
U Metric Score
Figure B.7 Critical Mass Scoring Function
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On a log scale, the range of metric values for neutron emissions results in a slope equal
to [1/(WNF - LEU)] = 8.3 x 10-' defined by the log(5.21 x 106) = 6.72 WNF values. If the
same slope is maintained for the 0 to -1 range, the low limit becomes 5.52-(6.72-5.52) = 4.27.
Thus, the log score is a -1 and the MOX score is [(5.64-5.52)* 8.3 x 101] = 0.10. Figure B.8
shows the associated scoring metric.
WNF
j1n .... R- 1 v li
Metric Score
Figure B.8 Neutron Emission Scoring Function
Finally, the decay heat scoring function ordinate range is defined by the low value of the
vitrified log decay heat generation, producing a uniform slope for 0 to -1 and 0 to 1 of 0.125
score units/watt. MOX earns a score of [(14.4 - 10.3)*0.125] = 0.513, the log earns -1 and
WNF earns 0.00.
MOX
1AA
LEU
10.3
(Kw/ton)
Log
2.3
lS -- 0= 1915)
Metric Score
Figure B.9 Decay Heat Scoring Function
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Table B.6 Summarizes all the metric scores.
1 111 1 II I.1
Metric Spent LEU HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu
Log MOX Non-U Fuel
Dismti' Product MatrixBarriers
Fissile Density 0.00 0.89 0.39 1.00
Dissolution 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.26
Separation 0.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.99
Radiation 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00
Barrier
Plutonium Weapons Usability
Isotopic 0.00 -0.82 -0.02 1.00
Critical Mass 0.00 -0.22 0.04 1.00
Neutron 0.00 -1.00 0.10 1.00
Emission
Decay Heat 0.00 -1.00 0.51 0.00
B. The non-uranium radiation barrier is assumed to be the same as MOX spent fuel.
B.3 Barrier Type and Overall Scoring Results. Individual metric values and scores are
derived above; two steps remain to determine the final ranking of the relative inherent
proliferation resistance of the three disposition products. First the proliferation score of the
disposition product matrix and plutonium weapons usability barriers types must be
determined. Then the options must be ranked in terms of their overall proliferation
resistance.
Barrier type scores are the sum of the product of the associated individual metric
contributions. The contributions are determined by weighting the importance of each metric
in determining the strength of the associated barrier. It is recognized that how the metrics are
weighted is subject to great debate. Weighting of the metrics is heavily dependent on the
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perspective of the decision maker and many different valid solutions can result. The
viewpoint chosen here is to minimize a sub-national or terrorist threat. The weight functions
(WF) and contribution of each metric, as assigned by the author, are listed in table B.7 & B.8.
The WFs sum to 100% so that the product matrix and plutonium weapons usability barrier
types both have an equal total weight of 1. Table B.7 explicitly calculates the barrier level
scores for WNF and table B.8 provide the resultant barrier scores for all three disposition
products.
L I J. I
WF Metric Score Product Score
Disposition Product Matrix Barriers
Fissile Density 0.3 1.00 0.30
Dissolution 0.1 -0.26 -0.026
Separation 0.1 -0.99 -0.10
Radiation 0.5 0.00 0.00
Barrier
Matrix Barrier Score 0.18
Plutonium WeaoU_
Isotopic 0.4 1.00 0.40
Critical Mass 0.4 1.00 0.40
Neutron 0.1 1.00 0.10
Emission
Decay Heat 0.1 0.00 0.00
Usability Barrier Score 0.9
A disposition product which exactly met the spent fuel standard would have an
overall score of 0.00. Table B.9 presents the overall scores and subsequent final ranking of
the disposition products. The overall scores are just the sum of the barrier scores. The
disposition products are then ranked in order of decreasing total score. The top scoring
product is ranked number 1 and is the most inherently proliferation resistant product while
the lowest scoring product is ranked number 3 and is the least inherently proliferation
resistant product.
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I Table B.7 WNF Barrier Type Scores
II I I I I I
WF HLW Glass Spent WGPu WGPu Non-
Log MOX U Fuel
_ _DjiaODall m.....lt~Man 1an:rriers_
Fissile 0.3 0.27 0.12 0.30
Density
Dissolution 0. I1 0.00 0.00 -0.03
Separation 0.1 -0.10 0.00 -0.01
Radiation 0.5 -0.09 0.00 0.00
Barrier
Matrix Barrier Score -0.074 0.12 0.18
______ ... Plutonim WeaponsUsabty
Isotopic 0.4 -0.33 -0.01 0.40
Critical Mass 0.4 -0.09 0.01 0.40
Neutron 0.1 -0.10 0.01 0.10
Emission
Decay•Heat 0.1 -0.10 0.051 0.00
Usability Barrier Score -0.62 0.069 0.90
The crude metrics and weighting functions are probably adequate for selecting
between an array of widely different options as in the given examples. More refined versions
are probably called for if one is to discriminate within a given category of options (such as
between different non-U fuel types). This could well be a profitable subject for future work,
in which case attention is recommended to evaluation of more appropriate (e.g. non-linear)
scoring functions, and to better metrics for dissolution.
Table B.9 Overall Scores and Ranking of Inherent Proliferation
Resistance
HLW Spent WGPu WGPu Non-U Fuel
Glass Log MOX
Matrix Barrier Score 0.07 0.12 0.18
Weapons Usability -0.62 0.07 0.90
Score
Overall Score -0. 55 0.19 1.08
Ranking 3 2 1
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Appendix C Weighting to Determine Core Average Reactivity
Coefficients
Subject to the validity of approximations made in the derivation of the FLARE-type
nodal codes, plus equality of the fast group flux and its adjoint (as confirmed by Mosteller
[M-5] for typical PWR Cores), and neglecting certain leakage related terms, it can be shown
that the neutron yield and reactivity coefficients should be weighted by the fast flux squared
(or equivalently by the product of fast flux and neutron source rate) when aggregating
assembly node values to obtain whole core average values [H-8]. The reuslt is:
ap 3p
*
5Tf - 6,P
(Cl)
From the near constancy of the energy release per fission neutron and fast group migration
area, it also follows that power squared weighting is a useful, fairly accurate alternative [S-5].
An alternative derivation of the power squared weighting scheme from the two group neutron
balance equation follows. Refer to chapter 3 of Reference [D-9] for supporting details.
Beginning with the two group neutron balance equations,
1
-D91V2k + Xaq,1 + , 12 , - - f (v I,(+ vlfA2) = 0 (C2)
-D2V 2( 2 + 1a2d2I1 - F12DI1 = 0 (C3)
and making the one and one-half group approximation:
laa2I 2 -121 (C4)
One can combine Eqs. C2, C3 & C4 and manipulate the results, using the definition of
reactivity, namely:
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a I
(vPf1 ,D + v 2D2)- (la + 2 2)(C5)
(vYf, c, + v f 2 2(2)
To obtain the critical system (k=l) equation:
V M 2 + - )p,=0 . (C6)
where,
D,
M2  ) (C7)
al +122
The fast flux can be eliminated by an energy balance:
q0q=f (C8)
if2Y12C(If I 1 a2
where q = the local power density and K is the energy per fission (i.e. Mev/fission) such that:
q= IC(fI% + If2 )Q'2 . (C9)
a2
Thus, combining C6 and C8:
V2[q(1 - p)]+ M2 -0. (CIO)
Normalizing Eqn. C9 by the total power for an assembly with reactivity pi and power fraction
fi:
V [f,(1- p,)]+ =2 O. (Cll)
and approximating the Laplacian as the difference between the local assemblies' average
value r and assembly i :
f,(1- p+)-f(1-- p,) pifi0.5h)---+ 
- 0 (C12)0.25h2 M2
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where h is defined as the assembly width, fi is the fractional power of assembly i and M is the
migration length. Assuming the assembly is surrounded by core average assemblies with Pr
= ps= 0 and taking the first order terms of a series expansion:
fi = 1+ Opi (c13)
where
1 h
0=1+ (C14)4ýM
One also has:
core i Pi (C15)
i=1
which follows directly from the definition of reactivity. To this point we have merely
reproduced the sequence of equations from chapter 3 of reference [D-9].
Differentiating Eqn. C14 with respect to temperature,
C- fi - + pi --i (C16)
but, relative to core-average power fraction (favg = 1/N) Eqn C12 can be rewritten:
f,= f(1+ pi) (C17)
Substituting Eqn. C16 into Eqn. C15 and manipulating the results leads to:
-= (-fi + 0 fpi) (C18)
For peripheral assemblies pi = pinf - pL, where pL is a leakage reactivity penalty
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(PL ~ 0.12). Finally since,
pi <<1 , (C19)
Eqn. C17 becomes,
C1 fJ (8P1 ) (C20)
Thus, the change in core reactivity due to a change in temperature can be calculated by
summing the contributions of the changes in reactivity of the individual assemblies weighted
by the square of their power. Since the ratio _ is less than one for the peripheral
assemblies considered in this application, using power weighted contributions (i.e. using
L)- instead of ( f) times the pin cell reactivity coefficient) to obtain core averagef f
values overestimates the effect of the peripheral assemblies on core average reactivity
coefficients. Thus, it is more conservative for this application. Using straight number
weighted contributions assumes the ratio f equals 1.0 and that all assemblies contribute
equally to the core average reactivity coefficients. Thus, number weighting produces the
most conservative core average values of the three weighting schemes.
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